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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION 
Paul Samuel son once formulated a list of early prominent American 
economists born after 1860.^ To the list consisting of W. C. Mitchell, 
Allyn Young, H. L. Moore, Frank Knight, Jacob Viner and Henry Schultz 
he added the name of Harry Gunnison Brown. It is improbable that 
Brown's name had a familiar ring for contemporary students. It is, 
however, possible that some student may recall that the library cata­
log card for Irving Fisher's classic work The Purchasing Power of Money 
lists Brown as assisting Fisher in this work. 
Harry Gunnison Brown was roughly of the second generation of 
American economists who followed the pioneering generation which in­
cluded John Bates Clark, E. R. A. Seligman, Frank Taussig, Francis 
Walker, Simon Patten, Richard Ely, Thomas Nixon Carver, Herbert Daven­
port and Irving Fisher, among others. Brown studied under and taught 
with Fisher at Yale until 1915. He and James Harvey Rogers were said to 
2 be Fisher's favorite and ablest students. Brown became a monetarist in 
the tradition of Fisher. Though on several occasions they differed. 
Brown demonstrated enduring respect for his mentor and colleague. 
Another economist, Herbert J. Davenport, was held in particular re­
gard by Brown. He joined Davenport at the University of Missouri for a 
year before Davenport left for Cornell. Davenport's work in refining 
and, at times, defending classical economic doctrine was admired by 
Brown. The discipline at that time struggled with the question of how 
much of the classical thought of the "British School" was to be retained 
2 
as sound. Brown's position in this regard was exemplified by his self-
description as "an economist unemancipated from the classical tradi­
tion." He inferred by this statement that other economists had gone 
too far in their rejection of classical doctrine. Brown, who had read 
J. S. Mill before entering college, would in some regards retain strong 
3 
elements of the classical approach in his writings. 
An element in Brown's thought which would make him practically 
unique among academic economists was his staunch belief in and advocacy 
of the ideas of Henry George. In particular, he would argue throughout 
his life for tax reform along the lines of George when the profession 
tended to dismiss George's thought as utterly fallacious. Most promi­
nent among Brown's areas of specialization was that of taxation and 
especially that of tax incidence. His text, The Economics of Taxation, 
stood for a time as a benchmark for texts on the subject of taxation. 
In his chosen profession. Brown's record was exemplary over five 
decades of teaching at Yale, Missouri, The New School of Social Research, 
Mississippi and Franklin and Marshall. He wrote over one hundred arti­
cles and ten books. He was said to be for many years the dominant in-
4 fluence behind Missouri's School of Business and Public Administration. 
His dedication to teaching has been praised by his students, many of 
whom were to become prominent in economics and related fields. 
Although Brown's concerns were diffuse, I would like to emphasize 
as characteristic of his work the three elements alluded to above. 
Through Fisher's infuence, he was aware of developments which can be 
considered "modern" in the sense of anticipating the direction of 
3 
economics as a field of study. He displayed, if not mathematical 
rigor, a dedication to a clear, logical approach to economic theory as 
well as an appreciation of the value of statistical application to the 
testing of economic theories. Harold Hotel ling once commented that 
5 Brown's logic was mathematical in nature. On the other hand. Brown, 
although by definition a neoclassical economist, tended to retain some 
elements of the classical approach as seen in his acceptance of 
Davenport's work, in his rejection of the claims of the "Psychological 
School" of Frank Fetter and in his later objections to Keynesian 
economics. Characteristic of Brown's work was a consistent attempt to 
relate economic questions to what he termed the "common welfare." That 
he found inspiration in the writings of Henry George was not unusual. 
His steadfastness in his espousal of George's proposed reform in the 
face of the hostility, scepticism and indifference of the profession 
was unusual. As is frequently commented upon, the advance and profusion 
of a discipline in many regards tends to foster the "bureaucratic" phe­
nomenon of "constructive forgetting." Although certainly not without 
merit, this process stands subject to Santayana's famous dictum.^ 
Harry Gunnison Brown's contributions were distinctly positive and 
worthy of recall. Arnold Harberger made this point in the following 
manner: 
. . . Brown was one of a small group of economists of his 
era which included Frank Knight, Irving Fisher, A. C. Pigou 
who really carried the science forward by large steps. For 
decades, their work was neglected as the profession pursued 
one fad after another, but now, as economists have returned, 
more or less, to their mainstream, they are seeing once again 
the brilliance and insight of people like H. G. Brown.7 
4 
Milton Friedman and Kenneth Boulding have commented that they felt that 
O 
Brown's work has been overlooked. Thus, my proposition is to examine 
his work with an even treatment of his efforts always trying to place 
them in the proper historical context and to render evaluatory comments 
where relevant. 
Brown's contributions can best be examined by considering separate­
ly his work in the wide variety of topics which interested him. How­
ever, first, the conclusion of this chapter will present a brief 
biography abstracted largely from obituary and memorial statements. 
Chapter Two is an attempt to set the scene of Brown's earlier years in 
the profession by surveying different views of a key question for Brown 
in economic theory. Chapter Three treats his views on capital and inter­
est theories. Chapter Four combines macroeconomic considerations of 
business cycles, monetary policy and Brown's view of Keynesianism. 
Chapter Five examines his work in taxation excluding the question of 
land value taxation treated in Chapter Six. His early interest in rail­
road rates and public utility pricing questions are dealt with in 
Chapter Seven. Chapter Eight examines another early interest in inter­
national trade and finance. Chapter Nine comments on his professional 
career as an educator and writer of textbooks. The final chapter is an 
attempt to evaluate and classify Brown's thought in economic and politi­
cal spheres. 
g 
Harry Gunnison Brown: A Biography 
Harry Gunnison Brown was born in Troy, New York, on 7 May 1880. 
His father, Milton Peers Brown, was an accountant. His middle name 
5 
derived from his mother's maiden name of Elizabeth H. Gunnison. At 
age four, he was stricken with tuberculosis of the hip which would 
recur and alter his vocational possibilities. After completing high 
school, he worked one year in a factory when the tuberculosis became 
active, forcing him to take a year of bed rest. He took advantage of 
the situation and read extensively, including in his reading works of 
J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer and Henry George. The illness, abetted 
undoubtedly by his intellectual curiosity, led him to enroll at Williams 
College at the turn of the century. He graduated from Williams in 1904 
which he was able to accomplish with the financial aid of a grandfather, 
scholarships, part-time jobs and summer farm work. In 1936, Williams 
awarded him an honorary L.H.D. 
Brown next attended Ohio State University in 1905-1906 where he 
coached debating teams, an activity he had pursued as an undergraduate. 
He entered Yale University the following year and completed his Ph.D. 
in economics in 1909. His dissertation under Irving Fisher's super­
vision was titled Some Phases of Railroad Combination. His earliest 
published articles date from 1907. Faculty members present at Yale 
mentioned by Brown other than Fisher were Clive Day, H. C. Emery and 
Fred Fairchild. Although no longer teaching economics courses, William 
Graham Sumner had been an early influence on Yale's teaching of politi­
cal economy. Also, the acting president of Yale, Arthur Twining Hadley, 
had an active interest in economic questions. 
Upon completion of his degree. Brown joined the faculty at Yale 
where he taught as an instructor until 1915. In this period, he 
6 
assisted Fisher in The Purchasing Power of Money and began his own 
publishing career with Macmillan and Company. It has been reported 
that he solidified his interest in Henry George and became an advocate 
of land value taxation before leaving Yale.^^ 
Brown became an assistant professor at the University of Missouri 
in 1915. The Economics Department at Missouri was then headed by 
Herbert J. Davenport and counted Thorstein Veblen as a member. 
Missouri's economics faculty had then the reputation of being one of 
the strongest in the country.Davenport resigned in 1915, but the 
department retained a fine reputation under Brown's chairmanship as 
well as a close relationship with Yale. He became a full professor in 
1918 and chaired the department with only brief respites until 1947. 
He also served as acting dean of the School of Business and Public 
Administration during the years 1934-36 and 1942-46. He was made pro­
fessor emeritus in 1950. Brown published nine books and many articles 
in his thirty-five years at Missouri. He served as a member of the 
executive committee of the American Economics Association for the years 
1937-38. He was elected president of the Midwest Economics Association. 
He became a director and member of the editorial board of the American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology. He was a frequent contributor to 
this journal dedicated to interdisciplinary research in the social 
sciences. 
In 1951 on the invitation of Alvin Johnson, Brown taught at the 
New School for Social Research and also at the Institute for Economic 
Inquiry in Chicago. As a visiting professor to the University of 
7 
Mississippi he taught six more years. He then completed his formal 
teaching career at Franklin and Marshall College. While residing in 
Pennsylvania, he and his second wife, Elizabeth Read Brown, were active 
in promoting local tax reform. After his retirement and return to 
Columbia, Missouri, he remained active by writing and lecturing on the 
subject of tax reform and other subjects. When he was ninety-three, 
the Department of Economics at Missouri sponsored a symposium on taxa­
tion and tax reform in his honor in 1973. His death occurred in March 
of 1975. 
Brown was married to his first wife, Fleda Harrison, in 1911. In 
many of his books, he cited her aid as a proof and critical reader. 
She died in 1952. They had three children: Cleone Eisa, Phillips 
Hamlin, and Richmond Flint. He was married to Elizabeth Read Lumley 
in 1953, who collaborated with him in his endeavors from that time on. 
8 
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CHAPTER TWO. LAND AS A FACTOR OF PRODUCTION 
A brief survey of contemporary introductory textbooks in economics 
appears to indicate that the classification of the factors of produc­
tion utilized by the classical political economists has been retained. 
To land, labor and capital, these texts occasionally add entrepreneur-
ship. The returns to these factors: rent, wages and interest (as well 
as profit), are explained in rough accordance to usage of over one 
hundred years. However, when more advanced texts in microeconomic 
theory are examined, the accordance disappears. 
In the March 1928 issue of the American Economic Review, Clark 
Warburton examined prominent textbooks of the time, comparing and con­
trasting the economic terminology employed to describe the factors of 
production and the distributive shares. Taking the terminology used 
by John Stuart Mill as a model, Warburton found wide divergences in the 
usage of the terms. He noted a tendency to retain the tripartite group­
ing of the factors while recognizing that it was both vague and mis­
leading.^ One of the inherent problems which accounted for the wide 
differences in approach was that there were differing views of capital 
and interest. Another was the question of the relationship of land to 
capital. Though the questions are clearly interrelated, I will discuss 
below the narrower question in the following manner. Is land an inde­
pendent factor of production? Should the terminological distinction 
between land and capital be retained for analytical purposes? Is the 
distinction important for welfare considerations? 
10 
The position of land in theories of value and distribution had 
been debated for many years prior to Brown's entrance into economic 
studies. The questions above had generated an interesting distribu­
tion of opinion among the political economists that preceded Brown as 
well as among his contemporaries. For Brown, these questions and their 
various answers constituted an important element in his thought and 
work. For this reason, I will survey this distribution beginning, 
arbitrarily, with Alfred Marshall and concluding with Brown's American 
colleagues. In reviewing these views, I will attempt to point out 
relevant tendencies in the arguments without critiquing individual 
positions. 
Marshall's somewhat equivocal position is familiar. His state­
ment that the rent of land is the "leading species of a large genus," 
2 breaks away from Ricardo's thought. Yet, he modified this statement 
with; "though, indeed, it has peculiarities of its own which are vital 
3 from the point of theory as well as practice." In the same article, 
he said: "And even there in a new country land must be regarded as a 
4 thing by itself from the ethical point of view." Marshall's views on 
land and rent were challenged by several economists, some of whom will 
be noted later. Edgeworth followed Marshall's lead and viewed land 
5 
as a form of capital to the individual, but not to society. Edwin 
Cannan traced the usage of the three "requisites of production" in 
English political economy in his Theories of Production and Distribu­
tion. Cannan argued that by 1848 the triad "was not quite firmly 
established."^ He identified the origin of the terminology with Adam 
11 
Smith, but noted that Smith's successors varied considerably in their 
approaches. James Mill, for example, identified only labor and capital 
as "requisites." Later, in his A Review of Economic Theory, Cannan 
maintained that the attempt to distinguish land from other forms of 
property was futile.^ 
Knut Wicksell discussed the question of whether land should be in­
cluded with capital. He concluded that the tripartite division of the 
O 
factors was justifiable. In his discussion of the concept of capital, 
he made an argument which Brown would later hark to in debates concern­
ing capital. Wicksell approved of Henry Seager's definition of capital 
as the produced means of further production. This, for Wicksell, dis­
tinguished capital from land and labor a priori as they are not "pro­
duced" in the same sense as is capital. Furthermore, interest he 
viewed as an organic growth out of capital in contrast to wages and 
rent; although rent may be expressed as a percentage, like interest, 
g  
this was "something derivative and secondary." 
In a similar manner, Gustav Cassel defended the traditional classi­
fication. He noted the assertion that the classification was due to 
particular social conditions in the England wherein the classical theory 
evolved, but stated that "this classification is without doubt in com­
plete accord with the requirements of a theory of pricing, and that its 
place in theoretical economics is fully justified.Cassel dis­
tinguished between natural and "produced" land, and argued that the 
price of the former is a secondary result of the pricing process, in 
that rent is capitalized with respect to the current rate of interest. 
12 
Stigler, in discussing the theorists of the Austrian school, noted 
that only Boehm-Bawerk trenchantly defended the traditional classifica­
tion of land as an independent factor.Although Boehm-Bawerk saw 
justification for including land with capital as "acquisitive instru­
ments," he maintained that, on the balance, it was preferable to retain 
the distinction. He argued that land's distinguishing factors included: 
immobility, fixity of supply, a difference in origin as well as 
12 
societal implications. On terminological grounds, he noted that the 
distinction accords roughly with common usage and the proposal to lump 
it with capital would leave us without a convenient term for the pro-
13 duced means of "acquisition." 
Menger and Wiesner along with Wicksteed, in contrast, rejected the 
tripartite classification. All three noted peculiarities of land, but 
none viewed land per se as fixed in supply.More significantly, 
Menger's assumed static case made irrelevant the distinction, as all 
"factors" are fixed. Thus, for purposes of analysis land was treated 
as capital. 
In the Walrasian system, all factors or resources are fixed or 
given such that the supposed unique attribute of land is assumed for all 
factors.Walras did find important the aspect of "extension" with 
respect to land, in that it could neither be produced nor destroyed, 
but land played at most a minor role in his analysis of production. 
Pareto's position was similar in that he argued "land capital" had no 
precedence over other capital.He did, however, concede that dis­
tinguishing land from capital was of possible political importance. 
13 
Early American writers on political economy had reacted negative­
ly to Ricardo's theory of rent. Frank Fetter commented in the intro­
duction to J. R. Turner's The Ricardian Rent Theory in Early American 
Economics: "They denied with almost as close approach to unanimity, 
the 'orthodox' contrast between land and capital in the sense of arti­
ficial agents.Henry Carey and Francis Bowen argued that land was 
capital and Ricardo's theory was formulated with respect to England's 
18 
"peculiar social conditions." Arthur L. Perry who taught at Williams 
maintained that all land value was due to human effort with only minor 
exceptions (unusual fertility or location).In contrast, Francis 
Walker followed the classical treatment of land as a distinct agent in 
20 production. However, the influential Simon N. Patten argued that 
the social imperatives no longer applied so that incomes should no 
21 longer be separated out as in the classical construct. 
Around the turn of the century, American political economists 
were heterodox in their approaches to economic theory. Several had 
22 
studied in Europe, especially at German universities. Doctoral pro­
grams were developing which permitted a greater specialization in 
economic theory. Professional journals were established and the publica­
tion of texts in economics expanded rapidly, frequently with "Principles" 
as a title. American scholars were achieving increasing recognition 
in the older centers of study. 
John Bates Clark, who studied at Heidelberg under Karl Knies and 
later taught at Columbia University, is considered by several commen­
tators the first prominent American economic theorist. Clark's 
14 
definition of capital denied land a separate role. He argued that the 
traditional treatment of land was based on its absolute fixity as 
opposed to other factors, as well as the differential nature of its 
23 
return. His analysis fixed all "instruments" or resources and 
illustrated that the distributive shares were alike determined in a 
differential fashion. Three other important theorists corresponding 
to this era were Frank Fetter, Irving Fisher and Herbert J. Davenport. 
Although they debated frequently and at length with one another as well 
as with Clark, they were unified in their rejection of the traditional 
approach. 
The debate on the significance of land in economic theory was en­
livened with the publication of Clark's The Distribution of Wealth in 
1899 and Fetter's articles in the American Economics Association Publi-
24 
cations and the Quarterly Journal of Economics. Economists who 
applied the "traditional" classification seemed driven in their at­
tempts to defend it against the "modern" view. Fetter's arguments were 
more detailed and emphatic than those of previous authors. He chal­
lenged Boehm-Bawerk's reasons for viewing land as separate from capi­
tal. After refuting his arguments one by one, he concluded that 
Boehm-Bawerk was, ironically, subject to the lingering influence of a 
labor theory of value by perceiving land as a gift of nature while 
25 
capital was the result only of labor. Within the same year, he 
attacked Marshall's position by arguing that Marshall had mixed indi­
vidual vs. societal and "static" vs. "dynamic" views in distinguishing 
land from capital.Essentially, Fetter felt that land should be 
15 
considered augmentable under dynamic conditions in a manner commensur­
ate with capital. Furthermore, he argued that a distinction based on 
a societal rather than an individual viewpoint relied upon a "real 
cost" concept of rent. Where Marshall had found the property of ex­
tension (situation) leading to "true rent" even in a "new country," 
Fetter maintained that from a "static" view, no such distinction could 
be made between incomes from a property of a factor and the income of 
the factor itself. Marshall's response in the 1907 edition of Principles 
of Economics was that "extension" was the chief property of land and 
thus justified consideration of "true rent"; he added that other proper-
27 ties as well work to co-determine the composite value of land. 
Fetter's own classificatory system differed radically from previous 
28 
usage. In another article, he stressed the impossibility of a practi­
cal division between land and capital. He stated: 
. . . the notion that it is a simple matter to distinguish 
between the yield of natural agents and that of imrpovements 
is fanciful and confusing. . . . the objective classifica­
tion of land and capital as natural and artificial agents 
is a task that always must transcend the human power of 
discrimination.29 
From another standpoint. Fetter was concerned (as were other economists 
of the time) with the terminological differences extant between aca­
demic and business usage of terms. He pointed out that the distinction 
between land and capital was of little importance to practical business­
men. 
Irving Fisher's definition of capital included land consistently. 
In Elementary Principles of Economics, he pointed out that other 
16 
authors limit the concept of capital, but argued, "Such a limitation, 
however, is not only difficult to make, but cripples the usefulness of 
the concept in economic analysis.Elsewhere, he conceded to the 
importance of land as a special category of capital as well as to the 
31 
significance of land's relative fixity in questions of taxation. 
Herbert J. Davenport, Brown's colleague at Missouri, investigated 
the separation of land from capital in more detail than did Fisher, 
although he agreed in large part with Fisher's view of capital. In the 
preface to Value and Distribution in 1908, he listed the doctrines he 
would eliminate from economic theory. Last on the list was the tri­
partite classification of the productive factors. Denying that a clear 
distinction could be made on technological grounds, he suggested that 
as many factors could be distinguished as were pertinent though they 
32 be myriad. As to the relative fixity or perceived inelasticity of 
the supply of land, Davenport'pointed out that this view involved con­
jecture or prophecy and as such, should not be admissible In rigorous 
33 theory. Although he was convinced on technical grounds that no dis­
tinction was tenable, he did examine the influences behind the tradi­
tion. In commenting on the origins of the distinction, Davenport said: 
"With these spatial qualities of land are more or less closely associ­
ated certain legal, jurisdictional and territorial aspects possessing 
34 great social significance." He indicated that the English common-
law distinction between realty and personalty is parallel to and inter­
related with the traditional division of the factors. For Davenport, 
separating land from capital was valid "a larger social, historical 
17 
35 
and philosophical view" and invalid for competitive analysis. What 
he may have been referring to in the first case was his Veblen-like 
views of "capitalized privilege and prédation" in which he included 
land ownership. 
In an American Economics Association Publication in 1902 titled 
"Rent in Modern Economic Theory," Alvin S. Johnson, one of Clark's stu­
dents, included a long chapter on land as an independent factor in 
production. Johnson began with the proposition that only if land has 
distinct characteristics of true economic significance can rent from 
land be treated as a distinct class of income. He discounted the 
"origins" or "gifts of nature" as inadequate or metaphysical. Where 
Marshall and Commons had found situation or extension as a distinguish­
ing element, Johnson denied that this was substantial enough to make 
the distinction meaningful. The argument that the value of capital 
will tend to equal "cost" while the value of land will exceed its 
"cost" he dismissed as relying upon unreal assumptions with regard to 
the capital market, i.e., perfect competition with perfect knowledge or 
insurance. He further found economic land to be augmentable, but he 
added: "The laws which govern the increase of land are not identical 
37 
with those which cause capital to increase." Thus, ultimately, he 
accepted land as a factor for dynamic analysis of price and income 
movements. 
At least eleven members of the American Economics Association were 
given an opportunity to respond to a paper by Fetter presented at the 
oo 
Association's meeting in 1903. Their response was not only to Fetter's 
18 
position but also, in part, to the well-known views of J. B. Clark on 
the subject. While the responses were largely critical, they did con­
tain concessions to the newer approaches. Thomas Nixon Carver main­
tained that a clear distinction between income from land and other 
incomes existed in the particular sense that "rent does not enter into 
3Q 
cost or into price." He added: "Whereas production would be quite 
as efficient as it now is even if no one were allowed rent as a 
personal income.Carver conceded, however, that for a functional 
view of distribution (rather than a personal view), the distinction 
was unimportant. Carver's remarks were rebutted by Fetter who argued 
that land rent is necessary to maintain the supply of land's productive 
qualities as well as induce their expansion. 
Among the other dissenting discussants were Jacob H. Hollander, 
Richard T. Ely, James E. LeRossignol and W. G. Langworthy Taylor. 
Hollander provided a defense along the lines of Marshall, arguing that 
land (as opposed to capital) would be available for "normal, long-time" 
production only in diminishing efficiency with respect to extensive 
use. Ely objected, in this instance, that Fetter's approach under­
estimated the "inseparable conditions of land." Ely's position in 
later writings emphasized that he viewed land as differing from capital 
in degree only: "Land in any usable shape had normally and regularly 
to be produced.LeRossignol stressed the difference between goods 
which are reproducible and those which are not. Finally, Taylor empha­
sized, in the dynamic view, land's greater inherent scarcity. 
Henry Seager in a review of Clark's The Distribution of Wealth 
19 
commented: 
. . . from the point of view of economic dynamics the fact 
that land is a gift of nature while other instruments are 
themselves the products of human industry attaches to the 
former an interest which the latter are without.42 
Charles Tuttle presented a similar critique of this aspect of Clark's 
book.^^ 
John Commons, a foremost institutionalist, maintained that for 
social and ethical reasons, land should be viewed as distinct from 
capital. He acknowledged that soil is capital but situation per se is 
not, as it neither produces nor is it produced. Land in the sense of 
its situation was for Commons a "social relation." He argued: "If 
there is a difference between patent right and capital, there is a 
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similar difference between land and capital." 
Frank T. Carlton's article, "The Rent Concept, Narrowed and 
Broadened," published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics 1907, 
was illustrative of the strategic retreat taken by many writers in their 
defense of land as a separate factor. Reacting primarily to Clark and 
Johnson, Carlton pointed to the rapid growth of urban lands wherein the 
capital and site values may be more easily distinguished than is the 
case in agriculture. He followed Commons by defining land as only 
that which "furnishes standing room and situation with regard to 
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markets." He proceeded to broaden the concept of rent by including 
special privileges or special relations to markets which cannot be dupli­
cated or physically depreciated. 
Frank Taussig retained the classical division of the factors while 
20 
admitting to the practical difficulty of distinguishing land from capi­
tal; he referred the term "natural capital" to designated land and 
other "natural agents." Making a number of qualifications, he argued 
that there was a broad margin toward which the return to capital would 
tend while no such tendency governed the return to "natural capital. 
For Taussig, truly permanent improvements embodied in land should be 
47 treated as land and their return as rent. 
E. R. A. Seligman closely follows Marshall's approach to the 
classification of factors by alternatively using a two, three or four 
breakdown, whichever was viewed as appropriate. For example, if capi­
tal were viewed as a fund, then land becomes a subcategory. Seligman's 
justification for the separation of land from capital was that he found 
"peculiar consequences" in the law of diminishing returns when applied 
to land.^^ 
Harry Gunnison Brown's position reflected portions of the earlier 
discussions. He accepted the narrower view of the rent concept in 
defining land as "land space," thereby excluding all improvements as­
sociated with land. As did other economists, he included (but without 
great emphasis) mineral and water resources in his concept of land. 
The return to "land space" was thus a situation rent which is very 
similar to Marshall's true or ground rent. Brown's primary defense of 
the continued distinction was based on the nonreproducibility of land 
space as a key property distinguishing it from ordinary goods. He 
admitted that this property was not unique to land space, since works 
of art, genius etc. have a like characteristic. The reproducibility 
21 
of land space was interpreted not only as a physical improbability, 
but also as entailing prohibitively high marginal costs in all but ex-
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ceptional circumstances. Brown attempted to integrate his distinc­
tion between land and capital into the theory of value and distribution. 
His attempt involved establishing that the return to land space was 
only superficially similar to the return to "made capital." The essen­
tial difference in his view rested on the mode of their respective 
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valuations and the belief that capital was a derivative factor. These 
arguments will be elaborated on in the succeeding chapter as they bear 
directly on Brown's part in controversies dealing with capital and 
interest theories. 
When Brown began his academic career, the question of the place of 
land in economic theory was far from resolved. Several more contribu­
tions to the debate were yet to be made, usually in connection with 
discussions of capital theory, methodology or simply terminology. The 
exchanges of Knight and Kaldor may be noted as one example. For Knight: 
Land is capital merely; defined in any realistic way, it 
presents an infinite variety of conditions as to maintenance 
and replacements, and possibilities for increase in supoly, 
as does any other general class of capital instruments.51 
Also: 
. . . The notion that what are called "natural agents" 
are not produced is false and reflects a false conception 
of production.52 
For Kaldor: 
. . . even if the distinction between "permanent" and "non-
permanent" resources or between "original" and "produced" 
is untenable or irrelevant, there is still a distinction 
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to be drawn between "producible" and "non-producible" re­
sources.53 
L. M. Fraser in 1937 commented: 
. . . The truth is that economists have not as a whole 
clearly made up their minds what to mean by "land"—much 
less, how important a part it should play in their exposi­
tions of value theory.54 
Some general trends in the earlier discussions can be discerned. 
Marshallian theory retained the usage of land, but greatly reduced its 
theoretical importance. Marshall's justifications, although more pre­
cise than Ricardo's "original and indestructible powers" were open to 
question. Modes of analysis, especially the general equilibrium 
approaches of Walras and Pareto, facilitated the exclusion of land in 
the sense that their assumptions attributed to any "factor" that 
property which was thought to be representative of land alone. Also, 
the growing concentration on price theory, as reflected in Fisher, 
Davenport and others, found the inclusion of land as a factor redundant 
given their definitions of capital. 
Given the strengths of these variations of neoclassical economics 
as well as emerging statistical studies which indicated that a surpris­
ingly small share of income accrued in the form of rent,^^ it would 
appear that an explanation for the continuing usage of land would be 
in order. One must bear in mind the strength of tradition in economic 
thought. Marshall's thought on the subject "marginalized" land but 
retained it as well. His treatment left open a limited acceptance of 
the views of Ricardo and J. S. Mill. Thus, the followers of Marshall 
tended to carry forward variations of his views. As I have noted 
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previously, many of the justifications for retaining land as an inde­
pendent factor draw implicitly on Marshall. Other prominent theorists 
such as Wicksell and Boehm-Bawerk undoubtedly had a like influence on 
their readers. 
The explanation must be supplemented with socio-political con­
siderations. Political economists of the latter nineteenth century 
were uniformly concerned with social questions relating to land and 
land ownership. This may be seen in reference to several arguments 
mentioned above that presented social or ethical reasons for the reten­
tion of land as a factor. This reasoning, of course, had origin in 
the connection between social class and a particular type of income. 
The connection was surely eroding in most European countries and, per­
haps, was never perceived as strongly in this country. Yet many politi­
cal economists gave currency to the classification of incomes as "earned" 
and "unearned." For them, the rent of land and monopoly profits were 
the prime examples of "unearned" incomes. In addition, toward the end 
of the century, economists became keenly interested in both the practi­
cal and theoretical questions of taxation and tax reform. In this 
respect, the work of John Stuart Mill and Henry George was important 
since most students of economics of the time were likely to have read 
both. In his work. Mill advocated with qualifications greater taxation 
of land as had earlier English reformers. The influence of George (al­
though academic reaction to his theories was largely negative)was 
widespread and profound for his teachings motivated considerable inter-
57 
est in the study of political economy. Of George's ideas at the time 
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of his death only the single tax survived in active academic debate. 
The underlying principles of his proposal gathered wide support among 
economists even if its implementation in its most radical form did not. 
The peculiarities of land so often mentioned by the economists 
cited above also motivated its retention as a concept in economic 
theory when stronger currents of thought found little or no use for it. 
Some of these peculiarities became the focus of special fields of study 
such as land economics, aspects of urban economics and more recently 
resource economics. 
Harry Gunnison Brown in his efforts to emphasize his concept of 
land and integrate it into economic theory would find Increasingly 
fewer colleagues with a like interest. His advocacy of land value 
taxation played a double role in his theoretical defense of land as an 
independent factor. First, if land were to be treated exactly like 
capital, economic arguments for its special taxation would in effect be 
erased. Second, even if land were treated as a sub-category of capi­
tal, unique for some purposes, the effect would be to diminish the 
weight and clarity of the arguments for land value taxation. However, 
in surveying the views of the early neoclassical economics and his 
prominent contemporaries. Brown's position was yet within the bounds 
of a somewhat hazy orthodoxy. 
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CHAPTER THREE. CAPITAL AND INTEREST THEORIES 
In the years of Brown's education, questions on capital and inter­
est were considered to be among the most, if not the most, difficult 
subjects of economic theory. Boehm-Bawerk and Fisher both attested to 
their intricacy. Moreover, numerous debates and exchanges in journals 
attracted wide interest, especially in this country. The longest and 
perhaps best known of these exchanges was between Boehm-Bawerk and 
John Bates Clark concerning (among other points) the concept of capital. 
Boehm-Bawerk's theories had greatly influenced the thinking of American 
economists; his theory of interest was, however, received unevenly. 
Some economists such as Fetter, Patten and Taussig were inclined to 
accept it in part and emphasize Boehm-Bawerk's "time preference" ex­
planation of interest rates. Others such as Seligman and Seager tended 
to reject the theory for explanations of interest rates which empha­
sized the "productivity" of capital along the lines of Clark. Irving 
Fisher's acclaimed publication. The Theory of the Rate of Interest, 
took an intermediate position. In an article in Scientia^ and later 
in his Elementary Principles of Economics, Fisher reiterated his theory 
in simplified form and introduced the term "impatience" to distinguish 
his view from Boehm-Bawerk's "agio" theory, and to replace the term 
"time preference" which he had earlier employed. Fisher saw the term 
2 
"impactience" as expressing the "real basis of interest," as well as 
3 
constituting "a fundamental attribute of human nature." 
In 1912, Henry Seager^ initiated an exchange which ultimately 
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5 involved Fetter and Brown as well as Fisher. Seager attacked Fisher's 
"principles" treatment of capital and interest. Fisher would later 
counter that this was unfair as his more complete statements were ig­
nored. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Seager took issue with 
a definition which incorporated land as opposed to Boehm-Bawerk's 
formulation. Moreover, he felt Fisher, in rejecting Boehm-Bawerk's 
third explanation for interest or the "technical superiority of present 
over future goods," had denied a role to the productivity of capital in 
determining interest rate levels. Therefore, Seager implied that 
Fisher's theory was methodologically incapable of serving as a theory 
of production and distribution. Fisher had, in his first approximation, 
taken income as given but had then relaxed the assumption in his second 
approximation in The Rate of Interest. Fisher also countered that he 
had already given special emphasis to the role of productivity in his 
theory (if not explicitly in his text) and felt that his contribution 
in this regard was the most original and difficult of the undertaking.^ 
Seager went on to criticize Fisher's refutation of productivity-
related theories. Boehm-Bawerk had, along with others, found a petito 
principii fallacy in using the productivity of capital as an explanation 
for interest wherein implicitly an existing interest rate was pre­
supposed in the valuation of capital via the discounting of future in­
come from it. To Fisher's reiteration of this charge, Seager gave a 
somewhat oblique defense. He first charged Fisher with using land as 
representative of capital, thereby obscuring the role of the "expenses" 
of production in the determination of value in exchange. Fisher had 
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used a hypothetical example of an orchard whose physical productivity 
doubled while the value of its products remained unchanged; the return 
or interest would remain approximately the same while the value of the 
orchard would approximately double.^ Seager agreed that in this case 
the interest return would remain the same, but for a different reason. 
Viewing the orchard as consisting of reproducible machines or tools, 
Seager argued that these tools would be multiplied under competitive 
condition so as eventually to eliminate in large part a rise in the 
value of the tools. Yet, the greater returns to the tools would have 
insufficient impact on the capital market to significantly alter inter­
est rates. Seager clearly felt that Fisher had obscured the issue by 
adopting the not-so-easily reproducible orchard for his example. Also, 
inadvertently or not, the orchard example tended to identify productiv­
ity theorists with older discredited theories which attempted to find 
in the productivity of nature a cause for interest. 
Fisher recognized that his first example was insufficient and 
altered the proposition to that of a universal doubling of capital's 
productivity. Briefly he argued: 
It is true that doubling the productivity of the world's 
capital would not be entirely without effect upon the rate 
of interest; but this would not be in the simple ratio sup­
posed. Indeed, an increase in the productivity of capital 
would probably result in a decrease, instead of an increase, 
of the rate of interest.8 
He added that the value of capital would be at least doubled. For Seager, 
this result was unimaginable, and he argued as before that: 
. . . time being allowed for an adjustment to the new 
conditions, the values of the produced means to further 
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production will be brought into conformity to the expense 
of producing them.9 
Thus, for Seager, some large increase in the interest rate, if not a 
doubling, was inevitable. In Fisher's reply to Seager, he expanded 
his argument by considering effects upon the prices of capital's prod­
ucts and the costs of producing capital. He maintained that product 
prices should fall while costs should rise, thereby mitigating a sub­
stantial rise in the return to capital. Further, the ultimate effect 
would be a lowering of the interest rate as the larger incomes forth­
coming to the owners of capital would lower rates of impatience to 
which interest rates must eventually adjust.Seager was unconvinced 
by Fisher's rebuttal. He replied: "He fails to comprehend clearly 
the way in which productivity and time discount operate in the deter­
mination of the current rate of any given time period. 
Brown, then Fisher's colleague at Yale, was similarly unconvinced. 
He published an article in 1913 titled "The Marginal Productivity 
12 Versus the Impatience Theory of Interest." The article was largely 
supportive of Seager's position. His stated position and the attempt 
of the paper was to show; 
. . . that productivity and impatience are coordinate de­
terminants, i.e., that productivity is as direct a deter­
minant as is impatience, and that productivity may be, in 
a modern community, the more important determinant.13 
Brown stated in several instances that he was an earlier adherent of 
"time preference" theories of interest such that Seager's paper may 
have been influential in an uncharacteristic change in opinion by Brown. 
Brown's dissent from Fisher's theory rested on the observation 
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that Fisher failed to admit that productivity had a direct rather than 
an indirect influence on the rate of interest through its effect on 
impatience rates. Brown acknowledged that the productivity of waiting^^ 
in Cassel's terms could affect the individual rates of impatience and 
thus interest rates, but he wished to establish that the productivity 
of waiting could directly influence these rates. Here, he was facing 
the problem with which Boehm-Bawerk as well as others had struggled. 
In addition to this, he would have to meet Fisher's refutation of 
Boehm-Bawerk's arguments. 
Brown began by assuming that "indirect" production could be in­
definitely extended without reducing the reward of marginal waiting 
below ten per cent. He then proceeded to explain how this would influ­
ence both the supply of and demand for present goods. In terms of de­
mand, he argued that any rate of exchange (of present versus future 
goods) below ten per cent will result in an excess demand for present 
goods. To show that this excess demand need not necessarily be due to 
"impatience," he presented the simple case of a person needing a cer­
tain amount of present goods with the options of working at direct pro­
duction to procure them, or borrowing them and undertaking roundabout 
production. The decision, he maintained, would not be based on the 
desire to provide for present goods out of future abundance but that 
of comparing the outcomes of the options. Brown was perhaps drawing 
15 
on Boehm-Bawerk when he stated: "He is comparing two futures, rather 
than a present and a future.Davenport, in a review of Fetter's 
Principles of Economics in 1916, accepted Brown's point as relevant. 
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Davenport said: 
. . . it is, however, not true that interest can emerge 
where present consumables are inadequate for present need, 
or where, through substitution for future purposes, they are 
made less than adequate. The interest contract may present 
nothing more or other than a choice between future incomes, 
no question of present enjoyment of incomes possibly enter­
ing the case.l/ 
Fisher had criticized Boehm-Bawerk's demonstration of the "technical 
superiority of present goods" showing that with the first two grounds 
for explaining interest being absent, 
. . . the only reason anyone would prefer the product of a 
month's labor invested today to the product of a month's 
labor invested next year is that today's investment will 
mature earlier than next year's investment. 
By insisting that a present comparison of options was the relevant 
view. Brown was making a point with respect to the limits of a pure 
preference approach to interest determination, but was not successfully 
defending the "technical superiority of present goods" as an independent 
determinant of the interest rate. Guy Arvidsson suggested years later 
19 
a possible way out for the discussants. 
On the supply side. Brown showed, with the same assumptions, that 
the supply of present goods would be decreased if the rate of exchange 
were anything less than the assumed productivity of "waiting" due to 
the supplier choosing to adopt roundabout methods to attain a greater 
final product. He again argued that "impatience" was not decisive in 
20 this case but that "nature or invention, or more properly both" is 
what gives them the option of receiving more for present effort. As 
to the issue between Fisher and Seager on the hypothetical doubling of 
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productivity, Brown agreed with Seager, so long as the productivity 
increase is defined as the increase in the surplus marginal product of 
indirect over direct production. He conceded, however, to Fisher that 
an increase in wealth could eventually reduce impatience and further 
the extension of indirect production such that a lower marginal 
product of waiting could result. 
Another significant difference in Fisher's and Brown's views was 
Brown's insistence, referred to previously, that capital's value, 
unlike that of land, was not necessarily due only to its expected future 
earnings and a discount rate determined by impatience. He stated; 
We may say that a person's valuation of capital, along 
with the valuations of other persons in a like situation, 
is less the direct result of a previously existing market 
rate of interest, than it is, by affecting his or their 
attitude towards the market, a determinant of the rate of 
interest.21 
Emphasizing the difference between land and capital (that in large land 
has no cost of production). Brown argued that the given surplus obtain­
able from the use of capital will have the effect of fixing not only 
the rate of discount but also the rates of impatience. 
He then altered his assumption to that of a constant marginal 
product of waiting with respect now to any indefinite decrease of round­
about production, and proceeded to show how the demand for and supply 
of present goods would be affected by the superiority of roundabout 
production so as to hold interest rates down to this assumed level. 
Finally, in the article Brown reversed the assumption by taking a 
constant natural rate of impatience invariant with respect to changes in 
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the income stream with the marginal productivity of waiting declining 
as indirect production is extended. In this case, the marginal pro­
ductivity would adjust to the impatience rate via the extension or 
reduction of indirect production. Brown concluded that in the real 
world adjustment would take place in both rates, but that impatience 
was not: 
. . . the fundamental cause of modern interest or even a 
cause through which all other causes must operate, but that 
it is one of two coordinate causes and is also to some ex­
tent a joint consequence, with interest, of the other cause, 
the superiority of indirect production. 
He clearly felt marginal productivity did not only influence the 
demand for present goods and that impatience did not only limit the 
supply of present goods. 
In 1914, Frank Fetter presented an article responding to Brown's 
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article as well as Seager's and the response by Fisher. Fetter's 
well-known position was that of a pure time preference theory of inter­
est and accordingly, he referred to himself as a capitalization theorist. 
In the article, he was particularly concerned with Fisher's partial 
concessions to productivity influences in interest rate determination. 
Moreover, he sought to show that time valuation was a prerequisite to 
the determination of interest rates and that such a valuation did not 
imply a pre-existing money interest rate and that, therefore. Fisher's 
charge of circular reasoning was mistaken. Fetter called Brown's theory 
"eclectic," presumably because it lacked a single unambiguous cause 
for interest. He offered three specific objections. First, he main­
tained that those examples which assumed a rate of productivity begged 
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the question and failed to establish technical productivity as a cause 
of interest. Second, he argued Brown's perspective was oriented to­
ward the enterpriser or middleman and thereby ignored the ultimate 
influences and motives of the consumer. And last, he rejected Brown's 
distinction between land and capital where the cost of production con­
cept was used to support the distinction. 
Brown replied in the next issue of the journal to Fetter's criti­
cisms as well as to Fetter's time-preference or psychological theory of 
interest. He described this theory in the following manner: 
Not only do the time-preference theorists explain the 
value of all capital by the discount process, but they ex­
plain cost-of-production in the same way. The expense of 
hiring labor to construct capital is said to be fixed by 
the discounted value of the future benefits constructed. 
The cost of raw materials and machinery and, further back, 
the wages of labor employed to produce these, likewise de­
pend, directly only upon the far future benefits to be 
yielded.24 
From this description. Brown clearly felt that the "pure" theory was 
unrealistic and, in an elaborate example, tried to show that the cost 
of production of capital must play a role in its valuation along with 
time preference. As in his previous article, he used quantities of 
goods to form his rate of productivity instead of employing value 
terms to avoid the circular reasoning charge. Fetter pointed out in 
a rejoinder that this constituted a present good standard which dis-
25 guised an implied value relation. Fisher later indicated in the 
1930 revision of The Theory of Interest that the example was acceptable 
as one possible case and that Brown's conclusions followed, given his 
conditions.^® However, in Brown's Cursoe-type example he repeated an 
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argument to which both Fetter and Fisher expressed dissent. He posited 
two coexistent methods of producing the same good; one was direct and 
the other roundabout. Fetter saw this as only a temporary possibility 
in that it could occur only in a competitive economy when the rate 
corresponding to the "gain" from the roundabout process was coincident 
with the rate of time preference. Otherwise, one of the two processes 
would be uneconomic. In Fetter's words, "Time preference dominates the 
27 
choice of techniques." Although Fisher rejected this view as too 
narrow in that it ignored at any moment in time "the opportunity of 
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choosing among many income streams," he later faulted Brown for trying 
to prove too much with the example. 
In a 1929 article, "Capital Valuation and the Psychological School," 
Brown made clearer his divergence with current thought on the valuation 
of capital and its relation to the causes of interest: 
. . .  i t  m a y  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
(or the net gain from roundabout production) has a direct 
effect on the interest rate, and not merely an indirect 
effect, goes logically with the idea that cost has a direct 
effect on capital value. On the other hand, the idea that 
capital value is determined only through discounting is 
part and parcel of the idea that the interest rate is af­
fected only through time preference.29 
The "indirect effects" of cost on capital which Brown refers to 
were those of discounted future repair costs and changes in the present 
costs which alter the perceived value of the future services. The 
direct influence which he wished to emphasize was to operate via oppor­
tunity cost on the demand for as well as the supply of capital goods. 
He added to the normal considerations of long-run demand and supply, the 
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possibility of a demander becoming a supplier and vice versa. Follow­
ing Davenport, he defined the cost of production as "the amount of 
other goods which the same effort and sacrifice would produce. 
Thus, he argued that, in this sense, long-run supply of and demand for 
capital depend on the present cost of production and that, therefore, 
the value of capital is influenced directly by its cost of production. 
He illustrated his view in the following example; 
Nowell is a fisherman. His usual catch is $40 worth 
of fish a week. His boat, a necessity of his business, is 
wearing out. He needs a new one very soon. He is a pretty 
good carpenter. He can build himself a satisfactory boat 
in a week's time. Kelleher, a dealer, offers to sell him 
a boat for $100. Nowell and other fishermen similarly situ­
ated refuse to pay such a price. Thus, the demand for 
Kelleher's boats is affected by the opportunity cost to 
Nowell and to others of building their own boats. Nowell 
refuses to pay Kelleher $100.31 
Brown believed that: 
. . .  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m  w e  s h o u l d  o r d i n a r i l y  h a v e  a  v a l u e  f o r  
capital (assuming it to be worth constructing and not yet 
depreciated) which would be the same as its marginal cost 
and also the same as the discounted value of its future 
services. . . . For if capital which has its value directly 
(and not indirectly) controlled by opportunity cost, is able 
to add to production, in its lifetime, goods in excess of 
those which measure its costs (on the opportunity cost basis) 
then its productivity influences the interest rate directly 
and not merely through first affecting the distribution of 
income over time and thereby affecting time preference.^2 
Brown, then, as in the previously cited article, applied his ideas 
to the distinction between land and capital. The value of land apart 
from its improvements, etc. is arrived at solely by discounting prospec­
tive net income at the current rate of interest while the value of 
capital is directly affected by the present costs of production or 
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duplication. Land or land space not practically reproducible earns, 
for Brown, a situation rent best seen as "an absolute amount measured 
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and determined by the surplus over production at the margin." Thus, 
the similarity between interest and rent viewed as a percentage of the 
values of capital and land respectively is only a superficial likeness. 
There were two responses to Brown's article.William W. Hewett 
of the University of Cincinnati accepted Brown's arguments in general 
but wished to expand them by applying Marshall's concept of the short 
and long run, interpreting them as referring respectively to a period 
where a market disturbance has led to a disequilibrium and a period 
where there is a general tendency toward equilibrium. For Hewett, in 
the short run the value of capital tends to equal the discounted 
prospective income and in the long run, the cost of reproducing the 
capital. Hewett's major criticism was that "the option to reproduce 
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capital can be made instantly effective," and thus he suggested that 
Marshall's concept of quasi-rent be utilized to describe the return to 
capital in the short run. The other response was from Edwin Cannan 
which dealt primarily with the arguments Brown had used to separate 
land from capital. Cannan noted that Brown avoided Ricardo's inclu­
sion of fertility as part of land and that situation value "in the use­
ful sense of relative accessibility is altered by human effort every 
37 Brown replied to both comments. He made a partial concession 
to Hewett in admitting that the alternative opportunity of switching 
to the production of a good temporarily in excess demand may well be 
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a practical impossibility for many buyers. However, he maintained that 
as long as the opportunity was available to some, the effect would be 
immediate and tend to reduce the effects of the supposed scarcity 
although the short-run price of capital would tend to exceed that of 
the long-run. Hewett's reply to this was that his perception of the 
extent of the alternatives was much more limited than Brown's. To the 
first of Cannan's points. Brown replied that he had always maintained 
that the value of land due to the maintenance or enhancement of its 
fertility be considered apart from land's situation value as capital. 
Of greater significance, he argued that the situation or site value of 
land may well have been humanly produced, but that this, in all but 
exceptional cases, did not militate against his point. A reasonable 
duplication of a site whose value rests on advantages in transporta­
tion, communication or location with respect to population, etc., is 
a practical consideration only to a mammoth corporation or a collective 
action by some institution. Brown argued that such decision-making 
bodies and the practical context for such decisions were not commonly 
found in the current situation. He did, however, admit to the existence 
of borderline cases, such as the founding of Gary, Indiana. Brown 
found such cases inadequate to support the theory that the cost of 
reproduction or duplication could to any significant degree influence 
land's site value. 
In 1928, Fisher wrote Brown as he was preparing a revised version 
of The Rate of Interest. He indicated in the letter that only he and 
Brown were in agreement as to the essentials of a theory of interest. 
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Fisher also said that he felt that the "productivity" side of his 
theory was an original contribution although he found Brown's references 
in his text to Jevons and Davenport to cast some doubt on this. Fisher 
said of The Rate of Interest: 
. . . (it) is the only serious work of mine the reception 
of which has been a profound disappointment and it is a 
great humiliation now to find the only, other writer who 
agrees doesn't realize itP° 
Fisher went on to request that Brown criticize the manuscript in detail. 
Brown did criticize at least Fisher's statement of the "opportunity 
principle" which Fisher thanked him for in the preface to The Theory of 
39 Interest. Brown made notes in preparation to answer Fisher. In 
them he indicated that he felt their differences to be substantive 
and that he doubted that Fisher would accept his emendations.^^ In a 
chapter titled "Objections Considered," Fisher addressed his continuing 
disagreements with Brown and in particular his 1929 article. Fisher 
41 
reproduced a more detailed version of Brown's example, and then 
stated: 
I accept all of Professor Brown's reasoning and con­
clusion except his application to me. His contention that 
the cost of duplicating existing capital will influence the 
value of capital is perfectly correct, but so is the dis­
count formula.42 
He pointed out that Brown's example was an isolated or nonmarginal case, 
and when "Nowell" made a marginal decision in a "perfect" market, he 
would choose the income stream which maximizes at the market rate of 
interest his present worth. Turning to a brief consideration of the 
cost concept, Fisher alluded to Davenport's view as generally correct. 
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Fisher maintained that future costs with respect to capitalization 
enter on the same footing as does future income, but that past costs 
only influence present valuations indirectly as they affect future 
expected income or cost. This indirect influence of cost would be 
through the limiting of supply which alters the quantity and value of 
future services. 
Brown apparently was never willing to concede these arguments to 
Fisher as he repeated his ideas in several later articles and succeeding 
editions of his textbook. He may have thought that his argument with 
respect to the opportunity cost influence on the demand for capital 
was not adequately addressed by Fisher. Also, one might speculate that 
Brown saw Fisher's identification of "past" costs not to be descriptive 
of what he saw to be "present" opportunity costs. 
In the aftermath of the above exchange, Brown contributed a some­
what obscure comment to the American Economic Review. His stated 
purpose of the comment was to: 
. . . merely show that such an attack as Marshall levels 
against the opportunity cost theory as applied to rent has 
neither less nor more validity against the opportunity cost 
theory as applied to wages or interest.^] 
Although Brown did not mention it, his attention was probably drawn to 
the question by an exchange initiated in the Economic Journal by F. W. 
Ogilvie in the previous year.^'^ Ogilvie had questioned the continued 
service of Marshall's thought on rent. Specifically, Marshall was 
criticized for failing to note that his argument, for the "inexpedi­
ency" of saying that the rent of land does not enter into the price of 
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its product, that it would be similarly inexpedient to say that the 
wages of labor do not enter into the price of what it produces. Brown 
simply expanded upon this point by illustrating that like the no-rent 
margin for land, one could conceive of a "no-wage" margin for labor 
and a "no-interest" margin for capital. Perhaps due to Brown's earlier 
articles, he was charged by R. W. Souter for having suggested that 
those who deny the distinction between land and capital do so on the 
45 basis of the doctrine of opportunity cost. Souter also classified 
Brown as a "repressed Utopian." Souter's interpretation appears to 
rely heavily on imputation and is not substantiated by what Brown 
actually wrote in the comment. 
In 1944, Brown published an article, "An Off-Li ne Switch in the 
Theory of Value and Distribution," wherein he argued that Boehm-Bawerk 
had erred on two counts and misled those who elaborated on his theory. 
First, Brown felt that his concept of direct production involving only 
the "naked fist" was misleading. He proposed an alternative concept 
to distinguish direct from roundabout methods of production: immediacy 
of the end product regardless of the mixture of capital, labor and land 
utilized in the process to be used. Thus, Brown would broaden the 
alternatives of a worker in the sense that his or her minimum offer price 
for his or her labor be set by the augmented opportunities available 
in "direct" production or the production of "present" (immediately con­
sumable or nearly so) goods. Assuming some general degree of possible 
substitution in the production of "present" versus capital goods, he 
maintained that the marginal cost of the production of capital goods 
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was the "present" goods that the factors producing capital might produce 
instead. In this manner then. Brown argued for a direct influence of 
the cost of production on the value of capital as in his earlier writ­
ing. In a 1962 article, Brown noted the current acceptance, if not 
dominance, of Fisherian interest theory and took the occasion to re-
46 iterate his dissent. 
In summarizing Brown's contributions to this area of economic 
thought, especially in the years 1913 to 1931, his influence on Fisher's 
revision of The Theory of Interest would appear to be of the greatest 
significance. Fisher commented in the book that anything new which he 
offered in his revision "was chiefly on the objective side"^^ wherein 
he cites only Brown's text. Economic Science and the Common Welfare, 
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as a "somewhat similar treatment" in a nonmathematical form. 
Gottfried Haberler commented in his review that Fisher was at great 
pains to clarify the role of productivity in interest determination, 
49 but that his explanation still left doubts. The emphasis which 
Brown wished to lend to the role productivity in interest determina­
tion was greater in Fisher's revision, however, it was less than that 
desired by Brown. As noted above. Brown saw productivity as having a 
direct affect on interest rates coordinate with time preference but 
for practical purposes dominating time preference. His disagreements 
with Fisher stem, I believe, from the following considerations. First, 
he was unable, as was' Boehm-Bawerk, to convince Fisher of an inde­
pendent influence of productivity on interest rates. Second, his own 
arguments utilizing the broad opportunity cost concepts of Jevons and 
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Davenport were not accepted by Fisher. Especially his attempt to por­
tray a supply and demand interdependency in the capital market received 
no comment from Fisher or any other critic. Although conceivable, the 
possibility was, and still is, viewed as having a negligible effect, at 
least under competitive conditions. Third, Brown as well as Seager, 
found Fisher's and even more so Fetter's emphasis on time preference 
to be deficient as a realistic explanation for interest rate determina­
tion and capital valuation. This may be due in part to their strong 
assumption of perfect foreknowledge. Subsequent capital theorists such 
as Knight and Hayek would reformulate these questions and find a much 
more persuasive influence of productivity in interest rate determina­
tion. The position taken by Brown in the time period referred to above 
appeared to be representative of a not uncommon attitude, despite in­
adequacies in its presentation, that the role of physical productivity 
was not then being accorded its rightful place in explanations of 
50 interest. A contemporary commentator on the state of economic 
theory, Daniel H. Hausman, pointed out continuing difficulties with 
capital theory in the following manner: 
Economists do not understand the phenomena of capital 
and interest. They do not understand why the rate of inter­
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CHAPTER FOUR. MONETARY ECONOMICS AND A VIEW OF KEYNESIANISM 
As one would anticipate, Harry Gunnison Brown was a strong and 
life-long adherent of the monetary approach of Irving Fisher. He began 
his career when such views were considered orthodox, saw their eclipse 
in the decade of the thirties, and witnessed their revival in part in 
his later years. Joseph Dorfman in The Economic Mind in American 
Civilization characterized Brown as a monetary specialist. This is not 
strictly true since his concentration produced only four articles along 
with the relevant sections of his texts prior to 1940. But the char­
acterization is accurate insofar as he did collaborate with Fisher in 
The Purchasing Power of Money and in later years would write articles 
on macroeconomic issues, some of which were critical of Keynesian views 
Brown also read and commented on the manuscripts of other books by 
Fisher, such as Booms and Depressions. As Dr. Paul Junk noted, in 1935 
Fisher called Brown one of eleven economists in the United States "who 
understood the real significance of money.Milton Friedman has com-
2 
mented favorably on his work in the area of money. W. H. Hutt in his 
The Keynesian Episode ranked Brown with such economists as Wicksell, 
Cannan, Mints, Hayek, Viner, Kemmerer and Benjamin Anderson as leaders 
3 in the pre-Keynesian thought on money. Leiand Yeager and James Dorn 
have recently identified Brown's expression as being in the tradition 
of the "theory of monetary disequilibrium."^ 
Brown's exact role in The Purchasing Power of Money is impossible 
to determine. Fisher felt that Brown's efforts were so extensive that 
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they deserved acknowledgment on the title page. As Fisher stated in 
his preface: 
There are two persons to whom I am more indebted than 
to any others. These are my brother, M. Herbert W. Fisher 
and my colleague, Dr. Harry G. Brown. ... My thanks are 
due. . . to Mr. Brown for his general criticism and sug­
gestions as well as for detailed work throughout. In recog­
nition of Mr. Brown's assistance, I have placed his name on 
the title page.5 
What can clearly be discerned is that Brown took advantage of this ex­
perience and wrote several texts of his own within a few years. 
Brown published three articles on monetary topics while still an 
instructor at Yale; all three were cited by Fisher in The Purchasing 
Power of Money. The first was titled "A Problem in Deferred Payments 
and The Tabular Standard.It considered the problems of price index-
7 8 ing set forth by Correa Walsh and Fisher. Brown explained how the 
stated purpose of the tabular standard (that of insuring ideally that 
contracting parties receive or pay back with interest purchasing power 
over an equivalent amount of goods) was complicated by the type of 
good to be chosen as a standard: capital or consumption goods. Brown 
saw no solution but that of a practical compromise which was to: 
. . . weigh the price change of each kind of good in pro­
portion to neither an existing stock nor to consumption dur­
ing any period, but in proportion to the value of the 
"exchanges" of that kind of goods during the period.^ 
R. A. Jones in a recent article credited Brown with having "convincing­
ly demonstrated that the linking of payments to a price index could 
not generally eliminate all price risk for both the payer and recipi-
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Brown's second article was primarily a description of commercial 
banks' role in financial intermediation, emphasizing the part played 
by banks in interest rate determination.^^ This short article is 
remarkably far-sighted in that he remarks on the efficiency aspects of 
financial intermediation and its contribution to economic growth. In 
addition, Brown noted in 1909 that banks and trusts were beginning to 
pay interest on demand deposits. He reasoned that the convenience 
return to depositors and the competition among banks were not suffi­
cient to attract deposits adequate to meet loan demands. 
The third article, "Typical Commercial Crises Versus a Money 
17 Panic," appeared in the Yale Review in 1910. In it. Brown attempted 
to describe a typical credit cycle which culminated in a speculative 
crisis. The key factor in the cycle was the lagging adjustment of 
nominal interest rates to unanticipated changes in the price level. 
Charles Kindleberger in his Manias, Panics and Crashes would later 
13 
refer to this as the "Fisher-Brown" thesis. The credit cycle would 
feature alternating periods of speculative prosperity and depression, 
even with a sound banking system. (Brown appears to be drawing pri­
marily from the early work of Fisher^^ and that of Wicksell."^) How­
ever, with a less than sound banking system, a loss of confidence 
would tend to precipitate a money panic. The panic period, according 
to Brown, would typically feature the case where currency had been 
plentiful and suddenly becomes scarce, driving rates abruptly upward. 
He then tried to identify those crises in the United States since 
1873 which displayed these characteristics, taking into account those 
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which were due, at least in part, to other, non-monetary causes. Using 
what he admitted to be inadequate data. Brown examined the crises of 
1873, 1882-84, 1890, 1893 and 1907. He found indications that in most 
of these crises, low real (virtual) rates of interest may have stimu­
lated credit expansion, leading to a high ratio of deposits to reserves, 
thus precipitating a crisis which featured falling prices and a rapid 
rise in nominal interest rates. 
Brown originally published his principles text. Economic Science 
and the Common Welfare, in 1923. It underwent several editions and 
in 1942 the title was changed and subsequent editions retain the new 
title. The Basic Principles of Economics.In three early chapters, 
•he dealt with the relationships of money, commercial banking and busi­
ness cycles to prices. His statement and explanation of the equation 
of exchange followed that of Fisher. He maintained that, despite 
other influences: "The effect of an increase of money is to make 
prices higher than they would be if the quantity of money did not in-
crease."^^ He also emphasized "the evils of a fluctuating price level." 
In regard to banking and prices. Brown's 1942 edition put greater 
emphasis on open market operations and indicated a greater confidence 
in the Federal Reserve system's ability to control the level of prices 
than did the 1931 edition. In the same section, he entertained the 
question of whether demands for higher wages could raise the level of 
prices. He concluded that: 
We can . . . more reasonably think of wages and price 
changes as being, in the main, joint effects of a common 
cause, than as being, either, the cause of the other.18 
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In a chapter titled "Depression, Prosperity and Prices," Brown 
analyzed the business cycle along the lines of Mitchell, Fisher and 
Davenport. Mitchell's Business Cycles may have convinced him to 
abandon Fisher's earlier emphasis on the lagging adjustment of nominal 
interest rates as the key explanation for cycles. Also, as Dorfman 
pointed out, he introduced qualifications of his own. Dorfman singled 
out his emphasis on propensities to spend. Brown had said that: 
No theory of prices can be accepted as perfect and com­
plete which makes the price level depend upon the quantity 
of money and bank deposits without reference to the general 
readiness to spend or hesitancy in spending.19 
Brown further emphasized this point: 
But from one phase of the business cycle to another 
phase of the same cycle, changes in the readiness to spend 
are perhaps of equal and possibly greater significance [than 
changes affecting the supply of money].'0 
In the case of a depression, he noted that a general unwillingness to 
spend was of particular importance in the case of businesses, as this 
would imply an unwillingness to borrow, despite low or falling interest 
rates. This unwillingness was explained in part by the reluctance of 
businessmen to accept lower prices for their goods as well as that of 
labor to accept lower nominal wages. Revival from a depression should 
be accompanied, if not preceded, by an expansion of credit. However, 
just as important for Brown was a positive change in business sentiment. 
The increased buying and hiring by businesses would be facilitated by 
the increase in credit and, for a time, the general price level would 
not be increased as businesses and workers would accept the existing 
lower prices and wages respectively. Leland Yeager has noted that 
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Brown's emphasis on the inability of the price system to quickly respond 
to a monetary disturbance was similar to the emphasis of Glower, 
21 Leijonhufvud and Alchian on informational difficulties. 
In discussing the crisis and ensuing depression. Brown felt that 
one of the many symptoms of a slowing prosperity was "the condition of 
22 bank reserves and the policy of the controlling central bank system." 
Speculative buying, unevenness of demand or maladjustment of production 
may arise over the course of prosperity, but these in and of themselves, 
should not cause a crisis. He looked to the condition of banks for 
indication of a turn-around. Banks whose loans had grown relative to 
their reserves may raise their rates or arbitrarily limit further 
credit. The perceived deficiency of reserves could also be due to 
restrictive central bank policies. Higher rates and restricted credit 
would impact on the demand for goods and services as well as alter 
purchasing plans due to the expectation that prices will cease to rise 
at past rates. As one firm finds credit more difficult to obtain, it 
will begin to limit the credit it extends to customers. As prices 
begin to fall, a further incentive to postpone purchases becomes part 
of the cumulative process. For Brown, there was "doubtless some level 
of prices, wages etc., low enough so that, even with greatly diminished 
23 
spending business would be active." Yet, he recognized that the 
process of readjustment may well last a long period of time, entailing 
great waste of capital and manpower as well as extensive social costs. 
Yeager in his article, "The Keynesian Diversion," used Brown's explana­
tion of a business depression as one example of a positive contribution 
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by a quantity theorist to the process of integrating monetary theory 
24 
and disequilibrium theory. 
Brown averred that at least a mitigation of the severity of 
crises and depressions was possible. A panic (which he defined as "a 
pc 
disorderly process of attempted liquidation") could be checked by the 
ability of the Federal Reserve to issue an unlimited volume of Federal 
Reserve notes. The mitigation of the swings in the business cycle 
•would require continuing Federal Reserve stabilization policies. 
He chose to show in his text the fallaciousness of the "over-sav­
ings" hypothesis of business depression. He argued that the hypothesis 
depended on the assumption that.the savings of the capitalist-employers 
somehow prevents them from buying. He maintained that this group 
could (1) spend on immediately consumable goods, (2) spend on durable 
or investment goods, (3) hoard their earnings, (4) throw them into the 
sea. Alternatives (1) and (2) should, if taken, result in no deficiency 
in effective demand. In the later cases, he argued that the temporary 
or permanent reduction of money in circulation must result in a lower 
price level. He concluded: 
It is no answer to the argument presented above, to say 
that decreased money in circulation, together with a general 
disinclination to accept reduced prices, wages etc. may lead 
to a depression. For to say this is to admit that problem is 
a monetary and credit problem and is to give away the whole 
case for "all-around over-production."'^" 
During the thirties, Brown made only one statement on the causes 
of the depression. In an article titled "Nonsense and Sense in Deal­
ing with the Depression," published in the Beta Gamma Sigma Exchange, 
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he strongly faulted the actions of the Federal Reserve. He, as Dorfman 
noted, felt no qualms about abandoning the gold standard if ultimately 
27 it interfered with the means to bring about a recovery. Although 
28 29 his views were close to those of Cassel, Fisher and James Harvey 
30 Rogers, some important differences may be noted. 
Brown began the article by attacking several contemporary pro­
posals as inimical to the goal of recovery. He mentioned the proposed 
sales tax, the proposed payment for holding agricultural land out of 
production, the proposed relaxation of anti-trust laws and the proposals 
from whom he called the "uncompromising deflation theorists." Thomas M. 
Humphrey in a 1971 article, "Role of Non-Chicago Economists in the 
Evolution of the Quantity Theory in American 1930-1950," stated that 
Brown, along with Fisher and W. I. King, were critical of Federal 
Reserve policies but did not hold the Reserve "largely responsible for 
31 the initial turndown in business activity." Brown, on the occasion 
of his paper and in his correspondence, did make such a charge. He 
stated: 
A major cause of the depression—in my own opinion the 
outstanding cause as far as the United States is concerned— 
is an inept policy of those in charge of our Federal Reserve 
system.22 
He felt that those in charge were not aware of the extent of their 
ability to affect business prosperity. Specifically, he argued that 
the Federal Reserve in 1928 and 1929 had been unduly restrictive in both 
open-market and discount rate policies. He thought that the reversal 
of policy in early 1931 was too late and too restrictive to have been 
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effective, given the existing conditions. He advocated (along with 
Rogers and others) a collaboration between the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve wherein the government would borrow extensively from banks and 
spend these newly created monies in public works projects. Brown con­
sidered this a permissible unbalancing of the budget, especially since 
the bonds could be sold at low rates. He went on to suggest that 
Federal Reserve board members had been influenced by sound banking 
principles in their actions and did not fully realize that these princi­
ples were not applicable to central banking policy making. 
With regard to international financial considerations. Brown 
posited that it should be possible to restore prosperity and maintain 
stability at a higher price level, though he-anticipated that the gold 
outflow might necessitate a presidential embargo on gold exports. He 
believed that gold holdings were sufficient in 1933 to support credit 
demands and maintain the gold standard domestically. His feeling was 
that the gold standard had become a "sacred cow" in American monetary 
policy. His opinion on longer-run policy was that: 
. . .  i t  w o u l d  b e  b e t t e r  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  g e n e r a l  p r i c e  
level by open market purchases and sales of eligible securi­
ties as well as gold and not be dependent upon any need to 
interfere with the importation and exportation of gold.33 
As to the effects of a "world-wide scramble for gold," he reasoned that 
"we had been not so much sinned against as sinning.His view seems 
to have been that this country must suffer the consequences of reper­
cussions from abroad, especially since the situation may well have been 
the result, at least in part, of errors in our monetary policy. 
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Other than in this article, Brown's views on the depression of 
the thirties may be examined in his correspondence with James Harvey 
Rogers. Rogers served on national committees designated to investigate 
the causes of and remedies for the economic crisis. He was best 
known, however, for his work as financial advisor to President 
35 Roosevelt. Brown corresponded frequently with Rogers, expressing his 
opinions and at times urging him to support certain policies. In his 
letters, Brown showed support for the Goldborough Bill which Fisher, 
among others, had worked on. He noted in support of the bill that he 
had recently learned that Wicksell had advocated price stabilization 
utilizing credit control including open market operations and inter­
national cooperation. Rogers predicted that despite his own kindly 
feelings for the bill that it would ultimately be vetoed by President 
37 Hoover and that some less objectionable approach must be followed. 
In a November 1933 letter to Rogers, Brown stressed that the key to 
recovery was a monetary policy which sought to increase purchasing power 
as a first priority over attempts to control exchange and maintain the 
OO 
price of gold. Citing the investigations of his colleagues at 
Missouri, Elmer Wood and Karl Bopp, he defended attempts to use open 
market operations to bring about a stimulus for recovery. He noted the 
reluctance to lend or invest in all but government securities, but he 
pointed out that even these purchases would prove stimulatory. He sug­
gested that the large excess reserves held by banks was linked in part 
to vacilation in Federal Reserve policy and that a stronger policy 
would induce banks to reduce their idle holdings. Brown also commented 
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on the monetary critics of a managed currency in the press and in aca-
38 demia. He felt that they could be overcome should the policy he 
advocated experience some measure of success. He expresses pessimism 
with regard to the behavior of the Board of Governors and inquired of 
Rogers if there was reason to hope for a change in policy. Rogers, in 
his reply, stated substantial agreement with Brown's views, but cited 
political difficulties which he was unable, for reasons of discretion, 
39 to explain completely. 
Brown wrote the Committee for the Nation expressing his dissent 
from the President's gold purchasing program in late 1933,^^ While he 
supported a system which allowed for change in the price of gold, he 
objected that gold purchases made with ninety-day Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (R.F.C.) debenture were not likely to result in an increase 
in the money supply which in the existing conditions was sufficient. 
He went on to suggest that in the face of the Federal Reserve's re­
calcitrance on open market policy that some separate commission be 
formed with power to force compliance by the Board of Governors. 
Brown urged Rogers on several occasions to publicly support a 
petition originated by agricultural economists, F. L. Thomsen and 
0. R. Johnson and others, which had been revised in response to com­
ments by Commons, Fisher and Rogers.He stated that he was aware 
that the unanimity found among economists in opposition to tariff re­
strictions would not be forthcoming on questions of monetary policy. 
The petition itself was an attempt to emphasize the plight of agri­
culture and to strongly advocate a truly stimulatory monetary policy 
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for the benefit of agriculture as well as industrial recovery. Brown 
was anxious to have the petition presented to Congress in light of what 
he called "the one presented by our conservative brother economists 
42 
with its low obesiance to the sacred gold standard." While Fisher 
had encouraged Rogers to work on the "inside," Brown questioned the 
effectiveness of this strategy for Rogers as he was in the main advis­
ing officials whose philosophy on monetary and banking matters was 
inimical to his own. He stressed to Rogers the plight of the Midwest 
and concluded his letter, saying: 
There is a fabled center of spirit life which is said 
to be paved with good intentions. Stupidity in the direc­
tion of our national economic affairs when it leads to such 
consequences is not too harshly to be judged as criminal 
In 1937, fears of an inflationary movement arising from a massive 
inflow of gold and the announced scheme to pay for the gold with new 
government securities prompted Brown to write to Fisher.He argued 
that these additions to the national debt, especially if they were 
large, would greatly increase the interest charge on the debt. He 
suggested an alternative he found to be embedded in the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 which would allow the Secretary of the Treasury 
to refuse to buy gold at the parity level of $35 an ounce and, thereby, 
allow its price to fall. Brown felt that this alternative in the face 
of a massive gold inflow should be considered, and despite the legal 
provisions for the maintenance of parity that provision for a changing 
official price of gold had been provided for. Fisher, in his notes 
made on the letter, indicated his agreement and his intention to bring 
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this matter up in Washington. 
Brown, in a later edition of his text, argued that the stability of 
the price level would be enhanced if the general monetary policy of the 
Federal Reserve and the government could be anticipated reliably. He-
seemed to have felt that anticipation of price movements by the public 
would tend to speed recovery as well as slow excessive spending in an 
up-turn. He never expressed a view on the advisability of "money 
rules," but the above might indicate his qualified support. He also 
stressed that monopolistic conditions contributed to the adversity of 
a depression and counseled continued enforcement of existing anti­
trust legislation. 
Irving Fisher's 1920 book, Stabilizing the Dollar, mentioned Brown 
in the preface as one of several unpublished "anticipators" of his 
ideas. Indeed, Brown evinced support of Fisher's general principles, 
45 if not acceptance of his specific program, as did many other econo­
mists of the era. In the mid-thirties, several arguments were presented 
to the disipline in advocacy of what was then known as the 100% Plan or 
the Chicago Plan. Henry Simons^® and Lauchlin Currie^^ contributed to 
the proposal and it was accepted by Irving Fisher who presented his own 
version in 100% Money in 1935. Several articles appeared which were 
critical of some aspects of the plan but were supportive of it in 
general. (It should be noted that Fisher's version attempted to link 
the plan with overall price stabilization, unlike earlier versions.) 
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In 1940, Brown published an article which was critical of the plan. 
In it, he brought up objections which he judged to be both important and 
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generally overlooked. The objections he presented were intentionally 
general in order to respond to the various versions of the plan. He 
argued that the advantages gained from the intermediary role of banks 
would be reduced under the plan. Specifically, the implicit conveni­
ence return to depositors would have to fall with the requirement of 
one hundred per cent backing of demand deposits. He objected to a 
proposed subsidization of deposit banking which would allow banks to 
continue to offer free or low service charges on checking accounts. He 
feared the possible incursion of political influence as well as the 
creation of an economic distortion. Were subsidization linked to 
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national debt retirement as had been suggested by Fisher, he argued 
that the concept of the debt would undergo distortion and eventually 
lead to a perpetual government obligation of unknown proportions. 
Brown then challenged what appeared to be the fundamental or under­
lying premise of the proposal which was in Frank D. Graham's words: 
"One-hundred per cent reserves will stop the private manufacture of 
money and nothing short of this will serve.Graham said this in a 
rebuttal to Brown's article. Two quite distinct perceptions of a 
proper banking system can be noted. For Graham and others advocating 
this reform, the banking system should be restrained from offering 
liquidity with interest on its accounts. He stated that such practice 
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"is responsible for most of the financial crises of history." Brown 
felt that the system, as was, was adequate if effective central banking 
principles were adhered to. Brown asked why 100% was a sacred figure 
and why other means could not be found to make deposit banking adequately 
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safe and stable. He also pointed out that other institutions may 
prosper by offering accounts which can be withdrawn on short notice. 
Such near money might become an attractive alternative to demand 
deposits, and movements in these accounts would have effects similar 
to the effects the plan was intended to arrest. Additional legal 
attempts to separate or isolate demand deposits from other assets 
would so deprive individuals of options that such legislation would 
be unlikely to find support. Brown concluded that less radical changes 
in the monetary and banking system should be examined to attain the 
desired stability. (It is worthy of note that Brown, as well as the 
proponents of the plan, demonstrated little confidence in the recently 
formed Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's ability to avoid bank 
failures. This perhaps may be explained by the low levels of insurance 
offered by this institution in its early years.) 
While in his sixties and seventies, Brown wrote several articles 
on topics in macroeconomics. His principal concerns were wartime 
price controls and subsidies, the growth of the national debt, and the 
Keynesian "revolution." All but one of these articles were published 
in the American Journal of Economics and Sociology. In one of these 
articles. Brown reflected on the New Deal legislation and found much 
that was ill-advised if not contradictory to the stated purposes of 
52 the acts. He attacked provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Acts 
of 1933 and 1938 that intended to limit agricultural supplies so as to 
raise prices by pointing out that the general effects of the programs 
were only to the benefit of a privileged group of grower-owners and were 
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detrimental not only to farm labor and renters of farm land, but 
consumers as well. He further argued that the Federal Fair Standards 
Act of 1938 which fixed minimum wages for certain occupations tended 
to result in greater unemployment and lower wages in occupations not 
covered by the act. In a similar fashion, he attacked the "fair trade" 
legislation of the period. 
Writing in 1942, Brown was critical of the decision to employ war­
time price controls, but he recognized exceptions and suggested alterna­
tives.^^ He felt that the difficulties, inefficiencies and injustices 
of a necessarily piecemeal approach to price controls rendered this 
method inferior to a program of heavy taxation of incomes to assist in 
meeting wartime expenses. He recognized, however, that wartime priori­
ties could necessitate emergency production priorities and the ration­
ing of certain goods, especially as the revamping of the tax system 
would take time and the result would be unlikely to be adequate in all 
respects. He also saw price regulation and rationing as temporary 
necessities to avoid panic buying and hoarding which, however, would be 
lessened if inflationary pressures were not so severe. In addition, he 
found redundant the idea that government subsidization of certain lines 
of industry would somehow serve to keep down or reduce prices in these 
lines. 
Brown's views about proper war financing were closely related to 
his objections to the increasing national debt. He maintained that the 
New Deal policies promoting business revival and stemming inflationary 
pressures added to the debt. Those instances in which the government 
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borrowed from banks as opposed to individuals, businesses, etc., to 
finance public works projects caused the debt to increase. And to 
the extent that the gold inflow to the Treasury was sterilized through 
the sale of government bonds, the debt grew as well. Brown saw the 
acceptance by economists of these increases as well as the much 
greater increases during the war as insufficiently critical. His ob­
jection was that unrestrained increases in the debt would necessitate 
future taxation to pay the interest on the debt and this may in turn 
inhibit incentives which promote productive efficiency. He pointed out 
that although an internally held debt imposed no necessary intergenera-
tional burden, this was not relevant to the question of the consequences 
he foresaw. Brown's view of the tax system was that it unnecessarily 
inhibited incentives for productive efficiency, and he assumed that a 
rapidly increasing debt would or could result in a heightening of the 
disincentives. In addition to future disincentives, he felt that a 
large and growing debt would provide further incentive for the govern­
ment to adopt inflationary policies.Although he did not attempt to 
predict a timetable for when these negative influences would become 
economically significant, he argued that alternatives to the growth of 
the debt could and should be found. 
Brown appeared to be reflecting on his wartime thinking in his 
last article in the American Economic Review in 1952 which he titled, 
"Cost of Production, Price Control and Subsidies: An Economic Night-
57 
mare." He observed that the growing tendency in the discipline was 
to define costs with respect to the individual outlays of the firm. He 
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felt that this tendency was responsible for erroneous support for the 
program of subsidies during the war and in the post-war era. He sug­
gested that a broader view of cost, seen as the alternative opportuni­
ties available to each factor of production, was the more useful view. 
The argument for subsidization was that prices could be held down or 
reduced by payment of subsidies to "high cost" firms only, with the 
loss to the taxpayers exceeded by the gain to consumers. He argued 
that theoretically one could not distinguish a "high-cost" firm, since 
any firm is likely to contain both "high" and "low" cost elements. 
Thus, for Brown, subsidies would have to be paid to the factors of pro­
duction with "high" opportunity costs which, however, are no more 
productive than factors with "lower" opportunity costs. The subsidy 
program would be unfair, administratively difficult to apply and would 
deprive a factor with low opportunity costs the protection to its 
returns afforded by the existence of factors with higher opportunity 
costs which could and would change their occupation should their returns 
fall. 
Brown commented in a letter to Lester Chandler in 1940 that he did 
not feel that the approach of Keynes need necessarily be followed "in 
order to make use of a demand and supply analysis in relation to 
money.He argued that the Fisher equation for money and bank credit 
could be interpreted for this purpose. He, however, did not follow up 
on his own suggestion. 
Brown as a monetarist was not taken with the rise of Keynesian 
ideas in the later part of his career. Keynes' growing influence on 
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the discipline was apparent by the late thirties. A former student 
of Brown's, Joel Dirlam, reported in 1939 that the graduate orals at 
Yale included several questions on Keynes. He also mentioned that 
James Harvey Rogers believed that Keynes had thought everything out 
clearly first and then had consciously mixed it up when he set it 
down.^^ Brown made no mention of Keynes' ideas until 1948 when he 
wrote an article titled "Two Decades of Decadence in Economic Theoriz­
ing." His view was that Keynesianism was a fad and, moreover, a rather 
unproductive one. He began the article with a defense of the mone­
tarist interpretation of the depression. He stated: 
The truth probably is that central banking policy has 
more to do with the alternation of prosperity and depres­
sion, and that central banking policy affects business 
activity through affecting the volume of circulating medium 
of which bank deposits subject to check are, at any rate in 
English-speaking countries, the major part.60 
Brown, like many other earlier critics of Keynes,questioned whether 
there was anything new or even useful in the General Theory. He pointed 
out that the concept of the multiplier was not new and had been ade­
quately understood in terms of the "velocity of circulation." He also 
argued at length that "liquidity preference" could not cause a depres­
sion. As noted above, Brown included a "reluctance to spend or lend" 
in the contributing factors in the length and severity of a depression. 
However, he felt that there was no evidence that a depression was 
initiated by liquidity preference considerations which were manifested 
"independently of any adverse banking or general monetary policy."®^ 
Citing Keynes as saying: "The concept of hoarding may be regarded as 
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a first approximation to the concept of liquidity preference, 
Brown said that the desire for liquidity in a depression could be over­
come with wise monetary policy. 
In the same article, Brown criticized statements made by Lloyd A. 
Metzler and Alvin Hansen. In a 1946 article, Metzler noted the demise 
of Say's Law of Markets and posited that, as a result, general over­
production in the economy was a theoretical possibility. Brown felt 
that Metzler failed to adequately qualify his argument, and maintained 
that there would be no overproduction even with price rigidities unless 
a sufficient expansion in the money supply to the "currently produced 
goods" market was not effectuated. Brown also criticized Hansen's book. 
Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles. He found particularly that Hansen's 
hypothesis that a slowing population growth rate was in part responsi­
ble for the depression to be without merit. Brown thought that Hansen's 
argument contained an untenable assumption wherein the diminished demand 
for housing would result in a similarly diminished demand for goods in 
general. Hansen had also emphasized the relative decline in new 
industries in the depression years which Brown rejected as a causative 
factor, arguing that Hansen had not shown how aggregate demand must 
fall as a result of this lack of new industry. In reply to Hansen's 
assertion that the supply of money and its rate of utilization (MV) 
would "adjust themselves to the demands of the underlying real factors," 
Brown argued that this was to assume a monetary policy somehow attuned 
to the changes in these "real" factors in the economy. For Brown, the 
search for explanations for the depression need not go beyond 
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institutional mismanagement of the money supply combined with the price, 
wage, rental and interest rigidities in the economy. He cited that 
work of Henry Simons as an effective critique of the "new" economics. 
Several years later (at age seventy-nine), Brown reiterated his 
objections to the ideas of Keynes and Hansen.For statistical sup-
55 port, he referred to the work of Clark Warburton. He chided the 
Keynesian economists for not considering land value taxation as a 
partial remedy for the supposed difficulties of a periodically low 
marginal efficiency of capital. He maintained that with land value 
taxation, taxes on capital could be reduced, thereby raising the ex­
pected return on capital investments. 
Once again, it is difficult to accurately assess Harry Gunnison 
Brown's contribution in the area under consideration. His theoretical 
contributions as a long-time monetarist are certainly of interest. He 
sought, as had Fisher, the means by which an economy could thrive with 
a reasonably stable price level. He often stated that he would despair 
for the future of the price system if the government proved incapable 
of taking the necessary stabilizing measures. It can be noted that his 
position on the effectiveness of central bank policy was very optimistic 
in comparison with that of most monetarist-leaning economists of the 
present day. His greatest achievement may well have been the influ­
ence he had on his students. One student of his. Beryl W. Sprinkel, 
commented on Brown in the following manner: 
He was a great inspiration to me and perhaps the kind­
est thing I could say is that I did not have to "unlearn" 
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anything he taught me when I reached Graduate School at 
the University of Chicago. 
I will defer a listing of the students of Brown who were later active 
in monetary areas until Chapter Nine. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. TAXATION 
In Brown's early years at the University of Missouri, he taught 
the advanced undergraduate course in what was then "public revenues." 
As not infrequently occurs, the years of interaction with students in 
a particular subject coupled with the publication of various articles 
dealing with the same subject culminated in the writing of a textbook. 
The Economics of Taxation was published by Henry Holt and Co. in 1924. 
It was reprinted in 1938 by Lucas Brothers and in 1979 by the University 
1 2 
of Chicago Press. The initial reviews by Henry Simons, Frank Knight 
3 
and Fred Rogers Fairchild were favorable; however, each reviewer ex­
pressed certain objections. Simons took specific exception to certain 
points which will be mentioned later, but he concluded: 
Professor Brown has contributed a great deal of acute 
analysis to a more or less special field of inquiry in which 
most of the stuff that is written and preached is of ex­
ceedingly unattractive quality.'^ 
Knight noted that: "The economic analysis is at all points careful, 
5 thorough and competent, and is stated with admirable lucidity." 
Fairchild, a successful author of textbooks, had similar praise for the 
book. Some fifty-five years later, Arnold Harberger in a publisher's 
blurb for the reprint stated: "This is truly a classic."® 
Brown's preface to the text was a noteworthy comment on contempor­
ary approaches to the study and instruction of economics. He argued 
that with few exceptions, advanced or intermediate courses in economics 
were less rigorous in terms of theory than the introductory "principles" 
courses. The tendency was, he maintained, to elaborate on an area of 
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economics such as public finance in a narrative or descriptive fashion 
rather than attempting to deepen the students' theoretical grasp of the 
economic principles involved. For Brown, this was detrimental. In his 
words : 
Only a thorough study of the cause and effect relations 
in taxation can, in fact, make one a competent leader of 
opinion on tax problems.' 
Thus, Brown's approach was to present ten chapters dealing primarily 
with tax shifting and incidence. This was done without the usual 
historical background found in McCulloch, Bastable or Seligman. Also, 
he generalized about the type of tax to be discussed. For example, he 
treated the incidences of taxes on capital and land in lieu of examin­
ing the effects of a property tax per se. A tax on labor incomes 
would be studied prior to considering income taxes. This prompted 
Fairchild to object: 
This book deals exclusively with abstract theory, tell­
ing us virtually nothing of the relation of these theories 
to the facts of present-day problems.8 
That at least a part of this criticism was anticipated by Brown is evi­
dent in his preface. He believed it was unwieldy to deal with specific 
tax forms as opposed to basic taxation, whether realistic or not, of 
commodities, labor, land and capital. He felt that the development 
of general principles of taxation would be better served in this way. 
Moreover, he recognized and regretted the lack of inductive or empiri­
cal verification of the theory he presented. While welcoming empirical 
studies of tax incidence along the lines of Fisher and Mitchell, Brown 
argued that those who would criticize the book for being too theoretical 
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were likely to be ignorant of the difficulty of the required statisti-
9 
cal analysis. 
In his introductory chapter, Brown placed the study of taxation 
within the broader area of public finance. He thought that questions 
of taxation, and especially of its incidence, could be most fruitfully 
explored with economic analysis. In addition, he felt that this could 
be done objectively. Knight pointed out that Brown did not deal with 
the "objectives of taxation and canons of justice." Brown maintained 
that knowledge of tax incidence was a necessary prerequisite to any 
discussion of proper policy. His stated intent was: 
. . .  t o  k e e p  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d ,  a n d  
devote attention to the discovery and explanation of economic 
laws as such, leaving it to the readers to make such applica­
tion of the conclusion reached as may seem to be proper.10 
By then, he was a recognized advocate of land value taxation, yet none 
of the reviewers (and in particular Knight) found Brown's personal 
bias reflected in the book. 
The benchmark of scholarship at that time was largely set by 
E. R. A. Seligman. The breadth of Seligman's work in the field of taxa­
tion was unparalleled. His major works. The Shifting and Incidence of 
Taxation (1892), Essays on Taxation (1895) and The Income Tax (1911), 
clearly established him as the leading American authority on the sub­
ject. Brown frequently referred to Seligman, although often to dissent 
from his views. There is a similarity between Brown's and Seligman's 
works: both attempted to synthesize past thought on the subject, 
rendering the determination of original contributions difficult. 
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Brown's methodological approach to the determination of tax inci­
dence is difficult to classify in modern terms. He proposed first that 
the effects of a tax be examined by analyzing "the conditions of supply 
and demand insofar as they are significant for our purposes. 
Further, his approach was nominally that of partial equilibrium 
analysis. However, as a student of Fisher, he was aware of the defi­
ciencies in applying such analysis to many considerations. Therefore, 
in most instances he extended the theoretical analysis toward a general 
equilibrium approach without the aid of a formal model. Simons referred 
to his attempt: "Especially noteworthy is the emphasis upon the 
extent of the diffusion process and precise definitions of its 
12 limits." Brown did not specifically employ balanced-budget inci­
dence; rather, he implied that the governmental expenditures from tax 
revenues would have minor or neutral effects, although he was aware of 
complications arising from this source. Nor can his approach be de­
scribed as one of differential incidence, as he did not utilize a 
basis of comparison such as a proportional income tax. He would intro­
duce a tax, analyze its incidence in the hypothetically simplest case 
and then extend the analysis to what he saw as relevant variations in 
each case. These variations might be long versus short run incidence, 
differing cost conditions, general versus specific taxation, etc. 
Brown's first two chapters were also unorthodox in that he first 
treated monetary inflation as a type of taxation and secondly discussed 
the incidence of governmental borrowing. He wished to emphasize that 
governmental issue of inconvertible paper money was, in effect. 
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taxation. He proceeded to show the effects of an increase in paper 
money in two cases. First, where the new issue serves primarily to dis­
place metallic money via the workings of Gresham's law, he argued that 
there would be no special burden on the issuing country's residents. 
He assumed: no barriers to trade, gold as the medium of international 
exchange and that the government spend the new money on domestic goods 
and services. The initial rise in prices is modified as purchases 
from abroad increase with gold as payment. Thus, in roughly equivalent 
terms, the public loses goods to the government and replaces them with 
foreign goods. Then, if the paper money remains an acceptable substi­
tute for the metallic money, no significant burden falls on the public. 
Brown's second case was one in which the paper issue is continued 
beyond the point where metallic money ceases to circulate. Here, the 
government in effect bids away a portion of goods and services initial­
ly corresponding to the percentage increase in the money supply. For 
this result to hold, he employed several simplifying assumptions. 
First, the price rise could not be moderated by increased importation, 
as there would be no international reserves and the paper money would 
depreciate so as to check any increase in imports unless there were 
foreign speculation in this currency. Also, the velocity of circula­
tion was assumed to be unchanged. (However, Brown felt that it would 
increase with a rapid inflation, citing the cases of Germany and 
Austria.) Finally, for the proportionality to hold, he assumed that 
the second-round effects of the new money spent by the government were 
not yet realized. With money incomes as well as prices proportionately 
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higher, the burden on the average of this "taxation" was "the wealth 
and services abstracted from them by the government when the new money 
13 
was first put into circulation." 
He then discussed the distributional effects of this induced in­
flation. In the most simple of cases--with prices all rising at the 
same rate--the burden was distributed according to the proportion of 
purchases, thus resembling, at least nominally, a general sales tax. 
He noted that, in practice, prices and incomes do not rise to the same 
extent nor at the same rate, causing the burden to be shared unequally. 
Brown emphasized the role of expectations in the process whereby some 
gain and others lose as a result of inflation. He concluded with the 
admonition that such induced inflations must be recognized as being 
taxation and should be seen by enlightened politicians as an undesir­
able alternative to direct taxation, despite the political difficulty 
of doing so. He further condemned the tendency of conservatives to 
find scapegoats for inflation in organized labor on the one hand and 
radicals to find scapegoats in profiteering capitalists on the other. 
Brown began his discussion of government borrowing with some 
general comments related to wartime finance. He referred to the ex­
change between T. N. Carver and H. J. Davenport which took place dur­
ing and after World War I. The alternatives of bond issuance and 
higher taxation were examined for their economic consequences. Brown 
here appeared to wish to emphasize an essential similarity of these two 
alternatives in that they both redirect economic resources from the 
private to the public sector. He felt that subtle and unpredictable 
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differences may arise with regard to saving and investment behavior. 
He argued: 
Discouragement to business or charitable contributions 
can only result if the tax method takes a larger proportion 
of the funds secured than does the bond-issue or borrowing 
method, from the particular persons who are inclined to 
business investment or to charity.14 
Brown felt that the bond-issuance was more likely to draw funds from 
those having a greater tendency to save and invest. He was not 
specific as to how the taxes were to be raised, but appeared to be 
thinking of a proportional income tax. 
Brown, although not explicitly at this time, had reservations about 
government borrowing even for wartime revenue which he recognized as 
politically expedient. However, he did not subscribe to the idea that 
such borrowing imposed a burden on posterity, where the borrowing is 
from the country's own citizens. He demonstrated the possibility where­
in a person may hypothetically buy a bond and end up exactly repaying 
oneself the interest and principal through tax payments. He then showed 
that the much more likely case would involve intra- and inter-genera­
tional transfers, but that later generations as a whole would not be 
burdened. He did note, however, that discriminatory tax schemes and 
extensive immigration would alter the conclusion somewhat in practice. 
He briefly considered Davenport's idea that war finance was "a mortgage 
15 
of the masses to the classes." That this was a possibility wherein 
the bond issue was primarily sold to wealthier citizens Brown admitted, 
but he pointed out that the incidence and effects of the total tax 
system would have to be considered to support this contention. 
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Brown's prime reservation about government borrowing lay in its 
inflationary tendencies in practice. Only if there were a reduction 
in private spending commensurate with the increased purchasing power 
lent to the government through bond sales, would the process not be 
inflationary. Especially under conditions of war, Brown thought that 
this was unlikely. Banks would tend to lower reserve requirements, 
purchase government bonds themselves with extended credit in the form 
of checking accounts or bank notes and allow as collateral government 
bonds on private loans. In addition, this would to some degree extend 
the borrowing needs of the government as prices rose, depending upon 
the elasticities of supplies. Brown formally herein offered no opinion 
on the desirability of a restrictive policy regarding bank behavior 
sufficient to stem the inflationary tendencies. However, reacting to 
the growth of the national debt during World War II, Brown adamantly 
opposed what he considered to be an unwise growth in debt financing. 
In the remainder of the book, Brown considered several forms of 
government finance which were not taxes in disguise. He treated first 
taxes on competitively produced goods and second, taxes on monopolisti-
cally produced goods. The two chapters (consisting of some eighty 
pages) represent a summation of the then current views in micro­
economics, drawing most heavily on Marshall, Seligman and Davenport. 
Having written well before the concepts of imperfect competition were 
elaborated on by Robinson and Chamberlin, Brown anticipated some of 
these developments in theory, as will be shown later. The theory of 
the firm he utilized lacked the precision of later presentations and 
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this, on at least one occasion, led Brown to err. One of the earliest 
to incorporate both imperfect competition conditions and a more de­
tailed theory of the firm into studies of incidence was John F. Due 
in his Theory of Incidence of Sales Taxation written in 1939.^^ Due 
cited Brown not only more frequently than any other writer, but, with 
few exceptions, favorably. Brown would later (in 1939) contribute an 
article titled "The Incidence of a General Output or General Sales 
Tax" which would add significantly to and amend his chapters on the 
taxation of commodities; this will be examined later. 
Brown first treated the case of a tax on the production of goods in 
a perfectly competitive industry where constant costs prevail over the 
relevant range. Assuming that all producers in the industry are 
marginal in the sense that any lower net return would force them to 
cease production of the good, then this tax would be shifted in its 
entirety to the consumers of the good. Brown recognized the likelihood 
of there being infra-marginal producers in the industry but treated 
this incidence under that of increasing costs. 
Brown next turned to the consideration of the effect of commodity 
taxation on the general price level and was severely criticized for 
the attempt by Simons. Brown found that a tax on a particular commodity 
produced under constant costs would not alter the general price level. 
The tax would result in the price of the taxed good rising by almost 
the amount of the tax and all other prices falling slightly so as to 
leave substantially unchanged the general price level. He assumed no 
international trade effects, an unchanged money supply and a constant 
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velocity of circulation. Simons appeared to feel that the treatment 
was an oversimplification, but he did not elaborate on his own approach. 
He said that the argument "appears to presuppose an altogether mysteri-
18 
ous disappearance of effective demand." Brown very briefly extended 
his argument to a tax on all goods, maintaining that the effect would 
be to lower all money incomes in relation to the prices of these goods. 
The 1939 article mentioned above elaborated on and modified this con­
clusion. 
The case of increasing cost of production for the competitive 
industry was examined by Brown. He felt this to be the normal or in­
evitable case as extension of production would eventually tend to 
encounter rising costs. He noted that the factors of production may 
differ in their likely contributions to increasing costs. A tax in this 
case was found to be partially shifted to consumers, but would also 
burden the factors of production in all but the extreme instance of a 
totally inelastic demand for the good. Brown's reasoning was that the 
incomplete shifting of the tax would drive from the industry those 
factors which were marginal between this and other industries and re­
duce industry supply. Further diffusion effects of the tax he saw as 
operating either through the higher price of the taxed good or the 
altered factor supplies. The higher price may reduce spending on other 
goods or the addition to the factor supplies of other industries may 
lead to lower prices and money incomes there, however slightly. Brown 
saw no general or average effect on prices unless efficiency was 
lessened by the changes wrought by the tax. He illustrated his general 
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point with examples and graphs. His emphasis on the possibility of 
changes in factor prices was unusual at that time; Due noted that this 
possibility "has been for the most part ignored despite the fact that 
in terms of orthodox value analysis the incidence would be modified 
significantly by changes along these lines.Due also pointed out 
that Brown's further treatment of short- as well as long-run incidence 
20 
was an early contribution. Brown maintained that the industry's 
short-run supply was likely to be less elastic than in the long run, 
due to the existence of specialized factors—especially capital and 
labor. Thus, the extent of the shifting of the tax to consumers would 
be less in the short run, as would the rise in price. In the long run, 
the competitive conditions would dictate an almost complete shifting to 
consumers unless elements taken as exogenous (such as tastes or tech­
nology) change. 
With respect to the case of decreasing costs. Brown said; "It 
would seem, then, only doubtfully worthwhile to discuss the incidence 
21 
of a competitive industry operating under decreasing costs." Knight 
in his review concurred that, in general, the case is of "doubtful 
22 
occurrence," but noted that this view was considered unorthodox. 
Brown argued that the external economies to an industry resulted in no 
advantage to a single management but only operate as an inducement to 
larger scale production in the area where the economies were effective. 
A tax on production would, were all producers marginal, result in a 
higher price by the amount of the tax plus the increased cost to the 
firms of producing a smaller quantity. He also pointed out that where 
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no external economies were present, internal economies may not lead 
to a monopoly situation. This would be true where no one plant is 
capable of providing all of the product demanded and thus increasing or 
constant cost conditions arise. Brown recognized that unless cost 
conditions changed in transition, no Marshallian stable equilibrium 
was possible and the inevitable result would be monopoly. The tax, 
therefore, would have an uncertain incidence depending largely on the 
pricing strategies of the competing firms and their capacities of supply 
with regard to total market demand. The extremes of incidence in this 
transitory state were between no shifting and a complete shifting of 
the tax. 
Finally, in this chapter Brown noted a further effect of a com­
modity tax which he termed a net loss in utilities to the community. 
This appears to be his term for excess burden. He suggested that if 
the product taxes were considered injurious, the net effect of the 
tax may be beneficial to the community. 
The possible effects of a tax on the production of a monopoly were 
first analyzed by Cournot. Brown's treatment of some eighty-six years 
later was described by Due as the most complete of the then more recent 
23 
analyses. Brown began by noting that the monopolistically determined 
price after the imposition of the tax could stay the same, rise by more 
than the amount of the tax, or by less. He referred to the different 
demand conditions, following Marshall to illustrate the first and 
24 
second possibilities where constant costs prevail. The tax would not 
be likely to be shifted where a small rise in price greatly diminished 
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the quantity demanded, assuming the pre-tax price to be at or near a 
point on the demand curve where it becomes more elastic. Here, Brown 
pointed out that the most profitable alternative for the monopolist 
may be to absorb the tax. The tax may be more than shifted where the 
monopolist faces a demand which becomes much more inelastic above the 
current price. Thus, he made use of what would later be known as 
"kinked" demand curves. Finally, he utilized a geometrical proof to 
show that a linear demand curve would result in a price increase of 
one-half of the amount of the tax. 
25 Where the monopolist operates with increasing costs. Brown 
argued that the increase in price and the shifting would be less than 
in the case of contant costs in all of the above demand situations. 
He stated simply that: "The gain from raising the price, when a tax 
is levied, is sooner offset by the loss from cutting off some of its 
former business." In the case of decreasing costs or that of a 
"natural" monopoly, he found the distinction between the short and 
long run to be significant. His reasoning was that in the short run 
(with the exception of where the tax resulted in the abandonment of 
the business), the monopolist would only consider operating costs which 
would be largely unchanged. However, this would not be true in the 
long run and the monopolist would tend to raise the price by more than 
he would in the case of constant costs. Brown demonstrated this by 
using the same demand for both constant and decreasing cost conditions 
in examples using graphs and tables. Brown rationalized his conclusion 
in the following manner: 
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For by raising its price it gains as much on each unit 
of business still done as if it operated under conditions 
of constant cost; while its loss on the business cut off is 
less since the cost of this business (except for marginal 
units) is greater than in the case of constant cost.27 
p o  
Brown's conclusion was the opposite of the earlier views of Seligman 
29 30 
and H. C. Adams but in accord with that of Edgeworth. He concluded 
by noting that a tax on monopoly's net profit could not be shifted. 
Brown was aware that imperfect information on the part of the 
monopolist and governmental regulation of monopolies would render un­
certain his conclusions. Also, he mentioned the difficulties of decid­
ing whether monopolistic or competitive conditions tended to prevail in 
a given case. He questioned: "What shall we say, for instance, of a 
tax on entertainments in towns and cities having one, two or three 
movie theaters?"^^ 
In a footnote. Brown entertained the somewhat minor but illustra­
tive question of how a specific or per unit tax would differ in its 
effects from one which was ad valorum. It is illustrative in that it 
shows how his approach could lead to errors or at least to some con­
fusion. Brown was specifically concerned with how a specific and an 
ad valorum tax would alter final prices in the competitive and mono­
polistic cases. He found in the competitive case no fundamental dif­
ference in the effects of these methods of taxation. He reasoned that, 
in general, in the monopoly case, the ad valorum tax on gross revenues 
would not tend to raise the price as much as would a specific tax. He 
was aware that this was not always true but he felt that this was due 
to the difficulties of making the comparison. He presented in tabular 
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form two different models of comparison, first one of equal yields and 
then, roughly one of equal initial burden. Although the second com­
parison bore out his reasoning, he failed to discover the reason for 
exceptions arising in his examples. Richard Musgrave has explained 
that had Brown assumed linearity of cost and revenue schedules as well 
as tax rates at or below the maximum yield, his reasoning "would have 
32 
admitted of no exceptions." 
Brown's next two chapters dealt with taxes on labor. He divided 
his brief treatment into three cases: taxes on wages in general; taxes 
on wages in a given line of work; and taxes on "surplus" labor incomes. 
A then largely hypothetical tax on wages had for Brown long-run effects 
which depended primarily on how population was affected. That the 
revenues from such a tax may be used to benefit wage-earners was not 
ignored, but he pointed out that this may not be the case, and that 
nominal incomes were lowered regardless with respect to other sources 
of income. The effect of such a tax on population growth was seen as 
uncertain although a sufficiently large tax would probably reduce the 
rate of growth and tend, thereby, to raise future wage rates. He 
further argued that should the rate of population growth fall, the 
land-owning class would definitely find Its income reduced as the 
Physiocrats had maintained. However, he saw this only as a possibility 
contingent on many factors and he viewed an increased birth rate as a 
conceivable consequence of lower living standards. 
Otto Von Mering in his text The^ Shifting and Incidence of Taxation 
(1942) referred frequently to Brown's treatment of a wage tax on a 
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33 particular line of work or occupation. Brown saw wages in the taxed 
line of work eventually rising to their original position relative to 
other lines of work and thus putting downward pressure on other wage 
rates. Mering objected to Brown's implication that labor and labor 
alone would bear the burden of the tax.^^ Furthermore, Mering noted 
that this was not compatible with Brown's view of the effect of a par­
ticular commodity tax presented here above. Mering was correct in 
part. However, Brown had qualified his position by pointing out that 
his conclusion required a redistribution of workers out of the taxed 
field which may not only be slow to take place but incomplete due to a 
lack of substitutibility in employments, tastes in work or the existence 
of rents in highly specialized areas of work. Mering's point as to the 
compatibility remained, yet Brown had indicated an awareness of this 
problem in the following passage: 
. . .  w e  h a v e  t o  r e o p e n  f o r  p o s s i b l e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  o u r  
conclusion, the case of taxes on commodities. For although 
such taxes may seem to be shifted, in large part, on con­
sumers, in the first instance, it is possible that in the 
long run some or all of the consumers (in our present prob­
lem, the wage-earners) will find the burden again shifted 
upon the shoulders of some other class or classes.35 
Brown's last case was the incidence of taxes on surplus or unusual­
ly high labor incomes. He described the present system of income taxes 
as a discriminatory tax where it applied to labor incomes. He con­
cluded that such a tax would not be likely to reduce the numbers in 
these high-paying areas, since advancement toward them would remain 
relatively unimpeded as long as lower incomes were not taxed at the 
same rate. 
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In an article published two years earlier and included in his 
text, Brown considered the incidence of compulsory insurance of work-
36 
men. The article was probably inspired by his dissent from the 
then common opinion that the incidence of such a tax would ultimately 
lie with the consumers of the goods produced by insured workers. Brown 
37 
cited Taussig as holding in general the correct view, and in the 
article he expanded and refined this view. Compulsory insurance pro­
grams were under consideration in this country, and Germany in 1884, 
Great Britain in 1897 and recently the state of California in 1916 
38 had implemented insurance programs. Brown examined in succession 
the cases where the insurance was general (paid by all employers) and 
where only high-risk industries were made to pay with consideration for 
the awareness on the part of the employees of the advantages of com­
pensation. He maintained along with Taussig that in the first case the 
long-run effect would be on labor markets and the incidence of the 
insurance premiums would fall on wage-earners alone with only minor 
qualifications. J. A. Brittain has pointed out that Brown assumed in 
addition to a fixed labor supply that "the tax would not increase the 
39 
money supply and have little effect on aggregate demand." In their 
text Public Finance, Earl Rolph and George Break referred to Brown's 
article as the original one to treat this subject.E. H. Downing 
in his posthumous Workmen's Compensation argued, as noted by Dorfman, 
that Brown had taken the marginal productivity doctrine to extremes to 
reach his conclusion.Downing, an advocate of such insurance, 
appeared to mistake Brown's position and implied that he did not favor 
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compulsory insurance when he actually did. 
Where insurance was required in only certain lines of work and the 
workers fully value the certainty of compensation in the case of acci­
dents, the result, as Brown saw it, was ultimately a reduction in the 
demand for insured labor on the part of firms and an increase in the 
supply of labor to the insuring firms. Thus, employment should remain 
the same at a wage lower by the amount of the premium. He then con­
sidered the situation wherein workers impute no value to the insurance 
and demand for the industry's product is inelastic. The workers, at 
least those who are marginal between their present and other employ­
ment, will resist wage reduction which would normally result in higher 
prices of the product. With an inelastic demand, consumers would tend 
to buy less of other goods which in turn would bring about lower wages 
and prices in these industries, thus compensating consumers in general. 
For Brown, the burden ultimately lies with the workers in other in­
dustries with no net effect upon the returns to capital and land. 
However, as noninsured workers are diverted to the insured lines, the 
burden would be shared more equally among all workers. Where the de­
mand is elastic, the result is the same but the impact of labor leaving 
the insured industry would be greater than the effect of redirection 
of spending on the part of consumers. 
Brown mentioned several qualifications to his argument such as 
possible efficiency losses, special cost and competitive situations and 
population effects. He wished to emphasize that his was a long-run view 
and that actual adoption of such programs would appropriately burden 
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employers initially. Also, if premiums were made to depend, for ex­
ample, on safety conditions at individual plants, the incentives cre­
ated for employers would have desirable consequences. 
Brown's treatment of the incidence of taxes on capital and capital 
income is similar in some respects to the early work of Arnold 
Harberger. He considered first the incidence of a tax on capital used 
in some but not all industries. This is comparable to Harberger's 
corporate and non-corporate division of the economy. It is also 
applicable to the question of the incidence of a tax on urban real 
42 property as was noted by Herbert A. Simon in a 1943 article. Simon 
therein indicated that conceptually a tax on urban property could be 
separated into a tax on site value and a tax on improvements, i.e., 
43 housing. 
Once again. Brown used the competitive case and noted that little 
or no shifting of the tax may take place in the short run. This would 
be the case were the taxed capital durable and specialized. The owners 
of such capital would bear the burden of the tax. However, in the long 
run Brown maintained that capital would tend to leave these industries, 
resulting in a higher relative price for their products. A possible 
imputation of incidence at this point was rejected by him as super­
ficial. For Brown, neither consumers of these goods nor workers in 
these industries were likely to bear the ultimate burden of the tax. 
Lower prices of goods produced with the nontaxed capital should, on the 
average, compensate consumers. In the case of labor, should the lowered 
productivity not be compensated with higher prices, migration to other 
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industries should approximately leave the wage level as before. Brown 
concluded that: 
The burden of the tax on some capital is finally (assum­
ing that it does not tend to decrease the aggregate volume of 
capital) distributed upon the owners of all capital in the 
taxed community.44 
He implied that this "distribution" would tend to burden what he called 
45 the "more strongly competitive capital." Simon in his article noted 
that: 
Professor Brown has performed a very valuable service, 
however, in pointing out that a tax upon a particular use 
of capital has repercussions upon income from capital in 
general.46 
Simon's "however" refers to his criticism of Brown's methodology, 
especially in that he made no explicit assumption about the elasticity 
of the demand for capital goods relative to that of all other goods. 
Peter Mieszkowski credits Brown with an early recognition of the close 
similarity of a general property tax (where the tax is at the same rate 
taxing all income producing wealth) and a general profits tax.^^ He 
objected, however, to Brown's conclusion that the entire burden of a 
property tax would fall on all capital's earnings. Mieszkowski went 
on to show how consideration of substantially different spending patterns 
among income groups would make Brown's view only partially correct. 
Turning to the case where all capital is taxed. Brown argued that 
the effect of the tax on the aggregate supply of capital would deter­
mine the tax's incidence. He pointed out that, with an open economy, 
such a tax may reduce foreign investment in the taxing country and 
increase overseas investment but he did not pursue this argument. He 
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felt that the effect of a tax on aggregate savings was a complex ques­
tion. He could not find deductively a satisfactory relationship be­
tween rates of interest and savings levels. What he described as the 
common supposition that savings will be decreased as rates of return 
are diminished by the tax he felt could not be regarded as a certainty. 
He pointed out that the tax may be shifted in part via higher interest 
rates to all capital users. Should, however, savings remain largely 
unaffected, the burden would fall on capital owners. He would only 
say that a tax which seriously decreased net returns would be likely 
to be shifted, especially in the longer run. 
Brown then examined the relevant aspects of property and income 
taxes as they affect capital income. He made a case for the proposi­
tion that a graduated tax on capital income would tend to discourage 
savings less than a proportional income tax of equal yield. He then 
traced briefly theories of taxation from the "ability" theory to the 
"equal" and "least" sacrifice theories and made clear his doubts about 
those theories which ignore market considerations. 
The possible incidence for excess profit taxes was analyzed. (In 
1919, such a tax had been enacted by Congress.) Brown indicated three 
ways in which this tax could be shifted. First, he thought that the 
tax may retard somewhat the redistribution of capital and secondly 
penalize risky industries. Finally, the tax might, as may a tax on 
capital, reduce the accumulation of capital. Brown did admit that a 
monopoly could be taxed so that no shifting of the tax was possible. 
But, he added that the cost and difficulties of evasion could still have 
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economic effects especially if the tax were viewed as being temporary. 
Brown wrote at great length on the subject of taxes on land. His 
conclusion that a tax on pure land value would fall exclusively on land­
owners and be fully capitalized in the price of land was the traditional 
one where static, general equilibrium analysis was employed. Although 
some writers in the past had attempted to challenge the view that a 
tax on land value could not be shifted, none did so successfully. Few 
ideas in economic thought remain sacrosanct. Martin Feldstein in 1977 
argued that shifting of a pure land tax could take place due to in-
49 duced capital accumulation or due to portfolio balance requirements. 
However, in response Calvo, Kotlikoff and Rodriguez maintained that 
whether there would be shifting depended on the nature of the life-
50 
cycle model used in the dynamic analysis. They went on to demon­
strate that a compensated tax on pure land rents would not be shifted 
in the long run in a life-cycle model with intergenerational transfers. 
On Brown's part, the only qualification of the principle were instances 
where a tax on land value actually taxed more than the site value in­
cluding elements which were better classified as capital. For Brown, 
the impossibility of decreasing the supply of land made shifting like­
wise impossible. Since Brown's analysis and advocacy of land value 
taxation are treated in the following chapter, I shall postpone further 
discussion of his arguments in this area. 
Brown discussed the incidence of taxes on the sales of land and 
capital as well as the incidence of taxes on loans and security trans­
actions. He found in general that the burden would depend on the 
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relative elasticities of supply and demand in the relevant markets. 
He chose to include consideration of import and export levies or 
tariffs. Considering a protective tariff as a tax, he concluded that 
in general the tariff or export duty burdened consumers more than it 
aided the protected producers. That some or all of a tariff would 
fall on foreign producers, Brown showed would require exceptional 
51 
circumstances. 
Brown's last article of significance on tax incidence, "The Inci­
dence of a General Output or a General Sales Tax," appeared in 1939 in 
52 the Journal of Political Economy. It represented a refinement of his 
earlier thought as well as a correction of some earlier views. His 
interest in this subject was perhaps sparked by the rise of state 
retail taxation in the decade of the thirties and what he perceived to 
be a faulty analysis of the incidence of such taxation. The then com­
monplace conclusion was that taxes on retail sales would be passed on 
to and borne by consumers. Due noted Brown as an exception to this 
view in his book which was completed in thesis form but not published 
until after Brown's article appeared. Brown's conclusion was that, 
with certain qualifications, such a tax would ultimately fall on the 
owners of the factors of production. Due said: 
It is interesting to note that no discussion of retail 
tax incidence has considered this aspect at all; the usual 
brief analysis merely indicated that the tax will pass to 
consumers, and ignored entirely the reactions on investment, 
unemployment and interest rates'which are inevitable under 
the orthodox theory of distribution on which the analyses 
are based.53 
In 1953, Richard Musgrave credited Brown with being the first to note 
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the fallacy wherein it was presumed that a general sales tax would 
raise the prices to consumer goods and not reduce cost payments to 
54 factors. Earl R. Rolph in 1952 commented: 
In 1939 Professor H. G. Brown demonstrated in a rigor­
ous fashion that a general system of excises is not shifted 
to consumers, does not affect the product mix, but does 
reduce factor incomes. For reasons not easily discerned 
his argument has rarely even been thought worth refuting. 
Brown began his argument by assuming that the tax would apply to 
"all lines of production" including purchases by the government. He 
implicitly assumed perfect competition in both the factor and commodity 
markets, a given supply of money and perfectly inelastic factor sup­
plies. Brown, as in other analyses, was vague with regard to the uses 
of what he assumed to be new tax revenue. Due suggested that he wished 
to assume that the use of the revenue would not alter the aggregate 
money demand for goods.H. P. B. Jenkins, however, interpreted him 
as having intended that the tax would not cause any additional diver­
gences between marginal rates of substitution of goods in production 
57 
and those in exchange. In any case. Brown was aware that collective 
versus individual spending patterns could alter relative demands for 
goods and have an effect on relative prices. 
Brown maintained that a general sales tax would not reduce output 
and thus prices need not rise unless for exogenous reasons the money 
supply were increased. Here, he appears to be following J. S. Mill 
He further argued that the reduction in factor incomes would be pro­
portionate which in turn implied that labor would contribute more than 
capitalists and landowners in absolute terms. He described the general 
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output tax as "in practical effect, the same as if it raised all prices 
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. . . without either decreasing or increasing money incomes." 
Brown then turned to a more practical analysis of state retail 
taxes wherein rates vary from state to state. Here, he found that 
retail prices would rise roughly by the amount of the tax in the tax­
ing state while slightly lowering retail prices in surrounding states. 
He saw the tax as driving a "wedge" in his terms between retail and 
wholesale prices. In a correction to the article, he stressed that: 
. . . average prices (counting producers', wholesale and 
retail prices and also individually received wages, inter­
est and rent and the governmentally received tax monies) 
as actually charged and paid in the markets, are not made 
either higher or lower by output or sales taxes, and that 
the average is, therefore, the same regardless of where 
the "wedge" is driven.^0 
He added in the correction that the additional transactions created by 
the collection of the taxes may slow the spending of money for goods 
which is the equivalent of saying that the velocity of circulation 
would be reduced. However, he thought this to be of little quantita­
tive significance. The existence of friction in the form of sticky 
prices and wages was used by Brown to show how the introduction of 
sales taxes may have contributed to the unemployment problems of the 
era. This obtains from his argument that in the long run the general 
sales tax could not raise commodity prices. 
Brown sent copies of his article to several economists who were 
specialists in taxation and received responses from among others, 
Howard Bowen and Richard Musgrave. Bowen praised the article saying, 
"I am glad that you have pointed out so clearly the true nature of 
102 
general output and sales taxes.Musgrave, although agreeing that 
the tax was likely to be shifted backward, felt that an increase in 
money velocity could also result in forward shifting of the tax.^^ 
Brown responded that he could see no reason to attribute a rise in 
money velocity to the imposition of a general sales tax, but did con­
cede that the velocity might fall slightly.®^ Musgrave expressed other 
objections which he elaborated on in subsequent publications and will 
be treated next. 
With one exception. Brown's article received no published response 
for several years. Due, in Theory of Incidence of Sales Taxation, 
appeared to accept Brown's reasonings if what he called the "tradi­
tional analysis" is employed and a given level of income is assumed. 
Due later came to refer to this as the "Brown Case" or the "Rolph-
Brown Case."®^ Rolph's paper cited above was a direct challenge to 
the orthodox view of sales tax incidence. He not only accepted Brown's 
view of sales tax incidence, but argued that it should be extended to 
the case of partial excise taxes as well. Both Due and Musgrave ob­
jected to the views of Brown and Rolph for different reasons. Due in 
a 1953 article found Brown's assumptions, explicit and implicit, led 
to a case of "very limited scope and usefulness.The assumptions 
of perfect competition with perfectly inelastic factor supplies do 
certainly limit the analysis; they do, however, provide a convenient and 
useful starting point for such analysis. The lack of a clearly stated 
assumption with regard to the effect of the new tax revenue upon 
product and factor demand was also emphasized by Due in his criticism. 
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Brown as mentioned above seemed to envision somewhat vaguely a neutral 
or minor effect. In 1953, Musgrave conceded that factor payments may 
fall but found fallacious the view that the tax would ultimately fall 
on the owners of the factors in a manner equivalent to a proportional 
income tax. "The direction of adjustment" for Musgrave "does not deter­
mine incidence.The difference for Musgrave was that adjustments on 
the income-uses side would not leave the two taxes equivalent as the 
market price for unripened capital goods would fall relative to the 
market price of consumer goods. Brown made no provision for "unripened" 
capital goods and appeared to have conceived the general sales tax to 
affect both capital and consumer goods whether purchased by the private 
or public sector. Jenkins writing in 1955 found that Brown was "not 
quite able to distinguish between the price effects of his tax and those 
67 
of his assumed constant quantity of money. However, he found Brown 
to be quite close to grasping the significance of the distinction be­
tween the direction of adjustment to the tax and the direction of tax 
shifting. Brown's statement as to the direction of adjustment given 
above was interpreted by Jenkins as a prediction of partial forward 
and backward adjustment. He faulted Brown for not attributing this to 
a decrease in the circular velocity of money in active circulation or 
the monetary effect of the tax. 
In conclusion. Brown's work in the area of taxation was an important 
contribution. Yet, it is understandable that it is only very rarely 
referred to in contemporary texts.From the post-World War II era 
on, the level of sophistication in tax incidence studies has risen 
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markedly, yet Brown's work should be counted as one of the bases upon 
which this advance took place. In particular, he may be seen as a pre­
cursor of a general equilibrium approach to the study of tax incidence. 
Arnold Harberger commented in a letter to the author: 
My respect for him is enormous. He belongs in a league 
with Seligman and Hotel ling as the best contributors to the 
literature of public finance over an entire generation of 
economists.®^ 
In addition to his work considered here, his analysis of land value 
taxation was extensive; this and his advocacy of land value taxation 
will be treated in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX. LAND VALUE TAXATION 
One year after Brown joined the faculty of the University of 
Missouri, the first major study of the single tax movement in the 
United States was published in 1916. Its author, Arthur Nichols Young, 
in a concluding survey, indicated that: 
The American single tax movement has not had large 
accomplishments either in the way of legislation secured 
or number of adherents gained for its essential principles. 
In his study. Young did not identify any academic economist who defended 
these "essential principles." In the succeeding years, Harry Gunnison 
Brown would move purposefully to fill this void. 
That the economics profession was opposed to George's proposed 
reform is not an unfair exaggeration. A simple listing of prominent 
American political economists who adamantly opposed the single-tax 
idea is indicative of the position of the profession. Beginning with 
2 3 William Graham Sumner and Francis A. Walker, a brief list would in­
clude John Bates Clark,^ Richard Ely,^ Simon Patten,^ Frank Fetter,^ 
8 9 E. R. A. Seligman, and Frank Knight. Outside of this country, a few 
of the notable opponents were Edwin Channan,^^ F. Y. Edgeworth,^^ and 
12 Gustav Cassel. This is not to imply that these diverse and prestigi­
ous scholars were uniformly hostile to Henry George and his ideas. 
Frank Fetter was influenced to pursue the study of political economy 
13 by George's Progress and Poverty. Seligman found support in George s 
14 
writing for his denunciation of the existing property tax system. 
Ely was careful to praise George for "bringing forth the land problem 
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15 
as one of paramount importance." 
The view of Brown as a solitary crusader is, however, misleading. 
Many economists of his time favored modified versions of the single 
tax, in particular where it would be applied only to future increments 
in the value of land. In 1904, Charles Fillebrown circulated a ques­
tionnaire to members of the American Economics Association wherein the 
statement: "It would be sound public policy to make the future increase 
in ground rent a subject of special taxation" was responded to posi­
tively by seventy-seven of the eighty-seven who replied.Thomas 
Nixon Carver,Frank Taussig,John Commons,and Herbert J. Daven-
20 port were some of the economists of the time with whom Brown could 
find varying degrees of affinity. Irving Fisher (according to Brown) 
21 
maintained a long silence on this question. Somewhat later, Irving 
Fisher along with Frank Graham, Raymond Bye and Paul Douglas expressed 
22 23 favorable opinions as well. Outside of this country, Leon Walras 
24 
and Knut Wicksell can be considered proponents of land value taxation. 
25 Brown's advocacy of land value taxation does stand in marked 
distinction to that of his colleagues of note, with the possible ex­
ception of John Commons. His position, as is to be seen, was some­
what between that of the orthodox "single taxers" and the "single-
taxers of a looser observance" as Davenport declared himself to be. 
Brown's advocacy, introduced by an article in 1917 titled "The Ethics 
of Land Value Taxation," would entail multiple considerations. First, 
theoretical questions in economics, such as the place of land in eco­
nomic theory as well as the meaning given to the concept of rent, were 
I l l  
treated in part in Chapters Two and Three in this paper. He was also 
concerned with examining the economic effects of increased land value 
taxation in defense of what he perceived to be beneficial outcomes, 
and refuting erroneous criticisms. As ethical or philosophical con­
cerns were endemic to the proposed tax reform, he addressed them as 
well. In addition, strategies on how to best promote land value taxa­
tion in such a manner so as to enhance not only its intellectual but 
political acceptance could not be ignored. Finally, Brown was forced 
to react to the changing social and economic conditions over many 
years as well as to the varying intellectual currents of thought. 
Brown incorporated the article mentioned above into a book pub­
lished in 1918 titled The Theory of Earned and Unearned Incomes. 
In 1921, he produced a smaller work titled The Taxation of Unearned 
Incomes, which was revised and expanded in a 1925 edition. This book 
27 in turn was expanded into The Economic Basis of Tax Reform in 1932. 
He published articles on land value taxation in.a wide variety of 
journals and when the American Journal of Economics and Sociology was 
founded, he became one of its major contributors as well as a member 
of its editorial board. 
Specifically, Brown's interpretation of the single-tax idea was that 
income derived from the site value of land (which he considered to be 
unearned) should constitute the first source for governmental taxation. 
A program then for tax reform would entain the eventual substitution--
to the extent possible—of land value taxation for all other types of 
taxation, which he found to be both economically harmful and 
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philosophically unsound. He never maintained that the revenues from 
the taxation of land values would suffice. His son, Phillips H. Brown, 
related to me that his father privately referred to himself as a 
28 
"tripie-taxer" and was willing to accept inheritance taxation, income 
taxation and perhaps use taxation (such a gasoline tax) to obtain the 
needed revenues that the taxation of land values could not generate. 
In addition, he was willing to entertain considerations which would 
allow landowners to claim some portion of their rent corresponding to 
site value. In contrast to Davenport, Carver and others, he tended to 
reject the view that only future increments in land value should be 
taxed. In this regard, and in implicitly arguing for a very large per­
centage tax on land value. Brown could claim little or no active 
29 
support within the profession. He rejected the natural rights and 
labor theory of value elements in George's thought as unnecessary to 
the support of land value taxation. Also, in contrast to some Georg-
ists, he did not feel that the tax program, in and of itself, was an 
economic and social panacea. Although he favored nationwide taxation 
of land values, he was, from the outset, willing to support (as he did 
later, quite actively) local experimentation with such taxation. He 
did, however, fear a too moderate or too gradual implementation of the 
tax program could blur the benefits and have, in some cases, perverse 
results. He noted in a 1930 article that 
I am sometimes spoken of a single-taxer by persons who 
are opposed to the single tax, while some of the thorough­
going single-taxers profess themselves not wholly satis­
fied with my orthodoxy. The truth is that I recognize the 
fundamental justice and common sense of the single tax idea.^u 
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As could be observed in Chapters Two and Three, Brown's arguments 
for the place of land in economic theory and the interpretation of 
economic rent had strong overtones of the classical writers, in particu­
lar Ricardo and 0. S. Mill. He frequently referred to himself as an 
economist "unemancipated" from the classical tradition, implying 
ironically that his opponents had gone too far in their break with the 
classical teachings. He thus attempted to fuse the doctrines of the 
classical writers, who emphasized the unique role of land in the 
determination of value, and the marginal utility analysis of the more 
"modern" economists. His key device in this attempt was his interpre­
tation of the opportunity-cost concept which he attributed to Davenport. 
Brown viewed long-run demand as being affected in part by the cost of 
production. He said: 
Normal or long-run demand may therefore be said to 
depend on the utility or desirability of the goods demanded, 
on the utility or desirability of the other goods which have 
to be sacrificed if these are to be enjoyed, on the dis­
utility or sacrifice of producing the goods necessary to 
pay for the goods, and, by way of comparison, on the dis­
utility or sacrifice necessary to produce, instead of buy­
ing, the goods desired.31 
This last comparison he maintained was equivalent to the opportunity-
cost principle of Davenport. John Commons noted that Brown had, some­
what inadvertently, shown the equivalency of Henry Carey's "dis-
opportunity value" and Davenport's opportunity-cost principle to the 
32 
"cost of reproduction." In simpler terms. Brown declared: 
There is a very real sense, then, in which the demand 
for an article, and the amount which consumers will pay 
for it, depends upon its cost of production. They will not. 
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in the long run, pay more for it than the amount of other 
goods which the same sacrifice will produce. 
He defined "land" as land space excluding fertility, improvements such 
as drainage and other items which he considered to be capital. The 
key property of land space was its nonreproducibility. Thus, land 
space could have no cost of production and constituted the most im­
portant element in what he called the second class of commodities as 
opposed to a first class of ordinary commodities, the demand for which 
depended not only on their utility but also on their cost of production. 
In this manner. Brown justified a separate treatment of land in economic 
theory. He added to this a related argument that the return to land 
space was unearned. 
That the economic return to land was not wholly earned by its 
owners was tenet of classicial political economy. Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo and J. S. Mill all tended to take his view. However, this 
proposition was vigorously and diversely attacked from the onset. In 
a latter day example in 1894, J. Shield Nicholson wrote: 
Mill himself was partly to blame for the excursions 
which he made into the applications of social philosophy 
to practice. It is these excursions we are indebted to ^4 
for the fantastical notion of the unearned increment. . . . 
In contrast, L. L. Price in an Economic Journal article in 1891 com­
mented: "The unearned character of a payment for the 'original and 
35 indestructible powers of the soil' can hardly be denied. , . The 
two statements are illustrative of a division within the discipline 
with regard to the manner and extent to which ethical or moral con­
siderations should be entertained in economic studies. The practice of 
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distinguishing earned from unearned incomes carried over into the 20th 
century in the language of economics; but it faced increasing dissent. 
Thomas Nixon Carver, for example, suggested as an alternative a tri­
partite division of forms of incomes received into earning, findings 
and stealings, under which increments to site values were considered 
findings.Herbert J. Davenport who labored to rid economic theory 
of such value judgments was, nevertheless, very reluctant to relinquish 
this distinction because this would excuse incomes which he perceived 
to be socially unproductive. He divided these into the capitalized 
37 bounty of nature, capitalized privilege and capitalized prédation. 
For many, the inclination was to reject such a division or to use the 
term "unearned" only in parentheses. However, usage of the terms was 
common even among those who opposed the single tax notion or socialistic 
views. 
In The Theory of Earned and Unearned Incomes, Brown presented his 
rationale for declaring the payments to the owners of land to be un­
earned. The marginal product of land or the "economic rent" was 
unearned in that the owner of land proportioned no equivalent service 
to the community. A renter received only a privilege to utilize the 
land while a receiver of an interest payment had proportioned a 
service in the form of saving. He went on to argue that the site value 
of land was originally zero and the present value is attributable not 
to its present owner, but to society. He made clear that unearned in­
comes were not unique to land. A monopolist's profit or wage was also 
unearned as were positive returns to disservices and negative services. 
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He argued that the transfer of land did not legitimize the incomes 
earned, even if "earned" income were used to purchase it. The new 
owner would, as had the old owner, proceed to collect, explicitly or 
implicitly, for the value of the services of the land which neither the 
first nor second owner produced. He asked: "Is such doctrine good 
38 
utilitarianism? Is its application good social policy?" Brown 
similarly viewed (with minor qualifications) the returns to the owners 
of natural resources such as mines, oil deposits, virgin timberlands, 
etc. 
Of course, Brown's position on these questions followed that of 
Henry George as did his proposed remedy. He rejected public ownership of 
land and other natural resources through purchase because it would 
represent a validation of unjust claims. Therefore, in a competitive 
business system, only the appropriation of economic rent through taxa­
tion for the general benefit would remedy the situation. 
Among the rebuttals to Brown's argumentation was a challenge of 
the terms "earned" and "unearned," with respect to incomes. Will ford I. 
King directly attacked such usage in 1921.^^ He noted that it was be­
coming increasingly common and that, despite the lack of sanction for 
it in "standard" texts on economics, many economists used it or admitted 
to its validity. He maintained that for practical considerations, the 
distinction was not useful nor could it be made so in a logical manner. 
He argued that all incomes were not necessarily earned but should be 
treated as such in economics: 
. . . the attempt to divide incomes into categories desig­
nated as "earned" and "unearned" seems to serve no purpose 
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and this classification appears to have been devised, not 
with an intent to aid science or statescraft, but in an 
effort to stigmatize the institution of private proper­
ty. . . .40 
Although the article was very critical of Brown's views, he made no 
immediate reply. John Commons did comment on the article in his Insti­
tutional Economics. He agreed that from the viewpoint of private busi­
ness enterprise. King's denial of the distinction of incomes was sound. 
However, from the viewpoint of society, this was not true due to the 
effects of speculation in land on industry and agriculture.^^ Commons 
agreed in part with Brown that income from speculation in land could 
be distinguished from other incomes because individuals do not create 
site value and thus speculation in site values represent no contribu­
tion to the commonwealth. 
A closely related question was whether, were land to be taxed, the 
current rent should be taxed or only the future increments to the rent. 
Several economists who were inclined to support taxation along "single 
tax" lines such as Taussig, Carver and Davenport adamantly insisted that 
only future increments be taxed. The taxation of these increments to 
land value derived from John Stuart Mill whose father James also advo-
42 
cated it as prior to that had the Scotsman, William Ogilive. 
Germany had experimented most extensively with such a tax and it was 
a controversial element in the Lloyd-George budget of 1909.^^ Arthur 
Young pointed out the province of Alberta was the first government in 
North America to employ a tax of this type. Knut Wicksell expressed 
an opinion on this subject, with which John Commons would have agreed: 
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Incidentally, once the right of expropriation of private 
land for public purposes is recognized, the proposed partici­
pation of the community in future increases in land values 
can hardly be opposed. 
Brown from the outset debated this issue, taking the side of the 
Georgists. 
Brown referred to the issue as one of "vested rights" in property. 
He attempted to meet the objection voiced in one instance by Fred 
Fairchild that to take a part or the whole of the value of land through 
discriminatory taxation without compensation would be like "changing 
the rules of a game, while the game is in progress to the disadvantage 
45 
of one contestant." Brown began with the analogy that an increased 
tax upon income (although personal income may not normally be capital­
ized and sold) was fundamentally no different from a like percentage 
increase in land value taxes. He noted that with an increased tax on 
personal incomes, "confiscation" or a violation of an implied pledge by 
society would be seldom mentioned in a discussion of a higher tax. He 
further noted that monopoly profits had been permitted in the past and 
the owners of the monopoly had certainly formed expectations of con­
tinued profits. In a similar manner, protective tariffs had been imple­
mented in the past, discriminatorily affecting incomes received. As 
the regulation of a monopoly or the removal of a tariff was normally 
undertaken without consideration of compensation for those adversely 
affected. Brown questioned why land value taxation could not be similar­
ly treated. In his view, the return to landowners corresponding to the 
situation value of the holdings was better seen as a tribute which 
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corresponded to no service, past or present, in the benefit of those 
who must pay it. Land-holding was only a negotiable privilege or fran­
chise which society could, should it so choose, remove most expedient­
ly through a program of gradually increased land value taxation. He 
felt that a gradual program, which would probably be implemented 
through local action, would not cause great losses to the majority of 
landowners, especially to smaller holders who live on their own land. 
Brown pointed out that the advocacy of taxing only the future 
increments was inconsistent if it was done to avoid the question of 
"vested rights." In a growing country, the capitalized value of land 
is likely to reflect in part the expectation of rising land prices, and 
to tax away these future increases in yield would be confiscation in 
the same sense as would a tax on the current yield. Admitting that the 
degree of confiscation may be less, he maintained that any defense of 
the more moderate approach relied upon arguments which would support a 
45 
more far-reaching reform. 
Brown's arguments on vested rights which appeared frequently in 
his writing received little reaction. Frank Knight, noting his own 
"altogether negative" view of the single tax, agreed with Brown that 
objections to the single tax were equally operative in opposing a tax 
only on future increments.Ward L. Bishop in reviewing The Economic 
Basis of Tax Reform said that Brown had made "probably as strong an 
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argument as can be made against the sanctity of 'vested rights'." 
An anonymous reviewer of The Theory of Earned and Unearned Incomes in 
a 1920 issue of the Political Science Quarterly said that Brown's 
120 
discussion of "vested rights" deserved attention. This reviewer also 
commented: "The book should disprove once and for all the shallow 
49 
myth that no economist has favored the single tax." Lastly, Harold 
Hotel ling in a 1938 article noted: 
The proposition that there is no ethical objection to 
the confiscation of site value of land by taxation, . . . 
has been ably defended by H. G. Brown.50 
The single tax idea, especially where moderately interpreted as a 
program to increase the taxation of site values and relieve the tax 
burden on "improvements," elicited arguments which tended to be more 
economic than ethical in nature. An exchange of articles in the Economic 
Journal on the question of the economic effects of the taxation of site 
values preceded and followed the Lloyd-George budget of 1909. The 
principal concern was the effect that increased site value taxation 
relative to taxes on buildings and improvements would have on urban 
population density. Edwin Cannan argued that the effect would be to 
disadvantageously increase urban congestion. He stated: "What is 
51 taken away in site values is simply slopped away in increased costs." 
By "increased costs," Cannan appeared to be referring to negative 
externalities arising from the greater population density. Edgar 
Harper and C. F. Bickerdike contested Cannan's conclusions. Bicker-
dike maintained that there could well be positive production externali­
ties and in addition, were the additional site value taxes earmarked 
52 for community improvements, the net result should be positive. The 
negative externalities would serve ultimately as a check on undue 
growth of the center cities. Of an altogether different disposition 
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were Charles Trevelyan and Joseph Wedgewood, M. P., who favored a 
nationwide program of increased site value taxation. Trevelyan argued 
that in the existing system, both urban and rural landlords "force" 
small manufacturing concerns to the cities, thus contributing to the 
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over-population there." Wedgewood, an avowed land-taxer, objected 
that the discussants had based their arguments on "purely utilitarian 
grounds" and had ignored consideration of freedom and justice. 
In the United States, urban congestion was not so great of a con­
cern at that time and the debate was ignored for many years here at 
least until the early sixties. However, single tax proposals and 
propaganda in this country and in Canada appeared to have provoked re­
newed opposition from many economists. The rebuttals to these charges 
were provided largely by Brown, Davenport and Commons. Alvin Saunders 
Johnson, a former student of J. B. Clark, published an article in the 
Atlantic Monthly in 1914 titled "The Case Against the Single Tax." 
Johnson reintroduced an argument of J. B. Clark's that the unearned 
increment played a vital role in this country's economic development. 
In his words, "It was the unearned increment which opened the West and 
55 laid the basis for our present collossal industrialism." He reasoned 
that the extension of the economically productive border of the country 
was hastened as the prospect of the increment induced pioneers to 
endure hardships and substandard present returns. A by-product of the 
western migration was the positive effect upon the return to the 
workers remaining in the eastern areas. In 1916, T. S. Adams used this 
same argument as one case of a more general diffusion of the unearned 
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increment. He concluded that "farmers and farms are more numerous, farm 
products more plentiful, and farm prices are lower, because of the un­
earned increment.In addition,he argued that the increment resulted 
in lower railroad rates. Both Brown and Davenport separately replied 
to these points in 1917. Brown first questioned whether the real in­
ducement for the pioneers was not the prospect of a higher return to 
their labor rather than a problematic rise in land values. Second, 
even if the prospect of rising land values was an essential part of the 
incentives, he questioned whether a more gradual spreading of the popu­
lation westward might not have been preferable. He also pointed out 
that the contentions made ignored the role of government subsidization 
in the form, for example, of the protection provided by the army. 
Davenport stressed in his article that the claim for the unearned 
increment was grossly exaggerated. To Adams he replied and Brown cited 
his statement later that: 
I submit that the net social result of sending men out 
where "farmers work for less than day's wages, if we measure 
his reward in annual income alone," is, so far, to waste the 
labor of each man. ... In the form of a mortgage on the 
future we have been paying the pioneers for wasting their 
time.57 
It is of some interest to note that some contemporary studies of the 
role of federal land grant subsidies tend to show that they were of 
dubious value. 
Richard Ely formulated another argument which sought to establish 
that the increments to land value were actually earned. In 1920, he 
suggested that the classical theory of rent had not adequately con­
sidered the costs which a landowner, urban or rural, incurred in the 
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period of transition from one use to another, higher one. The "ripen­
ing" costs were socially necessary for the land to reach the higher 
plateau of use, and thus the income from the utilization of sale of 
the land was earned. A land tax would then tend to force the land 
into production before the ripening period was completed and result in 
a lower productivity than could otherwise be achieved. Ely reasoned 
that the classical economists had been concerned primarily with agri­
cultural land and had not seen (as was clear with urban property) that 
bringing land into production required time and should not be con-
59 
sidered costless. Harold Groves suggested in Tax Philosophers that 
Ely's "ripening costs" seem at least in part to refer to interest and 
risk on investments. Brown would classify this as the capital com­
ponent of land value apart from its site value. 
Although Ely did not explicitly associate his theory of "ripening 
costs" with speculation in land, he did utilize expectations with 
respect to the future value of land. As seen above, J. B. Clark, 
Alvin Johnson and T. S. Adams saw land speculation as accelerating the 
utilization of land. Brown noted a seeming contradiction between this 
view and that of Ely who saw "speculation" as delaying the use of land. 
He also contrasted Ely's view to that of economists who maintained 
that land speculation resulted in very little land being held out of 
use. On several occasions Brown sought to defend George's thesis that 
speculation in land tended to "hold good land out of use, so forcing 
resort to poorer land, decreasing the productivity of industry, lower­
ing wages and raising land rent.In reply to Ely, he conceded that 
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some service may be rendered by land speculation, and cited Fisher's 
The Nature of Capital and Income in support of this opinion. However, 
he argued that disservices are likely to be rendered as well in the 
form of the economic waste entailed by the unnecessary extension of 
the infrastructure of services and in transportation costs. But he 
did concede to Ely that land speculation did not necessarily result in 
unusual gains on the average. He argued that George had not made this 
argument either. However, Brown felt that economic effects of this 
seemingly irrational "gambling" on the part of only a minority should 
not be ignored. 
Frank Knight, in a brief review of one of Brown's books, objected 
to the "familiar single-tax heresy that taxes on land value would have 
any appreciable effect in the way of bringing additional land into 
use."^^ From another perspective, Davenport opined that unless one 
hundred per cent of the rent of land were taxed away, land speculation 
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would actually increase with higher rates of taxation. He declared 
as a "fundamental" principle of taxation that any taxation should be 
proportionate to present income. Brown's differences with the two 
writers appear to lie in the nature of land speculation in the case of 
Knight and in the method of taxation in that of Davenport. Brown main­
tained that when both used and unused land were taxed alike, the 
tendency would be for the speculative return to land holdings to fall, 
thus increasing land usage. He assumed in his argument that the specu­
lator was not capable or was uninterested in making improvements and, 
in addition, tended to overestimate the prospective rise in land value. 
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Thus, the prospective return for such a land holder must fall relative 
to that of those who intend to make improvements on the land, regard­
less of the percentage of rent taken by the tax. Moreover, if taxes 
on capital were relieved as a result of the increased land tax, the 
differential would be greater. However, Brown noted that, in quanti­
tative terms, this advantage of land value taxation was relatively 
minor. Brown's reluctance to emphasize this advantage was not char­
acteristic of later expressions on the subject. He may have original­
ly felt uncertain as to the magnitude of the economic effects, which 
seem to rely on the size of the purely speculative forces induced to 
leave the land market as a result of the tax. 
Another argument commonly advanced against the implementation of 
high land value taxation was whether the site value of land could be 
accurately assessed in practice. Early opinions in this regard varied 
widely. Seligtnan said in one instance: 
It is quite impossible in practice to distinguish im­
provements on the land from improvements in the land. No 
attempt is ever made, in assessing land values, to differ­
entiate the two.64 
Brown pointed out that Seligman's use of words in this instance was 
confusing as the proposition was to separate site values from the 
value of all improvements. Alfred Marshall considered the difficulty 
"undoubtedly very great" but 
. . .  o f  a  k i n d  t o  b e  d i m i n i s h e d  r a p i d l y  b y  e x p e r i e n c e :  
the first thousand such assessments might probably give 
more trouble, and yet be less accurately made than the 
next twenty thousand.65 
Commons felt that the greatest difficulty was in valuing the fertility 
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value relative to the value of bare land and that urban site valuation 
should be easier and more accurate.Brown did not comment extensive­
ly on the problem. He conceded that the possibility of some unfairness 
existed due to inaccurate assessments. However, he viewed these as 
temporary problems, and argued that errors or inadequate data would cre­
ate minor penalties on thrift and improvement compared to a system of 
taxation which deliberately penalized them. In a 1970 study, Ursula 
Hicks commented that a number of countries presently use land value taxa­
tion so it cannot be said that it is not practicable.^^ In the same 
study, Kenneth Back said: "I am satisfied that highly accurate and con­
sistent land valuations can be established."®® He added that although it 
would be administratively feasible, it should not be assumed to be ad­
ministratively simple or necessarily less costly. 
Yet another source of opposition to the single tax notion was that 
land was an inadequate tax base. This was an early criticism which 
questioned whether a 100% tax on land would provide sufficient revenue 
for all public purposes. In that era, the question was largely con­
jectural. Brown, as indicated above, never held that such a tax would 
suffice. He argued that all that was required was that the economic 
rent be reasonably large; whether it should be adequate for local or 
other governmental needs was an irrelevant objection to its application 
as a first source of public revenue. The adequacy of land as a base 
for local governmental revenue continues to be a matter of debate. 
Many economists still feel that land value taxation would not be a sig­
nificant source of revenue. Mason Gaffney has argued that land values have 
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been underestimated for a number of reasons and other effects of land 
value taxation have been frequently ignored in attempts to assess the 
adequacy of land as a tax base. He concluded in one study that land 
values equal or exceed building values in the United States.Dick 
Netzer once commented on the local adequacy of land value taxation in 
a letter to Brown. He said: 
Once school costs are removed from consideration, the 
land value tax does come very close to satisfying the revenue 
adequacy criterion, I believe.70 
Brown, as noted above, was willing to entertain considerations 
which would allow landowners the right to retain some portion of the 
rental return. He agreed that, where land value had been increased due 
to street construction and the owner had contributed by way of special 
assessment, the owner was entitled to a return on this investment if 
one was forthcoming. He was more circumspect with respect to the 
return on what we would call "land development." He preferred to place 
this in a category of a limited service analogous to that of an inven­
tion. Thereby, he argued that possibly some special return might be 
allowed, but as with a patent, only over a limited period of time. His 
reluctance to accept a return was founded in his belief that the in­
vestors in such development projects should not utilize expected incre­
ments in land value in their calculations. He maintained that foresight 
with regard to the shifting or increasing of population rendered no real 
service and was not deserving of a special return. 
In discussing the "ability to pay" theory of taxation. Brown con­
ceded that there might be some adverse distributional effects in a heavy 
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reliance on land value taxation. He rejected the ability-to-pay 
principle as the sole basis for a reform of the tax system. In a manner 
similar to that of Commons,he maintained that if such a principle 
were to be applied, it must in the case that "earned" income be prevented 
from interfering greatly with the principle of "proportioning incomes 
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received to services rendered." The possibly adverse effects were 
that among those receiving a large proportion of their income in land 
rent may be found the "ubiquitous widows and orphans" and that among 
those receiving only a small portion of their income in land rent may 
be found the very wealthy. Brown responded in the first case that 
special provisions may be made and in the second that special taxes 
could be devised. His point was that these circumstances should not 
impede a tax reform leading to greater land value taxation and result­
ing benefits, both economic and ethical. 
Robert V. Andelson has noted that Brown on one occasion described 
73 himself as a Malthusian. To the extent this is true, it forms a 
marked contrast to the view of George on population. Brown did ex­
press concern with the results of overpopulation in general and rather 
openly advocated family planning in his texts.This concern led him 
to make a minor theoretical qualification to his argument as to the 
effects of greater land value taxation. He felt that such taxation 
might work, however slightly, to the disadvantage of families who pur­
posefully restricted their size so as to better endow their progeny. 
Brown was clearly thinking about the situation of a small, family farm 
with all land rent taxed away for the general benefit in times of 
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increasing population. This family in some cases in restricting its 
size may find its standard of living relatively reduced. Here, Brown 
would consider leaving the owner some portion of the rent so as to 
avoid this injustice. 
In 1924, Brown published an article titled "The Single-Tax Com-
75 pi ex of Some Contemporary Economists." He was undoubtedly aware of 
the long-standing mutual antipathy between professional economists and 
the followers of Henry George. One perhaps extreme example of the 
attitude of these economists can be found in a Francis A. Walker refer­
ence to George's proposal. He said: "I will not insult my readers by 
discussing a project so steeped in infamy.Single-taxers, mean­
while, tended to question the credentials of the profession, both 
scientific and moral. Brown's approach was more restrained in that he 
implied that the contemporary writers of texts in economics and in pub­
lic finance were in varying degrees the victims of a legacy of bias. 
The bias was expressed in an excessively negative and frequently 
erroneous conception of the single tax idea. He reviewed the treatment 
accorded the single tax on land values in several texts and was criti­
cized by one commentator for the causticity of his criticism of the 
authors. The basis of the bias was, he felt, a type of "defense com­
plex" wherein "a reasonable consideration of the merits of the case 
will not be tolerated.He further argued that the objectors had 
made rights in property a sacred cow and were unwilling or unable to 
consider the single tax proposal objectively. Among those criticized 
were E. R. A. Seligman, C. C.Phehn, Winthrop Daniels, Fred Fairchild, 
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Merlin Hunter and C. J. Bullock. Seligman, the most prominent of 
those listed, was thought privately by Brown to have attained a 
78 
stature in the field of taxation which was not wholly deserved. Jacob 
Viner had written a review article in 1922 on textbooks in government 
finance which was highly critical of recent publications in this area.^^ 
Two of his criticisms were cited by Brown in his article. In one of 
the cases, Viner charged Merlin Hunter with having misread Seligman 
and mistakenly stated that the impôt unique of the Physiocrats had 
actually been adopted and abandoned as a failure. 
Willford I. King responded to Brown's article with a rebuttal, 
on 
"The Single-Tax Complex Analyzed," about which Seligman commented 
81 
that it "effectively ridiculed" Brown's contentions. Whereas Brown's 
arguments were wry, King's response was not only clever in its mockery 
but even sardonic. King admitted that two of Brown's objections were 
valid and then proceeded to attack the single tax by reiterating, for 
the most part, existing arguments. King insisted, as had Seligman, 
that the term "single tax" be considered only in the precise context 
of George's proposal. Brown preferred to advocate greater land value 
taxation which he viewed as complementary to the goals of single taxa­
tion. He had asked that the particular argument of his article not be 
considered a defense of single tax principles, and perhaps for this 
reason, did not respond to King's article for several years. In 1943, 
he pointed out that King's views were typical of the authors of text-
82 books in public finance. Brown continued to be unrepentent in his 
criticism of authors whom he felt slighted land value taxation. 
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Brown described what he saw to be the "probable effects of making 
83 land rent the chief source of public revenues." He assumed that 
this would remove most of the existing taxation of capital. There 
would be a rise in the rate of interest and a fall in the price of 
land; interest rates would rise as the net return to capital rose 
until more savings was forthcoming; land prices would fall with the 
capitalization of the higher tax on land rent and also from the 
temporarily higher rate of interest. He then applied these effects to 
the case of a small farmer, noting that such farmers would have the 
taxes on improvements of all types reduced. Thus, all or most of the 
farmer's taxes would be based on the unimproved or "run down" value of 
their land holdings. The farmer could, then, accumulate wealth at a 
greater rate, and if indebted, they could pay off the debt more easily. 
Were the farmers marginal, in the sense that average earning were only 
commensurate with a fair return on labor and capital invested despite 
good management, they would pay only a nominal tax. Assuming that the 
necessary governmental expenses would be paid by better situated 
farmers and urban land holders, the small farmers, so described, would 
benefit from public services to which they were temporarily unable to 
contribute. 
Next, Brown examined the case of a prospective farm owner or 
tenant which would be nearly identical to that of a prospective home­
owner. Land value taxation would facilitate the purchase of land 
through the savings on the purchase price as the higher taxes on land 
value could be paid with the interest on the savings. To argue this. 
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Brown appears to assume that the prospective owner has the funds equal 
to the original price, and invests the savings. If so, he did not 
prove his point. He clarified this later saying that: 
. . . even if the lower price of land does no more than 
balance the higher tax on it, the reduction or removal of 
the other taxes is all clear gain.^^ 
Thus, he argued that tenancy should be reduced and prospective farmers 
aided. He envisioned the tax reform as a partial removal of an occupa­
tional barrier wherein those with very little means could begin anew 
in farming. He saw the land tax in 1932 as representing a lighter 
burden on farmers during sustained periods of low farm prices, as 
rental values of farm land would fall in these periods. He admitted 
that some farmers would be worse off—at least temporarily—as a result 
of the tax, but these farmers would, in general, be in a better position 
to bear this burden and should as well consider the interests of their 
progeny. 
Many critics of the single tax had pointed out that a one hundred 
per cent tax on land's economic rent was tantamount to a confiscation 
or nationalization of same lands. They frequently referred to this as 
a step toward socialism while others, such as Frank Knight, believed 
it to be the equivalent of anarchy.The confiscation of land values 
by the government was seen as economically disastrous as it would imply 
government ownership and management of land which would not attain the 
standard of efficiency achievable through competitive private ownership. 
Murray Rothbard commented in a similar manner on the scenario created 
by a 100% tax on land rent.^^ He argued that, upon the application of 
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the tax, land would become valueless or free and that owners would have 
no incentive to charge any rent. Thus, no revenue would be forthcoming 
from the tax, and furthermore no market allocation of the land sites 
87 
would be available and "everyone will rush to grab the best locations." 
The full implications of 100% tax were rarely discussed in detail by 
either the proponents or the opponents as the question tends to strain 
one's imagination. Some critics did stress the ensuing economic chaos 
of such a dramatic change in the tax as well as the property system. 
Brown, like other advocates, did not accept that a 100% tax was the 
equivalent of land nationalization. However, he would accept the reform 
would in a sense "confiscate" all site value. Property would retain 
"value" in terms of the improvements made upon it. 
Brown responded to Rothbard in a 1958 article arguing that his 
88 deductions were erroneous and contradictory. The owner's incentive 
to collect their rent, even should they own no improvements on the land, 
would be provided by the taxing body on penalty of sacrificing the title. 
In the more likely case where owners have invested in improvements, they 
retain an incentive to collect the rent to pay the tax and retain the 
title. Those who have not nor do not intend to make improvements on 
the land held could, of course, immediately give up their title, but 
the tax could then be collected from the renter were there one or with­
in due time the new owner. Brown argued that if land were to be in a 
"state of non-ownership" as Rothbard proposed, why then the chaotic rush 
to grab the best locations? He did not go on to answer the implied 
question of Rothbard, and of Knight as well, as to how an efficient 
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allocation of sites would be accomplished as the sites would remain 
economically scarce. Were Brown to have answered, one can suppose 
that in large part the allocation would be according to market princi­
ples with certain aid from governmental agencies. Ignoring the added 
difficulties of expectations with respect to the tax reform, the agency 
in charge, one could assume, would try to maximize the yield on the 
tax. C. Lowell Harris pointed this out in his commentary on Rothbard 
89 in the Critics of Henry George. Even with the 100% tax there would 
remain incentives to bid for the use of land on the part of those 
presently using it and those who wish to do so in the future. The 
agency controlling the title would grant to the highest bidder the 
right to use the land as long as the taxes were paid and to "sell" this 
right at their discretion. The bids would presumably be taken as 
revenue as well by the agency. Transfer or sale from one user to an­
other may present a problem even if assessments were accurately made 
on the potential yield of the land site. The problem would be one 
discussed previously; to what extent would "speculation" in land 
values perform a service in directing land to its most efficient use? 
Assuming it was minimal, then the land "market" would function on the 
basis of the expected returns to the application of labor and capital 
to the site although the site itself can nominally have no return. There 
are, of course, other possible complications but Brown would have 
stressed in this case the tax relief gained for labor and capital. 
Rothbard Knight and others were correct in pointing out in this extreme 
case the greater reliance on the auspices of governmental agencies in 
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terms of the requirements of assessments accuracy and the performance 
of its broker role. Yet, some urban and land-use planners might wel­
come the opportunities presented. Also such a radical change would 
be highly disruptive but as Brown and others maintained, no such 
change was contemplated nor thought practical. For Brown, the 100% 
land value tax was, I believe, an ethical ideal somewhat analogous to 
Marx's pure communism which did not demand immediate and detailed 
analysis. 
In 1936, George R. Geiger, a student of John Dewey, published a 
book titled The Theory of the Land Question. Brown was cited as hav­
ing read the manuscript and he strongly influenced portions of the 
90 book. Geiger's earlier work on Henry George had been critically re­
viewed by Frank Knight. Knight maintained that: 
There is no evidence, a priori or empirical, either 
(a) that speculative activity yields a larger return, in 
any representative sample of cases, than does activity 
where the results are actually in accord with expectations, 
or (b) that land acquisition or holding presents anything 
peculiar in comparison with other activities. 
Brown responded that George did not base his proposition on the belief 
that landowners receive an exceptional rate of return. To Knight's 
second point. Brown pointed out that George's view of land was analogous 
to slaveholding in that, regardless of the rates of return, the incomes 
derived were exploitive in nature. Brown constructed another analogy 
wherein at some nominal cost the ownership of a lake (Michigan) is 
acquired and charges for its use would then represent something "peculiar 
92 in comparison with other economic activities." Knight reiterated his 
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view in a 1953 article saying: "There is no socially-created unearned 
93 increment in the possession of landowners." 
Brown had occasion, in a 1941 "communication" to the American 
Economic Review, to chide Kenneth Boulding for an inconsistency in his 
Economic Analysis. He found fault with Boulding's definition of 
"economic rent." In one instance, Boulding defined it to be the re­
turn to any factor in excess of the minimum amount necessary to keep 
that factor "in its present occupation," and in another he substituted 
the phrase "in continuous service." For Brown, this minor slip was 
of importance as he wished to retain the use of the term "economic 
rent" to signify the rent of land exclusive of the return to improve­
ments. He asked: "Is the expression 'economic rent' now to do duty 
94 for every sense in which we may say that there is a 'surplus'?" Ben 
Fine in a recent article found Brown's question to be illustrative of 
the position of those who "reacted against the euthanasia for rent 
95 theory as a specific source of revenue tied to the land." 
In his later articles. Brown increasingly referred to the urban 
problems of slums, blighted areas and suburban sprawl. Land value 
taxation he thought would assist in alleviating these problems by 
creating incentives for improvements and lessening speculation in 
building sites. In addition, he felt that lower-cost housing would 
result and reduce the need for the subsidization of housing and home 
ownership. 
Studies of Australian land taxation by A. R. Hutchinson convinced 
Brown in 1949 that there was empirical support for the claims made for 
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96 greater land taxation. Hutchinson compared the Australian states 
based on the proportion of local real estate taxes levied on land 
value. He had ignored the state and national land taxes, as they 
produced relatively little revenue. (The national tax in effect in 
Australia between 1910 and 1952 has been discussed by many writers 
including, in 1960, Richard M. Bird who noted that analysis of the 
effects of the tax was complicated by continual alterations in the 
97 
rates and exemption levels. Bird found that when the tax was 
abolished in 1952, it provided only 1% of federal revenue.) Hutchinson 
found in those states taxing land value highly relative to improvements, 
in general, housing construction, acres under cultivation and popula­
tion inflow increased substantially in relation to those states which 
did not base the property tax largely on land values. Brown recognized 
that the study was not conclusive as there might not have been suffi­
cient similarity among the states, yet he felt it was a good prima 
facie case and worthy of further investigation. Mary Edwards recently 
has carried out a statistical study which supports Hutchinson's con­
clusions in that she found that the not-taxing of improvements tended 
to lead to an increase in the value of housing and the value of the 
go 
total housing stock. Brown served on the Board of Editors for a 1955 
publication, Land-Value Taxation Around the World, which remains a 
99 
unique resource for study in this area of taxation. 
While living in Pennsylvania, Brown became active in promoting 
local land-value taxation. In 1951, the Pennsylvania legislature 
passed a bill allowing "third-class" cities to voluntarily adopt a 
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graded tax plan wherein the cities could gradually assess land and 
improvements separately and increase the tax on land value relative 
to that on improvements.In 1913, Pittsburgh and Scranton had 
adopted a similar plan as had also the city of New York. The new 
plan did not set fixed limits on the ratio between land and building 
taxes. Brown and his wife aided in the attempt to convince city 
authorities to adopt the plan. The results were, however, disappoint­
ing, and they attributed this to a lack of understanding of the bene­
fits and the opposition of those with special interests.Recently, 
the fortunes of land value taxation in the state have improved with 
new cities adopting the plan and cities such as Pittsburgh increasing 
the ratio of land to improvements taxation. Steven Cord, an active 
supporter of this movement and editor of Incentive Taxation, was 
quoted as saying that the land-tax idea "has moved out of the hands 
of the aficionados and into the mainstream of local politics" in 
102 
western Pennsylvania. 
Brown was also active in organizations supporting the single tax 
idea and was a contributor to Land and Freedom, the Monthly Freeman 
and Henry George News among others and from its inception the American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology. As mentioned earlier, he served on 
the editorial board of this journal along with, for a number of years, 
two other economists, Harold Hotel ling and John Ise. Hotel!ing was 
sympathetic to land value taxation as originally was Ise, though the 
103 latter was shown to have altered his view by E. R. Brown. 
Intellectual and political currents during Brown's sixty odd years 
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of advocacy of land value taxation were generally not favorable to his 
cause. Progressive and populist movements existing in his early years 
were not drawn toward the single tax idea. Labor movements of a more 
radical bent were inclined to adopt socialistic programs. Moderate 
labor unions despite Samuel Gompers' support of George found in general 
no place for land value taxation in their agenda. The prominent intel­
lectual periodicals such as the New Republic, The Dial and the Atlantic 
Monthly, despite their vagarities over time, were never taken with this 
proposed reform. Despite the affinity between Georgist and libertarian 
thought, two of the latter's prominent expositors were adamant opponents 
of the single tax (Rothbard and Knight). Nor is there any traceable 
influence in the traditional political parties. 
The work of the Joseph Pels Fund, the Henry George Schools and Clubs 
and the Robert Schalkenbach Foundation in the promotion of land value 
taxation has not appeared to have commanded widespread attention. How­
ever, the ongoing efforts of the latter organization are indicative of 
the continuing attraction and relevancy of the ideas expressed by George 
over one hundred years ago. In academics, the Committee on Taxation, 
Resources and Economic Development (TRED) and the Lincoln Institute on 
Land Policy have been active and have published numerous studies. 
Among their members, several are sympathetic to increased land value 
taxation. The Critics of Henry George, edited by Robert V. Andelson, 
and Steven Cord's Henry George, Dreamer or Realist are recent works 
which have renewed interest in and respect for the work of Henry 
George. 
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In conclusion, one could note that questions as to the most ad­
vantageous land and tax policies to be pursued remain with us and 
their importance has not diminished. Brown's life-long work in 
demonstrating the relevancy of land value taxation to these questions 
forms a singular legacy for students whether they share his conclusions 
or not. Pinkney Walker, a colleague of Brown's at Missouri, commented 
that Brown chose to most actively support land value taxation because 
104 
so few economists were supporting any reform in this direction. 
His academic standing was certainly not advanced by his work in this 
area and was probably adversely affected. His persistence and deter­
mination reflected the strength of his conviction in his chosen cause. 
From the time of his first publication on the subject forward, it could 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. REGULATION AND RATE-MAKING 
An early area of specialization in economics dealt with theoreti­
cal and practical questions on the regulation of transportation and 
public utility concerns. The Munn vs. Illinois decision of the Supreme 
Court and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 moved the railroad in­
dustry toward a regulated status, and the 1906 Amendment to the Act 
gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the authority to set maximum 
rates. Along with the legislative and judicial bodies and the state 
and federal commissions, economists took an active interest in the 
attempt to regulate railroads in the public interest. That the "public 
interest" could be furthered by regulation was an assumption shared by 
all of these parties as well as, perhaps, the managers of the rail­
roads.^ 
2 Harry Gunnison Brown's first published article and his doctoral 
3 dissertation were concerned with questions related to railroads and 
rate-making. His interest may have been sparked by the economic impli­
cations of recent judicial decisions and legislative acts. Also, 
Arthur T. Hadley, then president of Yale University and a friend of 
Irving Fisher, was an authority on railroad economics and maintained 
4 
an interest in this field. 
Brown's 1916 Transportation Rates and their Regulation, published 
by Macmillan, was an endeavor to present a complete theory on the sub­
ject.^ In the preface. Brown cites John Bauer for a thorough reading 
and criticism of the text. Brown's 1925 article, "Railroad Valuation 
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and Rate Regulation," featured a defense of reproduction cost as a 
basis of valuation for rate-making.® This article sparked a long-
running debate with John Bauer and James C. Bonbright, among others. 
Alfred E. Kahn in 1970 referred to this article as containing the 
classic statement of arguments directed against the original cost valu­
ation method in rate-making.^ Brown's subsequent articles and exchanges 
centered on this and related questions. 
In a 1907 paper, Brown attempted to reconcile two views on how 
O 
railroad rates should be based. One view was that railroad traffic 
should be charged "what the traffic will bear," which would admit 
discriminatory charges. The other view was that charges should corre­
spond strictly to costs. He assumed that the railroads, whether com-
g 
peting or noncompeting, were subject to "increasing returns" due 
primarily to the relatively high overhead costs with largely constant 
operating costs. He noted that in these conditions, additional freight 
should be desired as long as it pays at least the "special additional 
cost" incurred. The question of whether the extra freight should in 
addition pay its portion of fixed expenses Brown regarded as an open 
one. He appeared to take "marginal cost" pricing as a first principle 
and regard the distribution of the fixed costs as dependent on the 
competitive conditions. He then considered the relative rates charged 
by competing railroads and noncompeting railroads in terms of dis­
crimination among places, commodities and corporations. He found as a 
generalization that competing railroads would, relative to noncompeting 
ones, tend to discriminate in favor of some cities, larger corporations 
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and certain commodities. The competing railroads would alter prices 
to attract business largely from competitors while the monopoly rail­
road would reduce rates only to attract new customers. Competition 
would force a reliance on cost of service as opposed to value of service 
and tend to distribute the fixed costs in proportion to direct costs 
incurred. He concluded that discriminatory reductions in rates were 
socially desirable as long as they result in increased traffic and not 
simply the diversion of traffic. 
In this article and another published in the same year on the 
similarities of monopolistic and competitive pricemaking,^^ Brown 
clearly was not thinking of the competing railroads as being competi­
tive in meeting the usual conditions for "perfect competition." Not 
only was his assumption of declining average costs over the relevant 
range incompatible with competition over time, but in the case of rail­
roads only a limited number of competitors is conceivable. He seemed 
to ignore the possibility of ruinous competition resulting in a monopoly 
for the advantaged firm. He did indicate that should both rivals follow 
a price-cutting strategy, both would lose, but then he retreated from 
the question.It is possible that he, like Hadley, as pointed out 
12 by Cross and Ekelund, did not believe railroads to be natural 
monopolies and thus the declining costs would not prevail in the long 
run. Nevertheless, his approach seemed to be that of comparing a 
monopolistic situation with that of imperfect competition, especially 
emphasizing in the latter the ability to profitably expand business only 
at the expense of rival railroads. Thus, the imperfectly competing 
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firms face a more elastic demand for their services than would a 
monopoly railroad. Brown termed this as the "relative responsiveness" 
13 
as opposed to the "absolute responsiveness" of demand. 
The similarity which Brown wrote of in competitive and mono­
polistic pricemaking was, in essence, that of the shared condition 
wherein marginal revenue equals marginal cost. He did not, of course, 
express it in this manner. He assumed that in both types of market 
structure, firms would search for a greater profit by altering their 
prices. Following Cournot in a (for him) rare exercise in mathe­
matics, he demonstrated how a firm would consider a price reduction. 
He identified the variables in the following fashion: P = original 
price, AP = change in price, (P-AP) = new price, S = original sales, 
AS = contemplated increase in sales, (S+AS) = total new sales, E = 
original total expenses, AE = change in expenses, (E+AE) = total new 
expenses. He expressed the condition under which the price reduction 
would be made as (1) (P-AP)(S+AS) - (E+AE) > P • S - E. Rearranging 
the expression becomes (P*AS-AP'S - AP'AS) > AE which in discrete 
form illustrates that price reductions should be carried out to the 
point where the increment to revenue equals the increment to cost. 
He elaborated his condition (1) by adding a return to new capital 
employed, (-i*C), and a return to risk-taking, (-R), to the necessary 
increase in revenue. Finally, he added a term to allow the firm to 
accept current losses, expecting as a result to gain higher profits in 
future years from the larger market share acquired in so doing. The 
discounted value of these additional estimated profits he added to 
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the left-hand side of the inequality as 
As noted, he felt that the condition as stated was applicable to both, 
monopolistic and competitive firms. 
While still at Yale, Brown reviewed several books for the American 
Economic Review in the area of railroad economics, most notably a 
15 translation of C. Colson's Railway Rates and Traffic. He also pub­
lished a long article titled "The Competition of Transporation Com­
panies"^® which he incorporated into his 1916 text. Transportation 
Rates and Their Regulation.• Despite his intention of writing a complete 
treatment of this subject, reviews of the book pointed out areas which 
were omitted or treated in insufficient detail. The reviews were, 
however, for the most part laudatory. J. M. Clark and Maxwell Ferguson 
recommended the book as a supplement to William Z. Ripley's longer 
text. Railroads, Rates and Regulation. J. M. Clark noted several new 
contributions to the field of study and had special praise for Brown's 
extensive treatment of freight discrimination.^^ Ferguson and an 
anonymous reviewer for the Political Science Quarterly found contro­
versial Brown's free trade philosophy which, they claimed, permeated 
the work. Ferguson also noted Brown's adherence to the "cost-of-
service" principle and concluded: 
In the opinion of the reviewer . . . the broad-minded 
analysis of rate discrimination, in the refreshing clearness 
with which the salient principles of rate making and rate 
regulation are set forth, and in the more even distribution 
of emphasis as between the "inner philosophy of rate regulation" 
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and the "mere record of past legislation and description 
of existing law," the author has produced a work which has 
much to commend it.l° 
In the following year, Brown included a condensed version of this book 
10 
in his Principles of Commerce. 
Brown's general approach to the subject of rate-making was to 
attempt to weigh the effects on the general economic welfare. Un­
justifiably discriminatory rates were, in his view, analogous to pro­
tective tariffs in that they discouraged commerce and created economic 
incentives and disincentives which tended to reduce society's welfare. 
In a 1933 review article, D. Philip Lockin distinguished three 
approaches in the literature of railroad-rate theory from the 1840s 
20 
on. The earliest view of Dupuit and others was that overhead costs 
best explained the differential pricing by railroads. In 1891, 
Frank Taussig challenged this view by arguing that railroad rates were 
21 primarily a case of joint cost and should be analyzed as such. 
E. R. A. Seligman criticized .Taussig's conclusion on the grounds that 
the existence of monopolistic conditions was the essential explanation 
22 for discriminatory pricing. A. C. Pigou's Wealth and Welfare of 
1912 rekindled the unresolved controversy, and he and Taussig carried 
on a debate in several issues of the Quarterly Journal of Economics 
23 
on this subject. One of the points of contention was whether the 
costs of providing railway service to different customers should be 
considered to be joint or simply common costs. Taussig preferred to 
extend joint cost analysis to much of railroad rates while Pigou saw 
common costs as prevailing in general. Pigou also opined that the 
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element of monopoly needed to be present to explain discriminatory 
rates. 
Brown commented early in Transportation Rates and their Regulation 
24 
on this exchange in a footnote. His view was that railroad rates 
were not perfectly analogous to the normal case of joint costs such 
as that of the production of beef and hides. A much closer analogy 
obtained when the case of back hauls was considered, and Brown saw 
this as a truer case of joint costs. He noted that as a railroad 
plant neared full utilization of its capacity, the complementary pro­
vision of services would become competitive. In his explanations of 
discrimination in rate-making, he utilized the overhead cost approach 
and found monopoly to be essential in exp^laining such discrimination, 
especially in the long run. Also in his general discussion of trans­
portation costs, he utilized the term "sunk costs" which he was likely 
25 to have borrowed from Fisher's Elementary Principles of Economics. 
J. M. Clark objected that Brown uncritically included the entire 
transportation investment in sunk costs and ignored the dynamic aspects 
of such investment. However, as suggested above, he agreed that 
unregulated railroads would charge "what the traffic will bear" in the 
sense where the competing railroad would charge what the traffic will 
bear "without being diverted," and what the traffic will bear "without 
being destroyed" in the case of a monopoly. He did not in this text 
express a firm opinion on the best test of the reasonableness of rates 
and on what these rates should be based. 
Brown was concerned in this text with the nature of competition in 
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railroad and water transportation as well as its limitation due to 
monopolistic tendencies throughout the industry. Some earlier writers 
on the subject had noted that competition in the railroad industry 
tended to be selective and opted to consider particular types of com-
27 petition. Brown expanded on the usual classification by distinguish­
ing: (1) competition of different shippers over the same route; 
(2) competition of routes; (3) competition of directions; (4) competi­
tion of location; and (5) competition directed against potential local 
self-sufficiency, (Earlier treatments had combined competition of 
directions and locations into the competition of and for markets.) 
Brown's first category applied only to water and motor vehicle trans­
portation. In terms of the competition of routes, he diagramed cases 
where more roundabout routes may be economically defensible. He pro­
posed that the long and short haul rule be arranged so that some level 
of economic waste be accepted in order to gain the stimulus of active 
competition. This might entail allowing slightly higher rates on 
intermediate traffic on the roundabout line to allow this line to 
remain in competition with the more advantageously situated line. 
The conditions where competition of directions could take place were 
shown by Brown to be more complex. He argued that where two or more 
lines led from a producing center in different directions to other 
markets, their rates could be competitive if, for example, there were 
other transportation lines capable of serving these markets from other 
areas. The additional lines could influence prices so as to make the 
original lines competitive in their rate-making. Competition of 
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locations existed where transportation lines compete in the sense that 
they attempt through offering low rates on traffic, to encourage the 
development of industries which utilize their services rather than the 
services of rivals in other locations. Closely related to this idea 
was Brown's "competition against potential, local self-sufficiency." 
The transportation line in this case would set rates so as to elicit 
traffic which would not otherwise be economical and in doing so miti­
gate against local self-sufficiency. 
Brown saw railroads as being, with few exceptions, partial 
monopolies in the sense that the various types of competition mentioned 
above would not alter a railroad's dominance over intermediary traffic 
over its lines. In addition, the tendency toward collusive behavior 
among railroads contributed to their ability to set rates as they 
desired. He argued, however, that competition among railroads was not 
inevitably of the ruinous type unless the railroads were operating sub­
stantially below their capacities. He believed that the era of specu­
lative railroad building was past and he thus maintained that legally 
enforceable rate agreements and legally recognized pooling would 
alleviate the discrimination in rates resulting from "cut-throat" 
competition. He argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission should 
sanction such open agreements in addition to setting maximum rates. 
Brown's views were somewhat unusual at that time, but they did reflect 
28 in part the earlier views of Arthur T. Hadley. 
All of the forms of competition which Brown had considered could 
result in discrimination in pricing among places. He proceeded to 
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delineate the cases where the resulting discrimination was economi­
cally undesirable and where it was economically defensible. From the 
viewpoint of the general community welfare, he found economic waste 
when railroads discriminated in favor of competitive and against 
intermediate traffic. He reasoned that where rates were discrimina­
tory, the average utilization of railroad plant capacity ms not 
furthered. The discrimination over time would arbitrarily deprive 
certain areas of the benefits of their natural advantages with regard 
to economic development, while encouraging development of areas which 
possessed less economic potential. In a similar vein, he argued that, 
should the equally promising intermediate locations be disadvantaged 
by discriminatory rates, then transportation patterns would be dis­
torted in an uneconomic fashion. He maintained that discrimination of 
this type resembled a protective tariff in its economic consequences. 
He also objected to discrimination for or against imported goods in the 
setting of railroad rates. In addition, the practice of state com­
missions of setting unduly low rates on intrastate traffic to encour­
age local production he found to be objectionable. 
Brown next examined cases in which rate discrimination among 
places could be deemed economically defensible. He found discrimina­
tion to a limited degree against intermediate points on roundabout 
routes to be acceptable. The limitations would be that no rate be 
set below the additional cost involved for competitive or through 
traffic, and no greater for noncompetitive traffic than that which 
would insure a reasonable return on the capital required to carry the 
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traffic. He recognized that, in practice, such rate settings would be 
a complex matter and could only be approximated so as to leave the two 
lines in the same competitive conditions as had prevailed before regu­
lation. Were the traffic on the direct line relatively light, then the 
company may be allowed to discriminate against intermediate traffic to 
maintain its competitive position. He also found justifiable low rates 
which favored points in competition with water routes as opposed to 
points connected only by rail lines. Discrimination in favor of 
traffic which is competitive with potential local self-sufficiency was 
also found to be desirable as long as goods could be delivered at less 
than the local cost of production and pay at least their marginal cost 
of transport. Brown argued that, under certain circumstances, dis­
crimination in favor of goods transported for export could be ad­
vantageous. This was where net earnings to transportation industries 
rose as a result, and the gain to domestic producers offset the loss 
to consumers. Finally, the case of discrimination between opposite 
directions in the rates charged different goods was considered. This 
referred largely to the question of the pricing of back hauls, and he 
found discrimination here to be acceptable as it would lead to a great­
er utilization of transportation facilities. Brown's analysis of 
discrimination predated the emergence of air and truck transport as 
viable alternatives to rail and water transport. Although this would 
complicate questions of discrimination, his general principles would 
still have application. (Alfred E. Kahn noted that he drew heavily 
on Brown's examples and discussion in a section of The Economics of 
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on 
Regulation on rate-making in the presence of competition. Kahn also 
had praise for "his painstaking elaboration of the consistent economic 
principles for the guidance of regulatory policy. 
Brown then summarized the development of rate regulation and 
examined the rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission on what 
constituted "reasonable" rates. He emphasized the difficulties involved 
in determining rates due to the variety of railroad services and the 
extent to which joint costs prevail. The I. C. C. rulings took into 
account in their decisions comparisons of rates, cost of service, 
earnings and the efficiency of management. Brown concluded that the 
Commission tended to follow where possible the cost-of-service princi­
ple. He also noted that reasonable rates should be a reasonable return 
on the fair value of railroad property. As to whether a fair value was 
better represented by the original investment or the present physical 
value, he opined that the Commission was somewhat equivocal in its rul­
ings but tended to favor the latter. Brown next examined representa­
tive cases where the Commission ruled on instances of discrimination 
among places, goods and shippers. He found occasion to criticize some 
rulings as being inconsistent with the principles he had elaborated 
earlier. 
In his final chapter. Brown roundly criticized governmental inter­
ference and subsidization of transportation. He argued that naviga­
tional laws designed to develop a national merchant marine and exclude 
foreign vessels from coastal trade were economically unsound. With the 
possible exception of certain defense considerations, he objected to 
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subsidization of shipping in the form of harbor or river improvements 
at public expense. Even where it was deemed necessary for the govern­
ment to spend to improve waterways, he argued that the localities 
clearly benefited should pay and, if possible, through user charges. 
He also objected to the "pork barrel" or "log-rolling" influences in 
governmental decisions which tended to prevail in the above actions 
as well as in the setting of protective tariffs. The subsidies for 
railroad building and in particular the land grants to railroads were 
similarly questioned. He argued that these policies were of dubious 
benefit in terms of economic development and represented to some de­
gree an unsanctioned redistribution of wealth. He indicated that 
there was no way to determine whether these policies had led to an 
enlargement or shrinkage of national wealth as no means of comparison 
existed, but he maintained that, in terms of general principles, the 
policies did not appear to have been advisedly adopted. It may be 
noted here that Brown rarely discussed anti-trust policies. When he 
did, he appeared to accept the existing legislation and encourage its 
rigorous enforcement. In the thirties, he adamantly opposed the re­
laxation of the laws. 
The Supreme Court decision of 1898 in Smyth vs. Ames provided a 
criterion by which to judge the reasonableness of rates set by the 
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state commissions. The criterion proved not only to be very vague but 
also to be the subject of controversy until the Hope Case of 1944 
32 
reversed it. The Court had mentioned in its criteria that consider­
ation be made for the "original cost of construction" and for the 
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"present as compared with the original cost of construction" along 
with several other factors. A rising general price level (especially 
during World War I and post-war era) sharpened the controversy as to 
whether "original costs" or "reproduction costs" should be the prime 
consideration in rate determination. The railroads then favored the 
use of reproduction costs while the regulatory commissions tended to 
favor the use of original costs. Justice Louis D. Brandeis in his 
dissent in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Case of 1923 attacked the 
33 Smyth vs. Ames decision as "legally and economically unsound." 
He favored a prudent investment basis of earnings control and found 
the reproduction cost method of valuation to be the cause of great and 
continuing difficulties in rate determination. His view echoed that 
of several economists specializing in railroad and public utility 
economics. One of their number, I. Leo Sharfman, was criticized by 
Brown in 1922. Sharfman in his The American Railroad Problem: A 
Study in War and Reconstruction had advocated that an original cost 
basis be employed with the qualification that the original investment 
had been made prudently. Brown declared the issue "to be clearly 
3ZL joined" in a review of the book. ' The reproduction cost approach 
which he favored was qualified as "the cost of bringing into existence 
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a plant capable of performing the required service." Also he indi­
cated that he favored policies which would, to the extent possible, 
make the returns to a quasi-monopoly conform to those which arise 
under competitive conditions. Most of his criticism of Sharfman's 
views was made more extensively in a later article. 
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This later article, titled "Railroad Valuation and Rate Régula-
tion," appeared after Frederic G, Dorety (then Vice-President and 
General Counsel of the Great Northern Railway) had contested Judge 
37 Brandeis's views in a Harvard Law Review article. Dorety's article 
contained both legal and economic arguments for the continued con­
sideration of reproduction costs. Brown gave no indication of having 
read this article and subsequent critics tended to group it with 
Brown's article and respond primarily to Brown. In his article, 
Brown noted that, just as the courts were beginning to emphasize the 
cost of duplicating a service, a number of economists had begun to 
insist that only the original cost or original investment be con­
sidered. He first criticized on grounds of fairness the original-cost 
doctrine, interpreted without qualification to be the original money 
cost. He argued that should the price level fall significantly, and 
if valuation is based on original costs, the returns to investors were 
in effect guaranteed relative to other investors at the expense of the 
consumers of the service. In the event of rising prices, he maintained 
that, with the reproduction cost standard, neither the public nor the 
investors taken as a whole would lose or gain in real terms. He did 
note that bondholders would lose to the benefit of the stockholders. 
Brown was unhappy with the high percentage of bond investment in rail­
roads and utilities and suggested that measures to redress the balance 
would be beneficial. (He appeared to assume that railroad and/or 
utility costs would move coincidentally with the general price level 
and that lags in the adjustment of rates did not occur.) 
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Brown's greater concern was with the economic consequences on 
allocations which would result from original cost methods. Once 
again, with changes in the price level, traffic would tend to be 
unduly discouraged or encouraged. He maintained that when prices 
fell, rates based on original cost would remain relatively high and 
create a distortion in that they would not conform to the "rule" of 
charging only enough to cover the extra or additional cost incurred 
and thereby discourage traffic. On the other hand, with a signifi­
cant inflation, the original costs method would result in rates lower 
than would yield a reasonable rate of return on the present cost of 
38 
construction while unduly encouraging railroad traffic. This could 
lead to traffic exceeding the capacity of the plant and force a ration­
ing of service with further undesirable results. Also construction of 
new facilities at higher costs and the charging of higher rates would 
force an arbitrary discrimination among shippers or other consumers 
39 
and ultimately result in the misallocation of industry and population. 
He applied the same reasoning to the case where price changes affected 
only the costs of construction and maintained that, in general, 
economic loss would result, were actual, past cost the basis of rate-
making. 
Brown turned next to an element in the valuation of railroad 
property--that of the value of land. Despite his own views on land 
value taxation, he indicated that the original cost method of valua­
tion was an inappropriate way of denying the increments in land value 
to the owners of railroads and public utilities. He argued that such 
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a denial would tend to discourage the building of railroads as the 
potential buyers of land for other than railway use could receive incre­
ments to the value of other land. Brown's remedy, of course, was to 
tax all land values equally. He explained that where compensation of 
some form was to be provided for the loss of the unearned increment 
in land values, further economic distortion would be the result. 
On more practical grounds, Brown conceded that for "short periods" 
regulatory commissions should properly rely on actual book costs. 
However, if actual costs have widely diverged from the current costs 
of production, the latter must be given priority. 
An important remaining question was how to treat depreciation and 
obsolescence in rate-making. Brown's view was that, all other things 
being the same, these factors should not be allowed to influence rates 
over the life of a plant. Thus, rates should be set so as to meet the 
repair and replacement costs plus a fair return for the life of the 
plant. A properly graduated depreciation fund would allow the rates 
to be invariant with respect to these costs. He noted as well that in 
the early period of low utilization of a plant, it may be appropriate, 
as patronage grows, to add these early losses to the cost of construc-
40 tion or duplication. 
Finally, he considered the special case of "weak" versus "strong" 
railroads wherein both roads connect the same terminals. He reasoned 
that if the "weak" road could not support itself by charging enough on 
intermediate traffic to maintain rates competitive with the "strong" 
road, then abandonment of the line should be considered. Rates set 
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in a manner to allow the "weak" road to survive would create a mis-
allocation of resources. Even the consolidation of the two lines 
would not necessarily resolve the difficulty, as pricing schemes would 
either uneconomically favor the terminal or intermediary points or 
discriminate unfairly among shippers. If the "strong" railroad's 
advantage was due entirely to its control over the best location, 
and if it was not capable of carrying all traffic, then he conceded 
that the costs and valuation of the "weak" road should determine the 
rates, leaving the "strong" road with a return in excess of what it 
could otherwise earn. He felt that only taxation and not regulation 
41 
was the proper means for the community to secure this economic rent. 
James Bonbright wrote a review article on contemporary books 
dealing with valuation in a 1925 issue of the Quarterly Journal of 
42 Economics. He mentioned Brown's article in two different contexts. 
He suggested that the current literature in favor of a simple actual 
43 
cost base of rate control had ignored the problem of economic rent. 
He noted that the low, actual cost rates on utilities or transportation 
services amidst greater land values and construction costs would not 
necessarily be of benefit to the community at large. Landowners may 
be able to increase the rent on properties served by the utilities or 
railroads and in doing so benefit disproportionately from the low 
rates. Although Brown did not use this approach, it accords with his 
view that regulation would only redistribute land value increments 
among certain groups and not benefit the public as a whole. Bonbright 
further noted that all of the books reviewed, including one by John 
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Bauer'^'^ (the only one for which he had praise), failed to effectively 
answer the criticisms Brown made of the original cost basis of rate-
, . 45 
making. 
John Bauer responded to Bonbright's challenge within the year 
Bauer was at the time and continued for many years to be a distinguished 
specialist in this area, as also was Bonbright.^^ He had, unlike Brown, 
practical experience in working with regulatory commissions. Although 
he believed that the use of reproduction cost in regulation decisions 
would "destroy" regulation, he did not immediately assault Brown's 
economic rationale. He said: 
I shall frankly state that except for the requirements 
of effective rate regulation and financial stability, I should 
agree with Brown that the reproduction cost basis would be 
more in harmony with general economic forces.48 
He, therefore, focused on practical considerations and tried to demon­
strate that Brown's objections, although in the main economically 
sound, were of little consequence in actuality. 
Taking practical consideration into account, Bauer argued that 
reproduction cost was far too indefinite a base and the concept had led 
to endless controversy in the past. Not only was such a base difficult 
to measure as well as reach an agreement on how to measure, but it was 
continually changing as well. He pointed out that approximately 
seventy-five per cent of railroad expenses were in the form of operat­
ing costs and taxes which were calculated on an actual cost basis. The 
remainder, the return on investment, should have a definite basis to be 
calculated upon, and actual or original cost was the most expedient 
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choice. In addition, to obtain a desirable level of financial sta­
bility for railroads and public utilities, the original cost basis 
would be best suited. He noted in this regard that bond issuance was 
the major form of financing these institutions and that inflation would 
tend to incite speculation in railroad and utility stocks while a 
deflation would exert exceptional pressure on the vulnerable financial 
structures. 
In his reply to Bauer, Brown noted that in emphasizing reproduc­
tion costs, the courts did so in part because of the perceived unre­
liability of actual cost figures and the accounting associated with 
them. Despite the inherent inexactness of reproduction cost esti­
mates, he insisted that their economic importance was such that 
they could not be ignored when they markedly differed from actual cost 
figures. He further countered that the financial structure of rail­
roads and utilities was not unique nor deserving of special guarantees. 
Should companies be forced into receivership, he believed that re­
organization could be accomplished without undue harm to the interests 
of the public. 
Turning to Brown's economic arguments, Bauer maintained that Brown 
had exaggerated the potential divergence between calculations of 
reproduction cost and original cost in several respects. Bauer ques­
tioned whether an actual cost basis would discourage investment in a 
period of rising prices. He argued that: 
. . . the actual cost basis would provide all the capital 
economically needed to take care of a developing business 
but would not exercise any artificial influences in stimu­
lating or retarding the flow of capital.50 
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His interpretation of the "artificial influences" was that the repro­
duction cost basis in an inflation would stimulate investment, assum­
ing adjustment in rates was promptly made. In reply, Brown argued 
that such investment would be economically irrational and that the 
substitution effects resultant of the return to regulated industries 
falling relative to that of other industries was his real concern. 
Bauer questioned the importance accorded to the expectations of 
buyers of railroad or utility stock with respect to not only a rising 
price level but also to increments in the value of land. In reply. 
Brown noted that they may indeed, in some cases, be of little im­
portance but they remain as reasons for the present cost of the neces­
sary plant to provide the service diverging from the original cost of 
the plant. Bauer also asked why should not the public deny to rail­
roads and utilities the "unearned" increments to their land values 
given the conceded element of public interest in these businesses. 
Bauer stressed that even the twenty-five per cent of the expenses 
of railroads corresponding to the return on investment would be the 
subject of gradual adjustment over time, and thus the small percentage 
of costs which are not reflected would be counter-balanced by the gains 
resulting from the ease of application and stability permitted by the 
original cost formula. He also questioned whether the construction of 
new facilities was, in the case of railroads and utilities, a reason­
able possibility such as to create a conflict in rate structures be­
tween old and new plants. He emphasized in the case of utilities their 
local nature in that they have become, due to differing histories, each 
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a special case and the problem of comparing old to new properties is 
then nonexistent. Brown replied that construction of new trackage to 
accommodate increasing demand was not altogether an unlikelihood, and 
so his point stood. However, he recognized that increased competition 
of other types such as trucks and airplanes may reduce the need for new 
construction in the future. He also defended his use in his examples 
of large price changes. Bauer found such use too unrealistic and, 
even accepting them, the effects of the price changes would be reduced 
due to the structure of railroad costs. Brown maintained that the 
extreme conditions which would result in large price movements were 
recurrent in history and at the present in evidence in Europe and to 
a lesser extent in the United States. For there to be dramatic 
changes in the costs to the industry, he pointed to technological 
breakthroughs or inventions as sources for such changes. He concluded 
his reply to Bauer by insisting that valuation based on reproduction 
costs should continue to play a role in regulation despite the diffi­
culties it presents in application. Where the book valuation is 
thought to have diverged significantly from present costs, then the 
book costs should be modified with index numbers of general and 
specific price changes and compared with the engineering estimates. 
The courts and the commissions could then utilize all this information 
to make their decisions. For Brown, the added difficulty should prove 
51 to result in a worthwhile economic dividend. 
In 1927, John Bauer was the chairman of an A. E. A. Round Table 
52 Conference on the problem of effective public utility regulation. 
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Of the participants in the discussion, only Brown spoke in defense of 
the use of reproduction cost. As reported by Bauer, Brown reiterated 
his position that original cost pricing did not accord with the princi­
ple of seeking to make rates of public utiliites correspond to rates 
which would prevail under competitive conditions. He also disagreed 
with proposals which would tend to assure the financial stability of 
public utilities. All of the participants challenged Brown's points 
of view. Robert Hale accused Brown of tacitly assuming a greater 
mobility of capital than was practicable in the cases of utilities and 
53 
railroads. He was joined by Professor Ruggles in insisting that the 
public interest in utilities was sufficient to justify spreading the 
risk-taking in utility investments beyond the investors, to the com-
54 
munity or to the general public. Clarence E. McNeill brought up the 
question of the elasticity of the demand for utility services. Accord­
ing to his studies, the demand was "peculiarly" inelastic, thus the 
effects suggested by Brown would be of negligible importance. Finally 
James Bonbright, noting that Brown's actual proposal was to ascertain 
the present cost of the most economical plant that might be constructed, 
concluded that the financing of utilities would become "utterly un­
es 
manageable." It was agreed that in the next meeting the subject be 
discussed once more. 
At this meeting a year later, Bonbright and Arthur Hadley pre­
sented the major papers and the comments by I. F. Sharfman and Brown 
were recorded as wellHadley's paper dealt with the economic mean­
ing of valuation, while Bonbright's compared the merits of reproduction 
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cost versus prudent investment approached on four different grounds. 
Bonbright stated that with respect to the criterion of efficiency, 
reproduction cost interpreted as the cost of providing the service with 
a new plant, did have advantages over original cost. However, he 
viewed the application of such a standard to be impossible. He also 
noted the adverse cyclical effects of original cost pricing as 
opposed to reproduction cost pricing, but he felt that this was of 
dubious importance. In his discussion of the concept of using repro­
duction cost as a means of attaining rates at competitive levels, he 
directly attacked Brown's and Dorety's argument that this was neces­
sarily the correct approach to the problem of rate setting. He pointed 
out what he saw as the "fatal flaw" in Brown's reasoning, accepting for 
the sake of argument that the cost of reproducing the service was a 
practical rate base. He pointed out that reproduction cost pricing of 
services would not conform to the ideal of marginal cost pricing any 
more than would prudent investment pricing. He further stated: 
Even Professor Brown, who is the leader in this type of 
defense, recognizes in a measure the dilemma in which he is 
placed. For while conceding that a price based simply on 
variable costs would come closest to meeting his ideal as a 
regulator of socially desirable traffic, he recognizes that 
the application of such a principle would be quite impossi­
ble on grounds of financial expediency.57 
Bonbright's solution was to allow railroads and utilities to charge 
rates which would, in many cases, be in excess of a fair profit on 
investment and invoke the recapture clause of the Transportation Act 
of 1920 to normalize profit taking. 
In response. Brown admitted that reproduction cost prices would be 
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likely to vary from the ideal of long run marginal cost pricing. How­
ever, he maintained that on practical grounds, the better regulatory 
policy was to allow returns only as high as is necessary to earn a 
reasonable return on the current cost of plant construction. Where 
the plant capacity was only partially utilized, he argued that low 
(marginal cost) rates would ultimately retard economic development as 
a fuller utilization of capacity was achieved. He asked: 
. . . how test, in the long run ,  the desirability of such 
(new) construction other than by charging rates high enough 
to yield a return thereon, and so judging whether there 
would be enough business at those rates to justify the 
construction?^^ 
He also added to his earlier arguments against strict reliance on 
original cost by pointing out that when the obsolescence of a plant 
was accelerated, to insist that the public continue to pay on the 
basis of original cost was to impose on the public the rule of "dead 
hand." 
Brown continued to support his position in an address to the 
59 American Bar Association and in an article in the Public Utilities 
Fortnightly.^*^ On these occasions for the most part, he reiterated 
his early arguments. He did, however, emphasize that he thought that 
no formula could be devised to directly determine regulatory rates. 
He also noted that rates are changed only at intervals in the regula­
tory process and that the efficiency of management became a large factor 
in the firm's profitability. After 1930, he made no further comments 
on the issues other than in the various editions of his textbooks. 
The question (as Brown left it at that juncture) was probably 
173 
carried by the proponents of the use of original cost as the rate base 
(or some variation of it). However, as Bonbright pointed out in a 
1940 paper, it was largely on the grounds of administrative feasibility 
and better financial adaptation that writers in the area favored this 
approach.A final verdict on the purely economic merits of the two 
approaches remained, at least in part, unresolved. M. G. de Chazeau 
strongly challenged the application of either method to the determina­
tion of service charges as distinct from the determination of appropri­
ate earnings.Hotel ling's advocacy of pure marginal cost pricing 
questioned the relevancy of the use of average cost pricing implicit 
CO 
in both the original and present cost approaches. Brown's arguments 
as to the distortionary effects of original cost based pricing en­
counter the problem of the "second best." His premise that the at­
tempt to set prices of public utility services at competitive levels 
would further economic efficiency is also brought into question as is 
the case for marginal cost pricing. 
Brown's advocacy of the use of reproduction cost considerations 
in pricing decisions was not as successful as his attack on original 
cost usage. He was, however, able to raise significant economic ques­
tions in this area and emphasize the relevancy of current and future 
costs for long run pricing policies. In the difficult search for 
"general principles" to guide efficient regulatory practice, his was 
a positive contribution. This view of Brown's contributions is sup­
ported in the comments made in 1961 by James C. Bonbright. 
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Thirty years or more ago, the case for the replacement-
cost principle . . . was developed with great skill, and 
with particular reference to railroad rates, by Professor 
Harry Gunnison Brown of the University of Missouri. Simi­
lar views have been expressed by later writers, but they 
have lacked both the incisiveness and the firmness of 
conviction that make Brown's earlier analysis a classic in 
the history of rate regulation.64 
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CHAPTER EIGHT. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 
In the area of international trade and finance. Brown published 
articles and texts early in his career. Two of the influences on his 
thinking with regard to the theory of international trade were William 
Graham Sumner and, to a lesser extent, Henry George. Although Sumner 
and George were decided opponents on the issue of the single tax, they 
were uncompromising advocates of free trade in the classical tradition 
of Smith, Ricardo, Mill et al. Whether Brown actually studied with 
Sumner at Yale is uncertain, as he never recorded that he had done so 
although E. W. Kemmerer, in a review of one of Brown's texts, mentioned 
that Brown had been Sumner's pupil.^ Brown at least shared Sumner's 
fondness for Thomas Buckley's The History of Civilization in England and 
2 quoted from it on occasion. He recommended George's Protection and 
3 Free Trade as a "very readable" exposition. In the area of foreign 
exchange, he drew heavily from the works of Franklin Escher^ and from 
5 Goschen. 
Brown's International Trade and Exchange was published first in 
1914 and subsequently republished in two volumes in 1920 and 1921 as 
Foreign Exchange and International Trade, respectively.^ In 1916, he 
had combined condensed version of these books with a section on 
transportation costs which made up his Principles of Commerce.^ 
Besides Kemmerer, Frank Taussig and Sumner Slichter reviewed his books. 
Brown introduced his discussion in Foreign Exchange with chapters 
on the laws of money and the nature of bank credit along the lines of 
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Fisher's interpretation of the quantity theory. Taussig objected that 
O 
such an introduction was not necessary. In his analysis of foreign 
exchange, exchange rate determination and specie flows, the reviewers 
found him to be fundamentally sound but presenting no original contri­
butions other than an emphasis on the possibilities resultant of trad­
ing countries having different standards of value. 
For his International Trade, Brown was credited by Taussig for 
having presented the orthodox or "British School" view of trade theory 
with consistency and precision. Taussig himself was considered heir 
to this line of thought, but he found fault with Brown's methodology 
wherein he assumed that specie flow would take place quickly and have 
a rapid effect on prices. He did not doubt the conclusions of the 
orthodox theory but felt it was poorly adapted to the problems of real, 
day-to-day trading situations. Taussig also mentioned that he did not 
agree with the contemporary criticisms of German economists of the com­
parative advantage approach. A few years later Frank Graham attacked 
g 
the comparative advantage rationale for free trade. He specifically 
mentioned Brown's assertion (deduced from Mill's treatment) that the 
greater the variety of goods a country can offer for export, the better 
was its position in trade.Graham argued that this was untrue and 
that the greater variety was more likely to result in less favorable 
terms of trade unless totally new goods accounted for the variety. 
Brown, however, had argued that the statement was true only in general 
terms and that the greater variety of goods and services would simply 
imply a greater volume of trade, with all its attendant benefits. 
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Brown dedicated much of the text to the question of free trade, 
which he advocated withlittle or no concession to protectionists' 
arguments. As mentioned by Kemmerer and Taussig, this view was the 
traditional one but had been challenged by economists both here and 
abroad for several years. For example, in 1890 Simon Patten had 
based a case for protection on dynamic considerations not treated in 
the classical approach. Taussig commented that: 
. . . there is more to be said on the workings of pro­
tective duties in detail, and on the conceivable advan­
tages to be secured by them, than Professor Brown is ready 
to grant. The controversy between "Agarstaat" and "Indus-
triestaat" is not to be dismissed so lightly as is done by 
Professor Brown; and the possible advantages from protec­
tion to young industries is underrated by him.H 
Brown found the effect of a protective tariff on national wealth 
to be negative. He argued that in the long run, the export trade would 
be restricted by the tariff barrier to importation. A misai location of 
resources was another consequence. He maintained that the gain to the 
protected industries would be more than balanced by the loss to others 
in the country. He found improbable but conceivable that a tariff would 
allow an industry to attain economies of scale so as to allow it to 
compete internationally. He recognized (following Mill and others) 
a possible indirect gain from improved terms of trade but concluded that 
this would likely be only temporary, as normally alternative outlets 
for the exports of the trading partners would be found. Citing the 
example of Great Britain, he showed that countries with low tariff 
barriers could compete successfully with countries with high tariffs 
and not be forced to raise their own rates. 
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Brown went on to discuss the distributional consequences of pro­
tective tariffs. Taussig complained in his review that too much 
emphasis was given to the effects on the distribution of wealth and 
12 
especially on the development of economic rent. Brown argued that 
the general result of a tariff would be to indirectly cause In terest  
rates to rise as the degree of specialization in production would fall 
and for wages to fall as well. He differentiated cases where protected 
and unprotected goods were produced under various cost conditions. 
Where both types of goods were produced under conditions of sub­
stantially constant costs, the rise in the price of the protected goods 
would exceed the proportionate increase in money wages and prices, thus 
resulting in a lower real wage rate. Where the protected goods were 
produced under increasing cost conditions while the unprotected goods 
were produced under constant cost conditions, the effect would be a 
gain for landholders smaller than the loss to wage earners. Brown 
found conceivable a case where wage earners gained at expense of land­
holders. This was where the protected goods' cost of production was 
constant and those of unprotected goods was increasing, and wage owners 
as consumers were chiefly buyers of unprotected goods. Here, once 
again, the losses to the landholders would exceed the gains to wage 
earners. He also argued that protection could benefit one area of the 
country at the expense of another and may also be conducive to the 
development of monopolies. 
Brown next turned to the special arguments for protection. He dis­
missed many arguments as fallacious or in need of exceptional 
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circumstances to have any measure of validity. He felt that the cur-
13 
rent argument—then associated with Adolph Wagner —for the protection 
of agriculture in "older," crowded European countries, relied on the 
assumption that great restrictions would be placed upon trade in the 
future. Should trade prove to be no more restricted or more free,, the 
country employing this policy would be greatly damaged as they would 
have failed to take advantage of their comparative advantage in manu­
facturing products. His objections to the infant-industry argument 
were primarily practical. He doubted especially that the political 
process could be relied upon to obtain the possible benefits of the 
strategy. He also argued that the benefits must somehow be compared 
to the losses to other less-favored industries before the strategy be 
adopted. He found the military or self-sufficiency arguments for pro­
tection to deserving of consideration, but subject to reasonable ob­
jections as well. 
In a 1919 note to the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Brown criti­
cized an argument made for protection by Thomas Nixon Carver in his 
Principles of Political Economy.The note was titled somewhat caus­
tically, "An Eminent Economist Confused.Brown had earlier noted in 
his Principles of Commerce that Sidgwick, Edgeworth and Carver held the 
opinion that protection could, in certain circumstances, increase wages 
and increase national wealth by "drawing labor out of lines of increas­
ing cost.Brown objected to the argument first made by Carver in 
1902^^ that a move to freer trade could reduce national wealth. Carver 
had depicted a case where the removal of tariff barriers resulted in a 
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switch from more to less labor intensive cultivation. The displaced 
workers would find employment at lower wages and the total product 
would by assumption be lower with landowners enjoying higher rents. 
Brown maintained that in this case there were two possibilities for 
the displaced workers. If they had no preferable alternative to their 
line of work, they would be forced to accept wages low enough for the 
landlords to realize the same gain as would be forthcoming from the 
less labor intensive production. Assuming their productivity was un­
impaired, the fall in wages would equal the rise in rent with no change 
in national wealth. If a preferable alternative was found by the 
workers, the landlord's rent would rise by more than the workers' 
wages fell. However, he conceded it possible that although the "values" 
generated in production would not fall, the "utilities" generated by it 
may. He hypothesized a case wherein the demand for a new product was 
largely by the wealthier classes as opposed to that of the old product. 
Brown's point here, and the key point of his article, was that pro­
tection in this hypothetical case was an inefficient means of obtain­
ing the desired results and that taxation of large incomes—in particu­
lar land income--was the preferable solution. Carver's rejoinder 
emphasized the different perspectives with regard to the question, 
18 international versus national. He pointed out that the search for 
a preferred alternative may result in migration, and from the national 
standpoint a reduction in the national product. Brown's re-rejoinder 
pointed out that freer trade would increase per capita wealth of the 
hypothetical country except under highly unusual circumstances. 
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In the 1920s, Brown continued his interest in the international 
aspects of economics by reviewing books on the subject for the American 
Economic Review. He criticized John Henry William's explanation in 
hi s Argentine International Trade Under Inconvertible Paper Money for 
19 the rise in the gold premium. He felt that William's treatment 
tended to underestimate the effect of an over-issue of paper money. 
Williams had found instances in which increases in the gold premium 
took place concurrently with decreases in the volume of paper money. 
Brown noted that lagged effects may have been at work and that other 
temporary considerations such as credit curtailment, business depres­
sion and falling prices in the rest of the world may have contributed 
to the rise in the premium. Still, the principal cause may well have 
been previous over-issues of paper money. He objected to the author's 
"inductive verification" that there was a strong correlation between a 
20 high premium on gold with increased exports and diminished imports. 
Brown maintained that the rise of the premium on gold relative to 
domestic prices of exported goods was the key factor and not the rise 
in the premium as such. 
In his The Principles of International Trade, Huntley M. Sinclair 
challenged the orthodox view which, under the gold standard, relied 
upon gold flows to bring about adjustments for trade imbalances. 
Sinclair maintained that "the adjustment would come in wages rather 
21 than through the influence of gold on prices." Brown's reply, in his 
review, was that this was too extreme a position, as would be also to 
assume that adjustment could only take place until the gold flow had 
186 
been completed. He argued it was not the gold flow per se but the 
decrease in the demand for domestic goods or the increase in the de­
mand for foreign goods which would lower domestic prices. He main-
22 tained that the question was essentially a monetary one. While 
Sinclair had found the quantity theory to be too simple a device in 
international finance. Brown defended its usefulness. He recognized 
the post-war changes in international finance, such as the steriliza­
tion of gold by some countries, but he felt that the theory needed 
only to be further elaborated to account for these complications. 
Finally, Brown reviewed Frank Taussig's International Trade in 
23 1928. Taussig's treatment, as Brown noted, conformed to the classi­
cal or orthodox approach. Taussig, a recognized authority in the 
field, extrapolated on the theory into new areas. Although Brown con­
cluded with a whole-hearted recommendation of the work, he found ob­
jectionable Taussig's treatment of rent as a cost of production. He 
thought that Taussig's presentation slighted the importance of land as 
price-determining factor and argued that rent was of equal importance 
in price determination. He cited the works of Jevons and Davenport 
in support of his view that the economic loss from the imposition of 
a tariff was the same whether labor, capital or land was diverted from 
its most effective use. 
After 1930, Brown published sparsely in the field of international 
trade and finance. What little he did publish was primarily on inter-
24 
national monetary policy. Likewise, in his correspondence with 
Irving Fisher and James Harvey Rogers he was concerned with price 
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stability, recovery from the depression and the monetary standard. 
His views in these areas were presented in Chapter Four. 
In summary, Brown demonstrated, as Taussig noted, a mastery of 
orthodox trade theory, but he did not make original contributions to 
the theory. He was an unyielding advocate and defender of free 
trade. Arguments made against free trade in Brown's early career would 
act as a catalyst for advances made in trade theory, both strengthening 
and weakening the case for free trade. He defended the importance of 
the quantity theory of money as a key to the development of a more 
incisive view of international monetary relations. Without doubt, he 
would have supported the renaissance of the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments and exchange rates. He showed awareness that the 
theories of trade and finance had not reached their "final approximiza-
tion" but felt that they stood "as a constant reproach to those who, 
through uneconomic interference with international trade, would line 
25 their pockets at the common expense." 
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CHAPTER NINE. CONTRIBUTIONS AS AN EDUCATOR 
Harry Gunnison Brown's contributions as an educator are worthy of 
separate consideration. Beginning with an instructorship at Yale in 
1909, he taught on a full-time basis for fifty-one years until retiring 
in 1960 at the age of eighty. Even in retirement he gave guest lectures 
at the University of Missouri and elsewhere. While at Missouri, he 
carried a full load of classes while serving as departmental head for 
twenty-one years and as acting dean of the School of Business and Pub­
lic Administration for six years. He evidently preferred to not take 
leaves; he kept his summers free for writing and relaxation. All 
this points to an exceptional dedication to the first requirement 
of his profession. Further evidence of his dedication and achieve­
ments in education may be found in the comments of his former students 
and colleagues. Also, in addition to his textbooks, Brown wrote 
several articles on teaching which reveal his approach to the instruc­
tion of economics. 
Pinkney Walker, an ex-colleague of Brown's at Missouri, stated 
that "Dr. Brown was first and foremost a teacher,"^ Walker went on to 
expound on the qualities that made him an extraordinary lecturer. He 
reported that Brown was an "excellent speaker," "a masterful logician" 
and "a most effective and skillful debator." To these qualities Walker 
added that Brown exhibited "an unbounded enthusiasm and a deep concern 
2 for and dedication to improve 'the common welfare'." 
Walker's views find support in statements made by Brown's former 
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3 
students. Alfred Kahn referred to Brown as a superb lecturer. Lester 
Chandler, who studied and worked with Brown for four years, declared 
him to be a superb logician.^ Joel Dirlam commented that he was an 
5 
excellent debater "who welcomed challenge to his position." Paul 
Junk referred to him as a master of the Socratic method in the class­
room. Junk also noted that Brown would make use of parables, real 
world examples and rhetorical questions to make his points clearer.^ 
Walker and others attest that he was not content that students acquire 
technical competence alone in economic analysis, but that they develop 
as well a philosophical framework in which economic thought is inte­
grated into broader systems of thought. Walker and Chandler both 
noted that he believed that a more widespread understanding of economic 
principles could contribute to the advance of society and that he 
attempted to inculcate this spirit in his students from the intro­
ductory to the graduate levels of study. That Brown sought to give to 
students a basis on which to appraise economic institutions and pro­
posals for economic reform is similarly attested to. Finally, Walker 
declared Brown to be "far and away the best teacher I have ever known," 
and it is reported that this sentiment had been expressed by many 
7 
others. 
Brown wrote a series of articles on the teaching of economics in 
O 
the late forties. One was titled "Objectives and Methods in Teaching 
the 'Principles' of Economics." In it, he listed economic fallacies 
to which students were likely to have been exposed. He recommended 
that special attention be given to their refutation. He saw the study 
192 
of economics as, in part, training in applied logic. He felt that 
students should be shown "the usefulness of deductive reasoning from 
g 
broad generalizations." However, he did favor inductive verification 
of theories where possible. Quantitative expression of relationships, 
he maintained, would strengthen students' understanding and retention 
of concepts. Yet, he found unfair and unnecessary the use of calculus 
or complicated algebraic expressions or complicated graphs. For be­
ginning students in most areas, he deemed arithmetic and simple algebra 
to be sufficient. Brown defended economic theory against the charge 
of inexactness by comparing the "given conditions" of the physicist to 
that of the economist, arguing that the methods of each were equally 
useful. He recommended that considerable class time be used for the 
examination of carefully chosen, illustrative examples following a 
discussion of the theoretical concepts involved. He further suggested 
that one to two class periods be given over to the answering of questions 
and the altering of the example to bring out its further ramifications 
until most, if not all, of the students demonstrate an understanding of 
the concepts. In this process, he suggested that hints be given to 
the class that the example might prove to be examination material. 
Brown opposed the trend toward chiefly descriptive introductory 
courses which were burdened with definitions. He had found that the 
"facts" and definitions were soon likely to be forgotten and emphasis 
on them would divert a student from gaining a basic understanding of 
the cause and effect relationships in economics. However, social and 
political elements, where relevant, should be pointed out. 
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Brown encouraged student-teacher dialogue in the Socratic tradi­
tion. He maintained as a principle that no instructor should claim 
by his or any other authority the right to judge wrong any student's 
(well-intentioned) objections. If in dialogue the student's question 
could not be satisfied, then it is the instructor's duty to either 
recognize his own error or his deficiency in presentation. 
As noted previously, Brown thought that courses in economics 
should not stop with the mastery of economic principles but should 
extend to the relationship of these principles to the welfare of 
society. He was aware that such an attempt could introduce subjective 
analysis which in turn could easily become warped or biased. He warned : 
Nor is there any intention to suggest that the teacher 
should become a preacher or exhorter, even for so good an 
end as the general welfare. If the house, the playground, 
the school, the church, etc., have not given to the student 
any spark of altruism or any spirit of idealism, it is not 
likely that a college course in economics will do so."10 
However, he felt that without exhortation the teacher could introduce 
such topics as exploitation or parasitism in our system. Brown used 
such discussions to introduce his advocacy of land value taxation, free 
trade and regulation or the elimination of monopolies. He was able to 
do this in an even-handed manner by welcoming objections to his views 
or, if necessary, he introduced such objections himself. This may be 
seen in the reactions of his students. Their comments on Brown indi­
cate that they were not always completely swayed by his arguments. 
Even his son, Phillips, wrote that he was not convinced in the case of 
land value taxation that a separate assessment of land and improvements 
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could be accomplished without great difficulty.However, these same 
comments indicate that Brown was successful in eliciting a sympathetic 
understanding from his students of the principles of land value taxa­
tion, e.g., Brown ended this article on teaching in an optimistic 
fashion. 
The idealistic economist . . . must believe that his 
science contains the words--at any rate some of the essen­
tial words—of social salvation. Only so can his work 
continue to be inspired by the zest of anticipated use­
fulness.12 
An early publication. The Principles of Commerce (1916), was the 
nucleus of Brown's general textbook, Economic Science and the Common 
Welfare, which was first published in 1923. This text was revised 
five times and superceded in 1942 by The Basic Principles of Economics 
which went through three editions. The 1946 edition was supplemented 
with a companion volume, A Postscript and Questions. The number of 
revisions and editions would indicate that sales were at least ade­
quate. Reviews of the text over the years found it, with few excep-
13 tions, to be praiseworthy. 
As with his other writing, reviewers were impressed with Brown's 
lucid style and his conciseness. The Basic Principles of Economics 
grew to over five hundred pages in length, but, as one reviewer pointed 
out, competing texts of similar coverage frequently contained in ex­
cess of eight hundred pages.His text made very little use of 
graphs, charts or diagrams; thus his writing style carried the burden 
of a clear exposition of relationships. The organization of the text 
would not be familiar to most readers of contemporary texts in economics. 
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In two parts, the text dealt first with price determination, the price 
level and trade, and second with the distribution of the product. In 
this second part, chapters on the determination of utility, cost and 
value were indicative of Brown's early neoclassical approach. His 
organization was not drawn directly from that of other writers, 
although some influence of Fisher's Elementary Principles of Economics 
(1911), Taussig's Principles of Economics (1911) and Davenport's 
Economics of Enterprise (1913) may be discerned. As noted in Chapter 
Four, Brown did not accept Keynesian analysis and the later editions 
of his text did not directly mention this development. He dedicated 
a substantial portion of the text to questions of land value taxation; 
some reviewers found this to be excessive while others found that it 
added interest to the reading. Also, controversial in his text was his 
implicit support for birth control. Later, reviewers tended to find 
the text somewhat outdated, especially in that it was not as encyclo­
pedic as the post-war textbooks. 
Brown's political philosophy permeated the text. He lost no 
opportunity to make application of economic analysis to questions of 
public policy. In his preface he stated: 
I have attempted here to present a sort of philosophy 
or defense of the price system ("capitalism"),—not a de­
fense of it as it is but an explanation of and defense of 
it as it might be.15 
In a preliminary essay titled "Prejudice Versus Science," he 
addressed the problem of bias in economic thinking from special or 
class interests or political affiliation.^^ He felt that these 
196 
prejudices, in addition to ignorance and special bargaining, could 
lead a democracy to policies which were unwise with regard to the 
general economic welfare. Although he found democracy deficient as a 
system in which to make economic decisions on the public level, he 
noted that the safeguards embodied in it made it superior to alterna­
tive systems. He found the growing influence of trained citizens to 
be a positive trend if their training emphasized what he called "dis­
interested inquiry." He asked rhetorically: 
Why should we be so tremendously ashamed of an unimportant 
break in etiquette such as carrying to the mouth with a fork 
food supposed to be carried by the hand, or appearance at a 
formal social function without the prescribed formal clothing, 
and be so little ashamed of a prejudice which controls our 
thinking? How is it that we look askance at the person whose 
pronunciation is provincial or whose sentences are ungrammati-
cal yet fail to visit with disapproval the person whose emo­
tions or class affiliations twist his reasoning processes out 
of all semblance of logical t h i nk i ng?^?  
Brown counselled disinterested inquiry or a rigorous application of the 
scientific method coupled with concern for the common welfare for his 
students and readers. 
Many of Brown's students achieved prominence in the field of 
economics or in related areas. Other than those already mentioned 
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above, Karl Bopp, August Maffry, Carl McGuire, L. Pao Cheng 
22 
and Beryl Sprinkel were at one time his students. Both of Brown's 
sons, Richmond and Phillips, studied economics under him at Missouri 
and Phillips teaches economics at Southeastern Missouri State. Brown's 
nephew, Milton Peers Brown, is a member of the faculty of the Harvard 
Business School. Bopp commented in an essay written in honor of Elmer 
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Wood, a long-time colleague and friend of Brown, on the environment 
he found at Missouri which was one of intellectual ferment stimu-
23 lated by D. R. Scott, Brown, J. H. Rogers and Myron Watkins. At 
the University of Missouri, an annual memorial lecture is given in 
Brown's honor by Professor Walter L. Johnson in the Econ 51 class 
Brown taught for so many years. 
The true extent of Brown's legacy as an educator is, of course, 
impossible to measure. Beyond the thousands who heard him in class­
rooms and read his texts, several thousand more heard him speak (gratis) 
to commercial, social and academic groups. Brown amply demonstrated 
the enthusiasm for economic education and reform which he wished to 
instill in his readers and listeners. 
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CHAPTER TEN. CONCLUSION 
A broader view of Harry Gunnison Brown's thought on political 
economy must include a consideration of his general philosophical and 
political views. In addition, his position with respect to Marxist, 
Institutionalist and Georgist thought are of interest. The effect of 
Brown's near heretical views regarding land taxation on his profession­
al reputation will be examined as well and a summary reconsideration 
of his work and place in economic thought will be presented. 
As Lester Chandler has noted. Brown would be considered today a 
"conservative," yet he was very much a "liberal" in the nineteenth-
century sense of the term.^ Like many economists of the early twenti­
eth century. Brown championed causes for economic and social reform. 
Land value taxation, which became his primary interest, is not easily 
classified as either liberal or conservative. He saw the political 
and economic system as flawed, but amenable to improvement. He used 
the term "economic democracy" in his early writing to denote the goal 
which should be sought. He ascribed to a "limited" faith ,n democracy 
2 to attain an "economic system fundamentally expedient and just." 
Brown had trust in the functioning of competitive markets in which 
proper regulation of natural monopolies and elimination of other 
monopolies were carried out. Yet, he found the resulting distribution 
of income unjust due to the allowance of a return to the site value of 
land. 
Brown was not specific on the philosophical origins of his views. 
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He once stated that "more or less utilitarian grounds" were the basis 
of his belief that income should be classified as earned and unearned. 
He quoted Herbert Spencer: 
Briefly, then, the universal basis of cooperation is 
the proportioning of benefits received to services 
rendered.^ 
Brown rejected the Marxian claim that interest was unearned or a 
surplus. He straightforwardly argued that capital's existence was due 
to abstinence or savings and that therefore the interest return was 
earned just as was the return to labor. Thus, for Brown the act of 
saving was potentially a service deserving of a fair return. He 
furthermore based his rejection of socialism on what he saw to be a 
necessarily coercive allocation of work or vocation. 
Brown was familiar with economists whose thought was later to be 
labeled "institutionalist." He was a colleague of Thorstein Veblen 
for a year, yet he made only scattered references to him and later was 
4 
said to respond to questions about Veblen with a wry smile. In one 
letter he recommended Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class to an in-
5 quiring student as his best work. John Commons once wrote Brown ask­
ing assistance for his presentation of arguments for a progressive 
land tax in the state of Wisconsin.^ Horace M. Gray of the University 
of Illinois linked Brown to economists like Commons "who kept alive 
the spirit of democratic liberalism against the advancing tide of 
privileged, subsidized, monopoly capitalism.However, when insti­
tutionalist economists tended to dismiss formal economic theory as a 
key guide to the understanding of an economy, Brown was sharply 
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critical. 
Although Brown came to be Henry George's most prominent academic 
proponent, he was also a critic of George. He clearly rejected 
George's "all-devouring rent thesis" and was critical of his interest 
and population theories. He found in George's interest theory an 
invalid distinction between "mechanical" versus "biological" capital 
which led George to an erroneous, productivity-of-nature explanation 
for interest. Brown found George's refutation of Malthusianism to 
be unconvincing and was himself an advocate of birth control. Also, 
he felt that George's theory of business depressions was "hopelessly 
O 
on the wrong track." Despite these substantive differences with George 
on economic theory, Brown gave almost complete support to George's 
general proposal for tax reform and its ethical underpinning. Brown, 
of course, did not attempt to emphasize the "singleness" of the tax 
nor did he form his ethical arguments in natural rights terms as did 
George. Yet, he considered George's errors to be dwarfed by his con­
tributions to political and economic thought. He mentioned not only 
George's single tax proposal but also his contributions to the theory 
of marginal productivity and his defense of free trade principles. He 
presented his criticisms of George only when he felt that his "errors" 
distracted from the fundamental message. Accordingly, these criticisms 
were presented only in Georgist publications. Brown found no incon­
sistency in transplanting the single tax idea into neoclassical theory 
as he interpreted it. 
Brown's open advocacy of land value taxation did not make him a 
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pariah in the profession. He quickly attained his full professorship 
at Missouri and expressed in a letter his satisfaction with his posi-
g 
tion. He never reported any infringement of his right to express his 
opinions. He did, however, state in several articles (without mention­
ing names or institutions) that he had heard of cases where professors 
or graduate students were "razzed" for expressing an interest in land 
value taxation or advised—for their own good--not to pursue such an 
interest.Paul Douglas, noted by Brown to favor land value taxation, 
never emphasized his position in professional journals.In another 
instance, Russel Bauder, a former student of Brown's and a graduate of 
the University of Wisconsin, wrote of his apprehensions about his appli­
cation to teach at another university due to hfs past association with 
12 Brown. He reported that he had been advised by John Commons, who 
expressed his high regard for Brown, to defend the professor should 
his interviewers raise the subject. When Bauder did so, he felt that 
he was not well-received and was not offered the position he sought. 
Although Brown received several honors in his career, he was never 
nominated for the presidency of the American Economics Association. 
Given the extensive nature of his contributions by the late thirties, 
it is a question of some interest that he was not considered for this 
honor. An exchange of letters with Frank Knight in 1939 provides some 
insight into this matter. Brown wrote Knight on departmental matters 
but enclosed a copy of a letter he had sent to the members of the 
nominating committee of the association. In it he had proposed the 
candidacy of John Ise of the University of Kansas. In Knight's reply 
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he said: 
The first thought that comes to mind is the name of an­
other man who ought to be recognized in this connection, 
before too long, a man whom I have felt for years did not 
seem to get recognition in accord with his merits by the 
profession generally, and that is the man to whom this let­
ter is addressed.13 
Knight further stated that he would mention Brown as a possible candi­
date in his letter of support for Ise. Brown replied that he did not 
wish to be so mentioned for three reasons. First, he did not want his 
candidacy to rival that of Ise's, and second, he did not wish to be 
burdened with the responsibilities of the office, given his priorities. 
Thirdly, he related that he had recently failed to be elected to one 
of the two vice-president posts of the Association and was asked to 
fill a temporary position on the executive committee, normally an 
elective position. He stated: 
It seems unlikely that I could be elected to any posi­
tion in the Association despite the support of good friends 
like yourself. I am not unhappy about this, whatever may 
be the honor and distinction involved, because I am really 
more interested in persuading others of the logical justifi­
cation for views I hold, than I am in filling any office and 
the more so if the filling of an office would interfere in 
any way with my other purposes.14 
Despite Brown's well-intentioned reservations, he would have ac­
cepted the presidency of the Association for the particular reason that 
he was most likely to have been denied it. The tradition of the presi­
dential address presented those chosen with a unique opportunity to 
express their views. Brown would have utilized no small part of the 
address to state the case for land value taxation, and the nominating 
committee was likely to have made this a consideration of importance. 
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Brown's credentials, however evaluated, were comparable to those 
of many who served as president. Eccentricity as a criterion for deny­
ing the office to someone had not prevented the nomination of such 
economists as Irving Fisher (1918), Thorstein Veblen (declined), H. J. 
Davenport (1920) and the later presidency of Frank Knight (1950). 
Brown's occasionally caustic criticisms of other economists may have 
prompted disfavor, yet in 1939 Jacob Viner, a harsh critic, was selected. 
The denial of this honor was also not likely to be attributed to his 
personality; he is reported to have been out-going, courteous and 
friendly as evinced in one case in his friendship with Knight (an 
adamant opponent of land value taxation) as well as with many other 
colleagues. Although several scholars of distinction were never chosen 
to be president of the Association, one may reasonably entertain the 
suspicion that Brown's views prevented him from attaining this esteemed 
position. 
On Brown's economic thought, Alfred Kahn wrote: 
. . . what impressed me more about his economic thinking 
was its coherence, its thorough internal consistency and 
its apparent sufficiency. . . .15 
He added: 
. . . it is an admirable system of economic thinking and 
Brown expounded it with grace, intellectual incisiveness 
and persistence.!" 
Although Dr. Kahn served only one year with Brown as a teaching 
assistant, his comments on Brown are particularly insightful. 
The neoclassical approach which Brown adopted was not a precisely 
delimited model. He disliked the term neoclassical as he felt it 
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signified too great a departure from classical thinking. Although he 
made no signal, original contribution to the theory, his skill in its 
application allowed him to make many important contributions in several 
areas of thought. The consistent purpose in his writing was to make 
economic theory applicable to the perennial problems of a capitalistic 
economy. His studies of tax incidence are only one example of his 
efforts. In them, he strove to refine existing theory to form a sounder 
basis for tax policy decisions. Likewise directed was his careful and 
detailed work on finding principles for efficient regulatory practices. 
As a monetarist, he demonstrated flexibility and imagination quite 
outside the usual caricature of pre-Keynesian monetary thought. His 
free trade advocacy was rooted in a concern for economic efficiency 
and growth. 
Brown's espousal of land value taxation was consistent with his 
theoretical position in economics. As more economists tended to merge 
land and capital and make more difficult his advocacy, he moved to 
justify the separation of land and capital on theoretical grounds. He 
saw economic rent as the marginal product of land in the neoclassical 
manner, yet also as a surplus over interest and wages in the classical 
fashion. The return to land was an absolute amount "measured and 
determined by the surplus over production on the extensive margin. 
Brown differed with Fisher's views on capital and interest, arguing 
that the value of capital was in large part determined by its cost of 
production or reproduction. Thus, the situation value of land having 
no cost of production was determined through the capitalization of 
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expected future rent at some previously determined rate of interest. 
He supported land value taxation as a tax which would not result in the 
distortion of market prices and was in accord with distributive justice. 
Also, greater taxation of land values should reduce the taxation of 
labor effort and investment, and thus further economic efficiency and 
growth. 
One may question the sufficiency and lack of specificity of the 
form of the neoclassical approach which Brown employed. However, he 
often pointed to the need for further elaboration and refinement of 
the theory and consistently worked to this end himself. 
Statements by M. Slade Kendrick in his Public Finance demonstrate 
an open-mindedness which Brown felt was all too lacking in the profes­
sion. Kendrick commented; 
From Henry George in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, to Professor H. G. Brown, brilliant economic theorist 
of our day, the single tax has not lacked advocates whose 
views command respect. The clear logic with which the case 
for the single tax is presented, warmed by the fires of con­
viction, is ample reason for an examination of the issues.18 
Despite the personal compliment. Brown would not have been pleased with 
Kendrick's subsequent rejection of the single tax. Kendrick's con­
sideration of the "single tax" as opposed to the more general arguments 
for "land value taxation" tended to bias somewhat his examination. 
However, his fair and objective presentation of the arguments is due 
in large part to Brown's influence. 
Robert Heilbroner commented that upon Henry George's death his 
reputation "went straight into the underworld of economics. 
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Whether Heilbroner's assessment of the place of George's thought is 
correct or not, the reputation of Harry Gunnison Brown appears to have 
suffered as a result of his persistent espousal of George's cause. 
This in addition to his monetarist views may explain the present-day 
neglect of his contributions as an economist. Such reasons should 
not, however, justify a continued neglect of so prominent a figure in 
the development of economic thought in the first half of this century. 
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